February 17

Quarterly report on household debt and credit. FRBNY.
this data is a little dated, as more recent data has shown a touch of releveraging, but on a long-term trend basis:

Aggregate consumer debt continued to decline in the fourth quarter, continuing its trend of the previous two years. As of December 31, 2010, total consumer indebtedness was $11.4 trillion, a reduction of $1.08 trillion  (8.6%) from its peak level at the close of 2008Q3, and $155 billion (1.3%) below its September 30, 2010 level. Household mortgage indebtedness has declined 9.1%, and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) have fallen 6.5% since their respective peaks in 2008Q3 and 2009Q1. For the first time since 2008Q4, consumer indebtedness excluding mortgage and HELOC balances did not fall, but rose slightly ($7.3 billion or 0.3%) in the quarter.  Consumers’ non-real estate indebtedness now stands at $2.31 trillion, the same level as in2010Q2, 8.4% below its 2008Q4 peak.

But if we get some further payroll growth, we should see more credit growth:

Intermezzo: the fight against credit contraction. macrofugue.

Rich valuations and poor market returns. John Hussman.

Last week, the S&P 500 Index ascended to a Shiller P/E in excess of 24 (this “cyclically-adjusted P/E” or CAPE represents the ratio of the S&P 500 to 10-year average earnings, adjusted for inflation). Prior to the mid-1990′s market bubble, a multiple in excess of 24 for the CAPE was briefly seen only once, between August and early-October 1929. Of course, we observe richer multiples at the heights of the late-1990′s bubble, when investors got ahead of themselves in response to the introduction of transformative technologies such as the internet. After a market slide of more than 50%, investors again pushed the Shiller multiple beyond 24 during the housing bubble and cash-out financing free-for-all that ended in the recent mortgage collapse.

And here we are again. This is not to say that we can rule out yet higher valuations, but with no transformative technologies driving the economy, little expansion in capital investment, and ongoing retrenchment in consumer balance sheets, I can’t help but think that the “virtuous cycle” rhetoric of Ben Bernanke is an awfully thin gruel by comparison. We should not deserve to be called “investors” if we fail to recognize that valuations are richer today than at any point in history, save for the few months before the 1929 crash, and a bubble period that has been rewarded by zero total return for the S&P 500 since 2000. Indeed, the stock market has lagged the return on low-yielding Treasury bills since August 1998. I am not sure that even members of my own profession have learned anything from this....

While we can certainly find analysts who believe stocks are cheap, we can easily test the long-term accuracy of their methods (which often amount to nothing more than applying an arbitrary multiple to forward operating earnings, or dividing the forward earnings yield by the 10-year Treasury yield). Frankly, many of those alternative methods stink. Regardless of whether an analyst claims that stocks are cheap or expensive, they should be expected to provide some sort of evidence that their methods have a strong relationship with subsequent market returns.

The cognitive dissonance of it all. Kyle Bass, Hayman Advisers.

Per Chris Whalen, Wells Fargo's CFO quit due to an internal dispute over financial disclosures. zerohedge.

Victor Shih on the Chinese economy. The Browser. (Five Books)