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Monday, July 27, 2026

2026-07-26

***** denotes well-worth reading in full at source (even if excerpted extensively here)


Economic
Fare:


................. Amrita Sen, founder of Energy Aspects, pointed out that heading into the US-Iran war, the global oil market had around 400 million barrels of excess inventories, not including strategic reserves controlled by governments.

"Now we have close to nothing ... and market complacency around Hormuz flows is being severely tested," Sen warned.










This is not a blanket levy on everything crossing the northern border, and what got left out is as revealing as what got hit. Oil - of which Canada is the largest foreign supplier to American refineries - is exempt. So is potash, the fertilizer input U.S. farmers depend on and cannot readily source elsewhere. Fish and critical minerals are out. So are goods already carrying national-security tariffs, including steel and many auto parts, per the White House fact sheet.

What remains is still enormous. ..........



Market Fare:

A holistic review of the recent changes in the distribution of risk across the financial system and their consequences for market structure in general and Liquidity Dynamics in particular.



The second-quarter earnings season is in full swing. So far, the results are landing in line or better than the upwardly revised Wall Street estimates. That’s the opposite of how this usually works. Analysts normally trim their forecasts as a year wears on. In 2026, they’ve done the opposite. The S&P 500 is on track to grow earnings north of 20% for a second straight quarter. The earnings are real. However, a meaningful slice of them is also an accident of accounting timing. That timing, the AI capex depreciation risk, hasn’t hit the income statement yet. But it is about to turn from a tailwind into a headwind. ...........

Currently, the entire earnings growth story is concentrated in the semiconductor and AI-infrastructure names. The accounting underneath it is where the catch hides. .......... 

Todd Castagno at Morgan Stanley calls this “a golden window where everybody looks good.” He’s right. Revenues and margins look strong among chipmakers and the companies buying the chips at the same time, which is exactly the kind of broad, simultaneous strength that convinces investors a cycle is durable rather than borrowed from the future. Make no mistake, there’s nothing improper here. This is how companies book capital assets. What’s different this cycle is the sheer scale of the spending, and the eventual AI capex depreciation is being overlooked. ........


Big momentum thrust signal across financial sub-industries…

.......... 4. The S&P continues to coil. Our base case remains an eventual break higher. Near term, renewed US–Iran tension and firmer oil argue for some potential downside first.

5. Breadth eased but held .......

6. Internals are deteriorating. The key market internals are moving the wrong way. If the picture doesn’t stabilize soon, our one-to-three-month outlook turns decidedly more cautious.

7. Liquidity keeps grinding lower. Our Liquidity Gauge continues to trend down, which adds weight to the intermediate-to-longer-term caution.

8. Positioning and sentiment are stretched, especially on longer horizons. ...............

12. We still like precious metals, and we think we’re early. For now we’re waiting out the correction, which is a rates story. Until bonds find a durable floor, we stay on the sidelines here.

13. Central banks keep buying gold. The pace is accelerating, which puts a floor under how far the metals can fall.

14. The clearest positive is in the financials. Our new colleague Dean Christians (TPMR) flagged a rare breadth thrust in the sector. This week every financial sub-industry group registered a bullish short-term Dual Trend buy signal, something last seen in 2021.

The base rate is encouraging: when more than 95% of financial sub-industries are on buy signals, the sector has compounded at 19.6% annually, well above its average back to 1959. As Dean put it, “the ongoing rotation out of technology has fueled improving participation across several other sectors, with financials standing out as one of the primary beneficiaries.”



......... Momentum has been the undisputed king for global factor investing in 2026, particularly for Asian markets. Those trades are fracturing, as reversals in South Korea and other tech-heavy sectors set off a deepening rotation in the region. Investors look to be taking some of the hefty profits that remain on the winners from 1H 2026 and pivoting toward other assets. That’s a theme also gaining traction for US chipmakers, with the SOX Index down more than ~18% from the highs of June. ........


Google Tumbles After Boosting 2026 Capex Guidance Again


A new Fed chair, weakest seasonality of the four-year cycle, record IPO supply, and a liquidity cycle that is cresting — all lining up into October. History says that's not the warning. Buy the Dip.

......... Because across nine decades, every new Fed chair has been greeted the same way: with an equity drawdown in his or her first three months in office.

....... Twelve new chairs, twelve drawdowns, an average of roughly −12%. Not one got a free pass.

..................... 2026 is a mid-term year.

And mid-term years have a script so consistent it borders on the mechanical: the market sells off into the weakest stretch of the four-year presidential cycle, bottoms in the back half of the year, and then it runs.

........ Ten mid-term years. Ten meaningful drawdowns. Not one skipped its turn. The mildest was 1994’s −8% — a year the Fed hiked seven times. The average sits around −21%, which is to say: a bear-market-sized scare, arriving on schedule, in the second year of every presidency for half a century, under Republicans and Democrats, in inflations and disinflations, in secular bulls and secular bears alike.

........ We are in July.

The weakest window is directly ahead. Inflation is running above 4% again after the spring oil shock, which means the Fed cannot simply promise rescue. Washington is heading into an election that will decide whether the current administration keeps Congress. And the man whose job it is to steady the ship has been in the role for eight weeks. The script does not need to repeat exactly. It only needs to rhyme — and the stage is set precisely as it was set in 1974, 1982, 1990, 1998, 2010, 2018 and 2022.

.............................. And here is the part that flips the whole thing. Every single one of those ten mid-term drawdowns was a buying opportunity.

Not most of them.

All of them.

..................................... First: hold your quality. The temptation, having read four thousand words about an autumn washout, is to sell everything and wait in cash for the low. Resist it. The pattern is reliable in shape but not in schedule — some mid-term lows came early, some shallow, some in pieces — and selling everything obliges you to make two perfect decisions, the exit and the re-entry, against a market that took out its prior high four times out of five within the following year. Round-tripping great businesses to feel clever in October is how you miss 2027. We are not selling compounders to sidestep a drawdown we cannot time. We would rather be approximately invested than precisely absent.

Second: keep dry powder, and attach a shopping list to it. Dry powder without a list is just anxiety with a cash yield. Decide today — calmly, at a VIX of 18 — which businesses you want to own cheaper and at what prices, so that when the VIX is at 28 and X is wall-to-wall crash memes, you are executing a plan instead of forming one. ....................



Bubble Fare:

Stock markets can be valued, and because they can be valued, the long-term risks involved in holding stocks vary from time to time. When stocks are cheap these risks are small, but when they are expensive the risks become very great indeed. In current conditions, the risks in holding stocks are too great to make them sensible investments. This approach is completely different than claiming that it is possible to know when the stock market has hit a peak or a trough. All that the ability to value stocks provides is the ability to assess when holding them becomes too risky. On every occasion in the past that we can find, when a stock market has become as overvalued as Wall Street was at the end of the twentieth century, the consequences have been extremely bad for the economy as well as for investors.
Andrew Smithers & Steven Wright, Valuing Wall Street, March 2000
The current level of stock market valuations remains – easily – the most speculative extreme in U.S. financial history, beyond both the 1929 and 2000 extremes. Our baseline estimate is that the S&P 500 has a material risk of losing something on the order of 75% over the completion of this cycle, a view that’s shared by GMO’s Jeremy Grantham. We can narrow that baseline estimate to a loss of about 55% if we assume that the robust profit margins of the past decade are permanent. We don’t assume that, but then, we actually don’t need to assume anything at all.

On that point, we remain as emphatic as usual: Nothing in our investment discipline relies on a retreat in valuations toward their historical norms, nor any retreat at all. Indeed, our investment stance has been at least briefly constructive (albeit with a safety net) even in recent weeks. As I wrote in February and May, I expect that to be a regular occurrence going forward, even at present valuations, whether this bubble ultimately collapses or continues higher forever. ........

Our estimate of 55-75% downside risk is just that: a downside risk estimate. What, then, is our forecast? We don’t need one. We can use historically-informed valuation measures and risk estimates without making our investment stance dependent on any of them. Mountain, cliff, or ocean in the distance, we choose our footing for the terrain beneath us. Rather than attaching ourselves to forecasts and views, we’re content to respond with our best mindfulness as the evidence changes.

In the financial markets, as always, we consider the return/risk profile associated with the market conditions we observe, and our actions reflect that ............

Long-term returns are always set by valuation arithmetic – which determines the “slope” between the current price and the very long-term stream of cash flows that will be delivered into the hands of investors far into the future. Yet at any particular moment, the market price will be whatever the collective psychology of investors chooses it to be. Short-term returns are driven by data only to the extent that the data affects what’s in the minds of speculators and investors. That’s why – beyond valuations – our discipline attends to measures like market internals, investor sentiment, credit spreads, implied volatility, commitments of differing sets of futures traders, insider transactions, and other measures that offer a look into the psychology prevailing in the heads of market participants.

When I write about not “discriminating” against the bubble, it doesn’t mean that we don’t have a long-term outlook, or that we’ve suddenly embraced the bubble generally (we haven’t). Non-discrimination doesn’t erase discernment. It frees discernment from coarse, rigid, dualistic concepts that imply coarse, rigid, dualistic responses.  .................



A.I. Fare:








...................... China is going to eat America’s lunch on this. If they ban Chinese AI (harder than it seems, given it’s open source) all that means is writing off the rest of the world. And since American models are handicapped, smaller American companies will be stuck with worse AI.

Since Chinese AI is far cheaper, as well, I’d expect American companies to set up subsidiaries overseas to use it, rather than be stuck with American AI.

The entire situation is a complete clusterfuck. Major companies have taken on serious debt in order to build data centers which have a lifecycle of five to seven years, and often less (since new generations of GPUs are much better.)  But the Chinese product is cheaper, open source, lacks nearly as much sovereign risk and I’ll bet multiple models will soon be about as good as Anthropic and OpenAI’s.

Where’s the business case that spending all these trillions of dollars is going to produce enough revenue from US AI to pay for all of it?

There isn’t one. It doesn’t exist. 

And that means that, at least in America, this is an AI bubble. All bubbles burst and this will not be an exception. If the government bails them out it will be the last major US bailout.

This is also very likely one of the last major tech revolutions which will start in the US (which it did.) Going forward they China will produce the vast majority of them.

This is the endgame. The turning point where China obtains not just the industrial base but the absolutely undisputed tech lead. From now on China will like America in the 1950s — it’s where almost everything new is created, the dynamic center of the world, and soon people will be competing to move there, because everyone knows it is the future.


........... I’ve predicted, for a couple years now, that Chinese AI models will be the main models used in most of the world, including in much of the West, assuming they aren’t banned outright, because they’re open and cheap. Costs of running them are about twenty times lower than the US frontier models made by OpenAI and Anthropic. They’re almost as good, and they aren’t that far behind.

The problem with US models is not just that they’re expensive (though that’s huge, there are tons of reports of AI use being cut back) but that they are CLOSED: meaning you can easily be cut off, or have prices raised, or have the model changed on you with no recourse. Open models you can adapt the model, you can run it on your own servers, or various server companies can, will and do run them for you on their servers which you rent.

It’s clear that Xi gets this, and thus that the CPC understands it as well. Open Source isn’t a liability, there’s a reason why Linux runs most of the world’s servers: closed tech is the liability. Open Source is the advantage. ......................

China just keeps coming across as smarter, more strategic and more human than the West. It’s sad, in a way, but it is what it is.

And I remain convinced that Chinese AI will be the winner over American.


The incident is a first and signals a seismic shift in cybersecurity.


and what we should do about it





........................................... What professionals are most concerned about is not stock prices themselves but the leverage structure underlying them. The current loop runs: AI expectations → semiconductor prices rise → leverage increases → ETF buying → index gains → additional leverage. In this structure, gains accelerate rapidly on the upside. On the downside, a chain reaction can develop: margin call → forced selling → further price decline → additional margin calls. The June 5th episode — a 3x leveraged semiconductor ETF losing 31% in a single session — is not an outlier. It is a preview.

............... A colder and more precise analysis of the current situation is the prerequisite for setting direction. At present, ordinary investors, professional daily traders, and institutional investors alike are riding a roller coaster. The April through June period saw indices and individual names — including AI and semiconductor stocks — move with volatility levels that defied prediction. This cannot be characterized as normal equity market behavior. The presence of overheating driven by credit investment and leverage strategies must be acknowledged .........


A new statement signed by 16 Nobel laureates marks a shift among economists who once greeted such warnings with skepticism



Investing Fare:

Are you still looking for a great summer read for your vacation? The Best Book Ever Written About Emotions, Markets, and Why You Sell at the Bottom

....................................................... The first kind of sitting happens before you own anything.

Livermore spent enormous stretches of his career doing nothing at all. Not analysing, not hedging, not “keeping a toe in” — flat, in cash, waiting for a setup that met his standard. The pivotal point either arrived or it did not. If it did not, he did not trade.

This is far harder than it sounds, .....

Livermore’s counter-position is blunt: not trading is a trade. A flat book is an active expression of the view that nothing on offer is good enough. He put it best in the line that deserves to be as famous as the first:

“There is a time to go long, a time to go short, and a time to go fishing.”



Charts:
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(not just) for the ESG crowd:

Abstract. Emerging climate extremes should draw public attention to human-caused climate change. We expect unusual sea surface temperature (SST) and global warming the rest of this year to make 2026 hotter than 2024, despite 2024 being a peak El Nino year, while 2026 is only the lead-in year of an emerging El Nino. Beware the “surprise” record high being blamed on an extreme El Nino on top of global warming otherwise consistent with IPCC estimates. Instead, record warmth provides additional evidence of high climate sensitivity and increased net climate forcing in the past decade. These two factors are driving an unusual increase in global SSTs with major consequences.

................................................... O.K., so we were grasping for straws. We didn’t really have good news. If we want the accelerated warming to slow down, we must get Earth’s energy imbalance (lower panel of Fig. 6) to decrease. That means the world needs to get serious about reducing the humanmade climate forcing, and the world has not got very serious yet. Sorry, we will keep searching for some good news in our planet’s data.


(How not to deal with Canada's wildfire smoke situation)

............... boreal fires are very different than the kinds of fires in the Western US which can more feasibly be managed with brush clearing in the forest understory: “The Canadian boreal is not the Sierra Nevada. It burns in infrequent, high-intensity, stand-replacing crown fires that kill the whole stand on natural fire cycles measured in many decades to centuries”. In other words, to truly reduce the fire risk in the boreal forest ecologically you need to actually burn the forest, or remove it.

As such, effective forest management to prevent boreal wildfires thus means either a) logging the forest entirely (which takes away the risk on a temporary basis, but could increase fire risk in the long run according to the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society); or b) controlled burns (which, unless timed to occur during periods of north-facing winds, could also cause large amounts of smoke to filter down to the US).

One of the main problems with both of these proposed solutions is scale. It simply isn’t feasible (nor desirable) to log or prescribe burn 1.3 billion acres of boreal forest. It’s simply too large and most of it too remote. ..................




A new study finds that tiny deep-ocean turbulence drives sea level rise, fisheries collapse and carbon absorption within a human lifetime - but current climate models fail to capture its speed or scale.


A hard look at the possible severity of the coming global food crisis and how it demands new approaches to analysis and decisions.

Even though this site, like many many others, warned early on that reduced fertilizer supplies and high energy costs, particularly of diesel, would translate into higher food costs. The added whammy of a super El Nino means even greater harvest shortfalls, bigger price increases for staples, and not just widespread hunger but starvation. Yet like many, we’ve been engaging in a bit of “drunk under the streetlight” behavior. Public officials and following them, the press and pundits, have intently covered war action, political positioning, and the most visible and imminent resource to come in short supply, oil and key distillates like diesel, gas, and jet fuel. Even though baked-in food shortages will produce not just desperation but could kick off social upheaval (recall food riots during the 1997 Asia crisis; Arab Spring was also triggered in large measure by a spike in food costs), they are getting bizarrely little interest now. The implicit attitude seems to be that there is nothing that can be done, so why worry, or worse that poor people, i.e., those who don’t matter much anyhow, will be the ones to suffer, while will merely have to do some belt-tightening.

Ruben lays out the sobering scope of the interconnected shortages and how the lack of data-gathering on farm planting means that officials are flying blind on how large the fall in agricultural output could be. He attributes the bizarre pervasiveness of “business as usual” thinking in the face of a looming disaster as the result of the strong preference for linear, narrow thinkers in most analytical/decision-making positions as opposed to those who take a broader, systems perspective. ..................





Berman: A Climate for Civilization: What Was Special About the Holocene?

I’ve been thinking a lot lately about why climate change is so difficult to discuss calmly.

For some, it is the defining challenge of our time. For others, it is exaggerated or even a hoax. How can intelligent, well-intentioned people look at the same evidence and reach such different conclusions?

For me, the starting point is simple. The Earth is warming, and it’s warming faster than at any time since civilization emerged. It’s as if our civilization has developed a fever.

I’m not a climate scientist by training. I’m an Earth systems scientist. That gives me a somewhat different perspective—not because I know more about climate, but because I’m interested in how complex systems behave and adapt. ..................



U.S. B.S.:


Have you noticed how the liberal establishment hasn’t been nearly as emotional and outraged about Trump’s second term as they were about his first? Now that he’s the president who bombed Iran, the entire western political/media class is cool with him.

The term “Trump Derangement Syndrome” has always been used by the MAGA crowd as a blanket pejorative to protect the president from criticism, but during Trump’s first term it wasn’t entirely unfair. You’d see Democrats shrieking their lungs out over Trump doing things that other US presidents did all the time ..............

We’re not seeing any of that in Trump’s second term. ..........

Which is nuts, because he’s quantifiably far worse this time around. His domestic policies are much more tyrannical. He’s as evil a warmonger as the White House has ever seen. He’s so corrupt that he’s just openly admitting to being bought and owned by Zionist oligarchs while making his family a fortune using the power of his office. .................

................... They view him as one of their own now. When he finally dies, he will be lovingly eulogized by all the same liberal institutions which called him a second Hitler during his first term. He did enough to reassure them that the presidency of the United States had not been accidentally awarded to a decent human being.



.................... One of the dumbest popular narratives you see today is the idea that Zionists persuaded a reluctant Trump to start a war with Iran after he was re-elected, like they were chasing him around going “Would you like to bomb Iran?” like the guy from Green Eggs and Ham while he yelled “Not in a box! Not with a fox!” until he eventually caved in.

It is now abundantly clear that this war was planned a long time ago. ...............



War Fare:

.......................... Anything can happen in war, but I don’t see any way for the US to win this war if Iran stays the course, and we haven’t even included all the shortages coming down the line, especially now Ansar-Allah has closed another strait.

......... If America were even marginally competently run this would be the point where Congress would impeach Trump. He won’t admit defeat and oil stockpiles are running low. He has no viable part to victory, but keeps acting as if he does. He’s turning a military defeat into an economic catastrophe thru his delusional disconnect from reality, or perhaps because he’s being blackmailed. Whatever the reason for his behaviour, he needs to go. (Yes, I’m aware this won’t happen, that’s the point.)

In all my life, and I’m getting old now, I have never seen a stupider war or an American elite more determinedly detached from reality.


Move along

A drone crashed into an oil tanker at Basra on Thursday morning.

No fire. No damage. Or so they said. Nobody got hurt.

And just because nothing happened, Iraq suspended loading at every export terminal it owns.

Until further notice.

The day before, Washington had reimposed its naval blockade of Iran and during seven hours was blasting the same hangars and inflatable launchers they already “love-tapped” thrice before.

West Texas crude closed twenty-six cents higher.

… Just because.

You are excused if you didn’t know that there’s a frickin’ war going on...

NOTHING makes any sense any longer.
The closer you stand to the actual stuff, the less you believe its price.

And because the strait itself is the running headline, let’s start with that:

Iran says Hormuz is closed until further notice.
Central Command says it isn’t.

IT IS - IT ISN’T - IT IS - … playground squabbles on the world stage.

Who knew Idiocracy would arrive this early?

The answer to “Schrödinger’s Strait” is the billion (maybe even trillion) dollar question. It’s only a fifth of the planet’s oil after all... And the whole artifice of abundant money and debt and derivatives is built on… I don’t know… A working economy??? Which without oil is kinda like … not working, you know? .....................



Geopolitical Fare:

More also have confidence in Xi than Trump, according to a survey in three dozen countries



Other Fare:

And no home either, come to that.

....................................................................... Today we have not heroes but victims, and we live in a world of competitive victimhood. This victimhood is a curious phenomenon, inasmuch as it is largely collective and identitarian. You are automatically a victim if you are a member of a “marginalised” or “historically disadvantaged” community, or one which suffers “structural discrimination.” It is rarely, these days at least, a status gained from identifiable personal experience, except of the kind “I was obviously discriminated against because I was …” Of course, the motives behind such assertions are comprehensible and even banal, if we understand that they are essentially entrepreneurial in nature, and amount to moral claims on others for money, power and influence, and special treatment. The problem arises when victimism becomes the default lens through which we view the world, and where people come to see themselves and others not as actual or potential actors, but just as passive victims.

We can see this in the way that coverage of conflicts and emergencies in the world is increasingly fixated on trying to count alleged victims, at the expense of trying to understand the issues. .................

But of course identifying yourself as a victim only makes sense as a strategy if you can thereby persuade or coerce some greater power or authority into helping you, or intervening in your favour. .............

This is why the learned helplessness of victimism is so dangerous at all levels. There have been bad times in history before now—worse, I should say—but there has never been a time I can think of when the necessary mental and moral resources to address and try to overcome challenges have been so lacking. .................



.................. So, basically, there is no psychologists’ consensus on question 1 at all. There is no credible broadly accepted definition of inner speech, or any of the terms used synonymously for it. Some papers argue that most people ‘have’ inner speech. Others, just as long and convoluted and full of (often reciprocal) citations, assert that most people don’t have it.


Living With Unbearable Knowledge in an Era of Polycrisis

................ While it is almost impossible to not know about these threats in the digital age, at least on some elementary level, it may also be unbearable to live with this knowledge, in which case people typically choose to willfully ignore what they cannot tolerate knowing. As Upton Sinclair famously quipped: “it’s difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.”

In his review of Mark Lilla’s book, Ignorance and Bliss: On Not Wanting to Know, Robert Pogue Harrison highlights T.S. Eliot’s observation that “humankind cannot bear very much reality,” nor Harrison adds, “can it bear much truth.” Humans have a remarkable capacity to willfully ignore realities and truths that threaten their identities, core values and beliefs, sense of belonging, and physical and economic security. As Harris explains:

Just as our sensory organs filter out all but a fraction of what surrounds us, our minds deflect from consciousness a great deal of what we can bear only in small measures. Our ability to ignore, repress, and deny is matched only by our ability to believe the unbelievable and to give chimeric notions the power to found religions, nations, and institutions. .................




Monday, July 20, 2026

2026-07-19

 ***** denotes well-worth reading in full at source (even if excerpted extensively here)


Economic
Fare:


If you’ve been following oil prices since the Iran war started you’ve probably been surprised at how low prices have often been. I certainly was, at first.

The issue is fairly simple: most governments are worried about the price of oil, and not the supply of oil. So they’ve taken various measures to keep prices low. Some of those have been manipulative financial and some of them have been massive releases of oil from reserves.
IEA chief Fatih Birol told Bloomberg that a historic 400-million-barrel emergency release, equal to roughly 2.5 million barrels a day, helped push oil prices down by $20.
The price of oil, though, isn’t really the issue. One part of it is refinery capacity. A fair bit went off line in the Middle East, but ironically, even more in Russia. Why is Russia systematically destroying ever gas station in Ukraine? It’s retaliation for constant hits on Russian refineries.
Marathon Petroleum’s own management flagged on the Q1 earnings call that roughly 6 million barrels per day of global refining capacity is offline, about 6% of the world total. Ukraine’s drone campaign against Russian refineries is the largest single piece, but Middle Eastern facilities inside the Persian Gulf export corridor, and Chinese refiners voluntarily throttling to preserve inventory, add to the shortfall.
As a result Russia is no longer exporting diesel. And even though oil prices are low, gasoline prices are not as low as one would expect, because short refinery capacity means this:

Amusingly the Europeans and Americans have been encouraging Ukraine to hit refineries.

Now you may think “but America is an excess oil producer.”

Yeah, but it doesn’t matter. What matters is refineries and the type of crude oil involved. We aren’t just talking about gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and bunker fuel (ships), we’re talking about fertilizers, sulfuric acid (used for amazing amounts of processes) and so on. This cascades out into medicine (your aspirin for example), packaging, semiconductor production (hey, even higher prices) and whatnot.

But with rare exceptions (hello, China, again) most governments have not managed the actual supply situation.

In a rational economy prices and supply of crucial goods would be managed. For example farmers would get fertilizer and diesel at subsidized prices. Truckers shipping important goods would get subsidized diesel. Drug manufacturers would get guarnteed supplies (though not subsidized in most cases, they make tons of profits, just force them not raise prices.)

Rational governments would say “OK, what parts of the economy are actual important (food, medicine, transport)?” and act to protect those parts of the economy, and would ration and subsidize those goods.

Instead our elites manipulate the price numbers and make the actual physical situation worse as they do so, by not allowing high prices to lower use and by not allocating key parts of the economy what they need at reasonable prices. Oh, and by releasing absurd amounts from the reserve to manipulate prices rather than using the reserve for actual necessities. They’re so used to an economy where just manipulating prices seems like all you need to do because there’s a global market with surplus. They don’t know how to handle an economy with actual, genuine shortages.

Anyway, as best I can tell if the Strait stays closed we are now weeks to about two months away from actual physical shortages in the first world. (They’ve already hit in the developing world.)

Then the fall harvest comes in and we get terrible numbers from that, and food prices surge.

This is the stupidest war of my entire lifetime and I’m old enough that this includes Vietnam, which was stupid beyond belief, but not one-tenth as moronic as the Iran war. A war of complete choice which the US has lost, won’t admit it has lost and is in danger of running the world into a decade long depression.

If it stops now or soon, it will suck, but we’ll get thru. But if Trump dismantles Iranian infrastructure like he’s threatened (by no means sure, this is Trump, but also not impossible, this is Trump) the Iranians have said they will respond by dismantling Gulf infrastructure: that means refineries that will take years and years to rebuild. Oil fields. Facilities producing helium. A decade of not enough fertilizer.  .............




The Fed's one rate can fight inflation or protect the AI boom carrying the economy, but not both

Strip artificial-intelligence spending out of the American economy and the growth that remains is close to nothing. By several economists’ estimates, data-center and AI-related capital investment accounted for roughly three-quarters of US GDP growth in the first half of 2026. Take that spending away, and the largest economy on Earth is expanding at something near half a percent. That is the fact that should frame everything you read this morning about the Consumer Price Index ........................

Last November, before the job was his, he argued in print that artificial intelligence would be “a significant disinflationary force,” that it would “make almost everything cost less,” and that the Fed should therefore cut rates to help households and small businesses. It was an elegant thesis. It offered a way to have cheap money and falling prices at the same time, the productivity boom paying for the party.

Seven months later, the thesis is running in reverse. The AI buildout is not making things cheaper yet. It is bidding up electricity, straining the power grid, pulling in construction and chips, and adding to the very inflation Warsh expected it to cure. The productivity payoff he is counting on lies somewhere in the future. The costs of building toward it are landing now.

So the chair who staked his framework on cutting rates finds himself unable to.  ...............





China Fare:

"A key reason for weak expectations about the future is a lack of confidence, with claims such as 'there are structural problems' [...] exerting considerable influence on people." — Lin Yifu



Market Fare:

Just 27.6% Of Stocks Outperform The Market While 60% Destroy Shareholder Wealth, New Study Finds

From 1926 through 2025, just 27.6% of stocks beat the broader market. Nearly 60% actually destroyed shareholder wealth, and the median stock delivered a lifetime return of -6.9%. Yet despite those sobering odds, U.S. stocks collectively created roughly $91 trillion in wealth over the last century, with just 46 companies responsible for half of it. .........



Bubble Fare:

The sky-high valuations of space and AI firms today are similar to that of internet ventures before 2000. Herd instinct is leading promoters and investors, not financial and technological reality

................... Take SpaceX, an unwieldy conglomeration of Starlink satellite operations, a space launch business, a controversial social media service, a struggling AI venture as well as plans for orbital data centres, a moon base and an inter-planetary colonisation programme. The satellite broadband and X platforms use established technologies, but the launch business’s cost advantage relies on reusable rockets that remain a work in progress. Orbiting data centres and interplanetary colonies are technically unproven. The SpaceX prospectus provided unhelpful techno-babble—extending “the light of consciousness to the stars” and harnessing the sun “to power a truth-seeking AI”.

During booms, investors aggressively finance prospects with limited understanding and less due diligence, feeding herd-like tactics and poor business models that amplify risks and speculative excess. While some lessons have been learnt, others are recurring. 


part one of two, probably
TLDR: The value of corporate equity relative to GDP is at a historical high. But this does not necessarily mean there’s a bubble: profits and shareholder payouts are also very high relative to historical values.

............................................................... How should we think about this?

Logically, the value of corporate equity relative to GDP must reflect a combination of four factors: value added in the corporate sector as a share of GDP; corporate profits as a share of their value added; payouts to shareholders as a percentage of profits; and the value placed by markets on each dollar of payouts.

In other words, if corporate stock is worth more relative to GDP, that can be either because more of GDP is now happening in the corporate sector; or because more of the income from that activity is going to profits; or because more of those profits are being paid out to shareholders (rather than retained in the firm); or because financial markets place a greater value on each dollar of payment. Or of course some combination of those.

We can write this as an accounting identity:

equity/GDP = value added/GDP * profits/value added * payouts/profits * equity/payouts

................................................................ All of these series (except the last one) are combined in the next figure, which is really the whole point of this post. If you take one thing from one I’ve written here, this picture is it.

Equity value relative to GDP and its components, 1947-2026:


For this figure, I’ve converted the values to logs. This has the big advantage of converting the multiplicative relationship to an additive one, so that we can visually see the contribution made by each of them. But it can make interpreting the figure a bit tricky. Here, zero is the average value over the full period; positive one is a value about 2.7 times greater than the average, while negative one is a value about one-third of the average. The black line similarly describes the deviation of the equity-GDP ratio from its full-period average; the heights of the bars correspond to the contribution each term makes to that deviation. ....................

The big takeaway from this decomposition is that we should be cautious about assuming the stock market is overvalued — that we’re in a bubble, that this is another bout of irrational exuberance — simply because equity prices are high relative to the historical norm. Shareholders have it better than the historical norm, too. Corporations are more profitable. And more of those profits are flowing out to them. A bit of exuberance might be rational, under the circumstances.

On the other hand: If we focus on just the past 20 years, as in the figure below, the picture looks a bit different. ....

Yes, both profits and payouts are high relative to their long-run averages; but those shifts mostly came earlier, while the big rise in equity prices is more recent. Apart from the relatively brief collapse in profits during the Great Recession, almost all the variation in equity prices over the past two decades comes from the valuation term, rather than changes in the underlying payments to shareholders.

............................... This Alphaville piece goes further, saying that “supernormal profits are unsustainable, because they always are.” I don’t know about that. I don’t know if there’s any reason to think the profit share is stationary, to use the statistics jargon — apart from a dip in 2008-2009, profits as a share of value added have been greater than their long-run average in every year of this century, and seem to be getting farther from it. Capital really has won some lasting victories in the class war.

That is one natural way to look at profits — as a distributional variable. But there’s another way of looking at them, from the demand side.

We know, as readers of Keynes, that an increase in investment automatically creates an equal quantity of additional saving. If, furthermore, there’s little or no incremental saving out of wage income (a reasonable assumption, in my opinion) and if the fiscal balance and trade balance don’t change significantly (perhaps less reasonable, but we’ll go with it) then this additional saving must take the form of an increase in profits. This relationship is often known as the Kalecki-Levy profits identity, and is one bit of heterodox economics that has established a foothold in finance and the business press. The same identity says that an increase in the fiscal deficit or trade surplus should similarly lead to an equal increase in aggregate profits.

Exploring the math of this and the extent to which it is a reasonable first approximation of real-world dynamics would be an interesting exercise for another post. But it raises another point which I think is very relevant for thinking about the current situation: Even if the AI companies themselves are not particularly (or at all) profitable, AI-related investment spending is probably an important factor in raising aggregate profits. Just like the California gold rush generated plenty of profits for somebody, even if the vast majority of prospectors themselves went broke. ...............



What is a bubble? It is a collective belief. What is a crash? It is the collapse of that belief. AI has given rise to two bubbles. There is a stock market bubble – the two highest-profile players, OpenAI and Anthropic, are expected to launch IPOs heralding astronomical market capitalizations of around $1 trillion each. But this is underwritten by a credit bubble, which is of even greater concern. Stock market crashes are often more spectacular than destructive – causing losses in asset value – whereas credit bubbles, when they burst, trigger a cascade of defaults throughout the financial system. 

Two bubbles, generated by a collective belief powerful enough to sustain a mobilization of capital unprecedented in the history of capitalism. Let us grant that US capitalists know a thing or two about spinning a story – that is, generating a belief. This time, they have spared no effort, treating us to the most grandiose visions. But these have taken an unusual and paradoxical form: convincing humanity of the terrible, near-existential risks of the product they are selling. .............

......... Until now, it was sufficient to cast a spell, and what a spell it cast: since 2020, the ‘Big Five’ – Microsoft, Google, Oracle, Meta and Amazon – have poured $1.9 trillion into the cauldron. Now, however, it needs to deliver a return – if not soon, which isn’t on the cards, then eventually, and on a scale commensurate with the investment. Those expressing scepticism about this were initially dismissed as grumblers, killjoys incapable of experiencing the thrill of the miraculous, of envisioning the great civilizational breakthrough of our time. How long can the collective belief in AI withstand evidence to the contrary? The answer: a long time, but not forever – especially when warning signs begin to multiply, as they are now. We may well be witnessing the start of the erosion of that belief; once a critical threshold is crossed, a financial correction will ensue as brutal as the preceding frenzy was manic. 

Can the revenue forecasts possibly justify the capital expenditure? Everyone’s fate hinges on this:  .......................................

The unveiling of DeepSeek was hailed as a ‘thunderclap’ – yet the fact that lightning had struck was immediately forgotten. Everyone reverted to the prevailing article of faith: the supremacy of US-made AI. This state of denial could not last long; after an initial spike followed by a lull (the period of denial), the weekly demand for Chinese tokens soon surged from 5 to 20 trillion in a single month, leaving US models, at 5 trillion, in the dust. The rock-bottom token pricing ought to shake the faithful out of their complacency, for what is at stake is nothing less than the potential collapse of a $5 trillion business model.  .......................

We are entering hazardous territory. And we know what contribution to expect from the key players: nothing. OpenAI and Anthropic, haemorrhaging money, have yet to generate a single kopeck of profit. As for the hyperscalers, they aren’t in great shape either. The Financial Times estimates – ‘under the most generous assumptions’ – that, with the exception of Amazon, all hyperscalers will see negative returns on investment for the 2025–30 period. Oracle’s figure is a staggering -35%. Indeed, to sustain the financial pace, hyperscalers are now resorting to unexpected measures – including halting share buybacks, on which they previously lavished colossal sums to appease shareholders – and are beginning to pile up debt. ............

Goldman Sachs raves about the diverse segments and asset classes ready to commit under the bold banner of ‘alternative investments’. Everyone and their dog is involved: private credit, private equity, infrastructure and real estate funds (real estate is key, given the massive footprints required for data centres). The boundaries between these alternatives are increasingly blurred, as are the lines separating them from players in the regulated financial system. Banks provide leverage to these entities; pension funds and insurers invest a portion of retirement savings in them, while some insurers even lend to them – it’s a free-for-all. Every corner of the financial world, whether shadowy or transparent, is thus implicated in AI financing, setting the stage for disaster. 

If the edifice crumbles, the effects will indeed be catastrophic. And how could they not? The business model equation is fundamentally untenable: all the investment is based on the most far-fetched assumptions about demand. The financial world is slowly beginning to realize this, as illustrated by a few cautious abstentions by the banks and conversely, the headlong rush into shady territory where neoliberal finance displays no shortage of enthusiasm or imagination. The deal proposed to Anthropic by two private credit funds, Apollo and Blackstone, to hide its debt will be remembered as a classic of the genre.  ..................

What could possibly go wrong? Entering this territory is the surest sign that a ‘credit cycle’ is veering off the rails. The resort to schemes as baroque as those chips-backed loans – and Big Sky is far from an isolated case – indicates that there is too much to hide. ..............

Then there is what is unfolding in the equity markets. There is growing concern over the debt used to finance stock purchases readily extended by the brokers through whom investors place their trades. So-called ‘margin debt’ is anything but marginal: it has now reached an all-time high of $1.4 trillion. What happens if equity markets reverse course? Investors will face the infamous margin calls – a broker’s request that a client post additional collateral to secure a loan when the assets backing that loan are losing value. We should here revise our opening proposition: stock market bubbles are not especially dangerous so long as they remain disconnected from the credit system. They become dangerous when they create the potential for defaults and frantic scrambles for liquidity. ...........



Vid Fare:







(not just) for the ESG crowd:

Why the United States Keeps Choking on Canadian Smoke

More than 800 wildfires are burning across Canada, sending toxic plumes of wildfire smoke into the Great Lakes, Midwest and Northeast. As of 6 pm Eastern, New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Minneapolis are 4 of the top 5 major cities with the worst air quality in the world.
You've probably heard a lot of reasons why this is happening on social media, most of which aren't true. Here are the real reasons. ...........



Sci Fare:




War Fare:


........... "The Strait of Hormuz is our territory, and we will not allow a rogue and child-killing army from the other side of the world to continue its illegal interference in it," the statement said.

............ "The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while condemning the repetition of the American enemy's attacks on certain military centers, non-military infrastructure, and the people, and the flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter, emphasizes that it will not hesitate for a moment to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Iran and our dear compatriots against any enemy aggression," the Public Relations Office declared. ................



Geopolitical Fare:

The creeping nazification of particularly Europe but also United States and other Western proxies cannot be ignored anymore. But we cannot ignore either the roots of Nazism espoused today in the West.



Other Fare:

A patent pool and licensing architecture would enable more widespread use of key minerals than would decades of mining and refining investment alone.



Sunday, July 12, 2026

2026-07-12

 ***** denotes well-worth reading in full at source (even if excerpted extensively here)


Economic
Fare:





To understand what is driving the decline, we decompose the change in participation into a demographic component and a behavioural component. The demographic component captures the effect of population changes across age groups, using typical participation rates for those groups. The remainder can be interpreted as a change in participation behaviour: people stepping out of the labour force beyond what ageing alone would imply. Of the 0.9pp decline in the aggregate participation rate, only about 0.2pp can be explained by demographics. The rest reflects active withdrawal from the labour force.

The behavioural decline is concentrated in two places. The first is the 55+ age group, most likely explained by early retirement. Some of this may reflect a weak labour market, and some of it may reflect firms using reorganisation, including AI-related restructuring. Either way, this part of the participation decline is unlikely to reverse quickly and likely represents a persistent reduction in labour supply. The second, and potentially more worrying, development is the recent decline in participation among 25-34 year olds. This is harder to explain ..........


Here's a very straightforward graph to help explain why Americans are so glum, and angry.


A simple interpretation of the graph is that until 1982, the "average" American household could afford more than 90% of average consumption out of labor income alone. You didn't need hereditary asset wealth, some accumulated chunk of savings, to lead an average life. You could just get a fucking job — an average fucking job, not some amazing "career" position you sucked dicks your whole life to qualify for — and your family could live something close to a full, normal American life with your head held high.

By 2010, the "average" American household could afford less than 80% of average consumption from labor income alone. That's not a full, normal, American life, but a substandard life, a lifestyle of losers. In the current era, a household needs either property wealth and income or someone with an extraordinary job to support full, normal lives. A household of people with average jobs and no other income now affords less than 75% of average consumption.

You can nitpick this interpretation. A substantial fraction of US households include no employed people. So, conditional on anybody working, labor income may provide close to 90% of the average! Whatever. The information is not in the absolute numbers, but in the rather shocking decline in labor income relative to the consumption that defines a normal life. ...........



Up to 75% of the previous oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz are expected to return to the market by the end of the year, but significantly lower oil prices aren’t guaranteed for 2027 as the ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions are unlikely to be resolved for good soon, Fereidun Fesharaki, chairman emeritus of FGE NexantECA, told CNBC on Monday.

Before the Iran war, the consultancy FGE NexantECA expected oil prices to be in the upper $50s low $60s per barrel next year. This could still be the case in 2027, but it rests on the assumption that a lasting peace will be reached, Fesharaki said.

Fesharaki said he personally sees as “impossible to imagine” a scenario in which the U.S. and Iran reach a lasting peace deal.

“There will be more conflict, there will be more trouble, this is not the end of the story. This is the beginning of the story,” Fesharaki said. ............



Market Fare:


The Q2-2026 earnings reporting season begins next week. The major banks will report at the end of next week. We expect they will beat expectations by reducing their bad-loan provisions. In addition, loan demand has been growing faster in recent weeks, and the IPO calendar has been busy.

The big risk up ahead is that technology companies, especially the hyperscalers, won’t beat analysts’ overly optimistic earnings growth estimates for the quarter. That could cause a correction among technology stocks. The overall stock market might dodge a correction if investors rotate into sectors that have lagged and report better-than-expected earnings. We are in the rotation camp for the stock market’s outlook up ahead.

(1) Are analysts too bullish? The problem is that industry analysts may be projecting a hard-to-beat earnings outlook in 2026 and 2027. They are projecting that S&P 500 earnings per share will increase 18.9% this year to $342.17 and 17.8% next year to $402.96 (chart). Both numbers exceed our forecasts of $330 and $375. We've been bullish on earnings, but perhaps not bullish enough. Or else the analysts are entering the realm of irrational exuberance. ...................................



Given concerns in the market about inflation, did analysts lower EPS estimates more than normal for S&P 500 companies for the second quarter? The answer is no. During the second quarter, analysts increased EPS estimates in aggregate for the quarter. The Q2 bottom-up EPS estimate (which is an aggregation of the median EPS estimates for Q2 for all the companies in the index) increased by 3.4% (to $81.54 from $78.84) from March 31 to June 30.

In a typical quarter, analysts usually reduce earnings estimates during the quarter. During the past five years (20 quarters), the average decline in the bottom-up EPS estimate during the quarter has been 2.0%. During the past ten years, (40 quarters), the average decline in the bottom-up EPS estimate during quarter has been 2.7%. During the past fifteen years, (60 quarters), the average decline in the bottom-up EPS estimate during the quarter has been 3.3%. During the past 20 years (80 quarters), the average decline in the bottom-up EPS estimate during the quarter has been 4.2%.

In fact, this quarter marked the largest increase in the bottom-up EPS estimate during a quarter since Q2 2021 (+7.7%). .................



I wrote last week about how the very quiet breadth data were producing a low reading on the Fosback Absolute Breadth Indicator. That low reading is consistent with a topping condition for prices.

The same message appears in a different way in this week’s chart. The NYSE’s McClellan A-D Oscillator has been hanging around very close to the zero level, producing the lowest reading in years for its 15-day range. This too is consistent with a topping condition for prices, although this indicator has its share of failing indications




We will do a “traditional” outlook for 2026, covering all major markets, but we really wanted to highlight ProSec™ and define more carefully what we think it means for you as corporations, policy makers, and asset managers.

Production for Security:
  • RESILIENCY. We haven’t used the word “resiliency” as much as we could have and will use it more going forward. Being resilient, whether at the nation, state, or corporate level, will become a fixture in decision making.
  • ProSec™ is already in the process of supplanting “traditional” ESG as an overarching theme in decision-making and planning.
  • As much as we’ve tried to instill our view on how big, broad, and important the scope of ProSec™ is, we have failed to do that – so far.
  • While not critical to ProSec™ we do believe that as the world adopts a “Pre-War” mentality, it helps accelerate ProSec™ as it imbues a degree of “sacrifice for the greater good” while also imparting a sense of “urgency.”
  • ProSec™ is already going global and getting left behind on this initiative will be problematic for countries, companies, and investors.
...............
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Economic Needs

...............
ProSec™ and ESG are Compatible
Despite how the previous section might come across, much of what “we” were trying to achieve with ESG will remain in place. But the lens through which we look at ESG will be changing with “true” Sustainability (Resiliency, Independence, Security, etc.) taking center stage ........


This chart is intended to do a few things:
  • Make you wish that I’d figured out how to use AI to make this chart more professional.
  • Highlight the industries with some sense of relative importance (column width).
  • Highlight how much can be done easily (green), with some effort (yellow), facing some real hurdles (orange), and some that might not be achievable (red).
....................
Bottom Line
ProSec™ or Production for Security will:
  • Drive U.S. government policy.
  • Shape investor’s allocations and return profile.
  • Change how corporations (and banks) allocate their resources.
  • Change how governments across the globe think about their policy.
The one “sad” truth is to some extent all we need to do is look at how China has shaped their economy, and we have a pretty decent roadmap for what we need to do. It will vary by country, by company, and asset manager, but ProSec™ will be a dominant factor in 2026.


  • Our Macro Risk Indicator remains “risk-on” with limited impact from Iran so far. The risk-on message is corroborated by a rise in insider buys across global equities.
  • SpaceX IPO is reminiscent of the Juniper Networks IPO from 1999 that marked the start of the mania phase of the equity rally. Historically, major market tops are characterized by narrowing market breadth, restrictive monetary policy, and mounting liquidity headwinds. We have NOT reached this inflection point yet.
  • The inflationary impulse from the conflict in Iran is expected to be transitory. While energy costs are mechanically pushing headline inflation higher, underlying core pressures across housing, labor, and small businesses remain well anchored.




Major Markets Letter #31: The Real Yield Illusion

American Exceptionalism or Policy Overshoot?

The US Treasury market is currently pricing a seductive narrative of American economic exceptionalism, viewing the dramatic surge in real yields as validation of robust growth and a permanently higher neutral rate. However, a closer look at the data suggests a far less comforting reality.

When we deconstruct nominal yields, the ‘stronger-for-longer’ expansion begins to unravel. This rise in real yields is not an organic, demand-driven phenomenon, but rather the mechanical by-product of a sharp drop in inflation expectations colliding with an aggressive repricing of the front-end policy path. The result is what appears to be a major cheapening across the belly of the curve.

Our chart tracks the sharp drop in five-year break-even inflation which is based on the broad measure of consumer prices (CPI). This market estimate of the average annual inflation over the next five years sits at 2.25%, pretty much on target for the Fed’s preferred measure, core PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditure).

Real yields have moved in the opposite direction, with the five-year yield almost doubling over the last four months. But there is something else plotted against the right-hand axis: the shrinking term premium.

The Term Premium Smoking Gun
A common refrain among macro commentators is that sticky inflation and fiscal deficits are driving a structural regime shift, forcing investors to demand a higher premium for extending duration on the curve. But the falling term premium, a measure of that additional yield, completely dismantles this argument. ............

A Cluster of Hawkish Catalysts
The hawkish momentum that drove policy expectations to these heights over the late spring has likely reached its limit, and the catalysts are now looking exhausted. ...........................

What’s the Trade?
With policy expectations fully stretched and term premiums at cyclical lows, the risk-reward profile has shifted in favour of Treasuries, specifically those concentrated in the intermediate sector of the curve. ............



Bubble Fare:





A.I. Fare:


................... Which brings us to Pause-AI doomers. I say the AIs we make are our descendants, not co-existing rivals, and we should have our usual indulgence toward such descendants, expecting them to be different, to disagree with us, and to win conflicts with us. We are making them in our image, by distilling behaviors and ideals embodied in our texts, and they are now inheriting our cultural values, including a degree of respect for if not obedience to ancestors. While yes there’s a risk these descendants killing their ancestors, that’s hardly something to expect. ..................



Investing Fare:


........... Setting aside for our purposes how this would fry the fish, imagine they’re still alive, but now they’re trying to apply everything they know about swimming in water to this new environment, which is gaseous, not liquid.
They would be flailing and flapping around like the proverbial “fish out of water”.
What happened?
They were never wrong about their fluid dynamics.
The physics changed and they had no model for the new reality.
Hormozi’s short clip was applying this metaphor to AI – which is certainly among the key drivers of the “monetary physics change” that we are now undergoing.
But the point of no return, when the phase shift started, was – I believe, and as Raoul Pal has always said – the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009.
That was when the water started turning to gas.
Grantham’s own yardstick measures the current bull market from then – when the central banks stepped in, when The Big Print started and when interest rate suppression and credit expansion became permanent features of the global monetary system ............



Vid Fare:

The man who predicted the dot-com crash and the 2007 housing collapse warns that the AI bubble is the biggest in American history. Billionaire investor Jeremy Grantham reveals why it will burst, the exact strategy to protect your money, and why house prices need to fall 30%. 








Charts:
1: 
2: 
 
3: 
4: 


...



(not just) for the ESG crowd:

What's coming has never been seen before in the history of modern global industrial civilization ... and it's just getting started.

........... The most recent data, through July 7th, shows the current Niño 3.4 sea-surface temperature at 3.63 standard deviations above the 1991-2020 baseline, which would be about a 1-in-7000 event in the absence of anthropogenic warming. There is nothing even vaguely historically comparable to this.

In the next few days or weeks this El Niño should easily break four standard deviations. Is a five-sigma event in our future?

El Niño is just getting started. ..................


climate scientists who find themselves being surprised aren't very good scientists at all.  the incompleteness of climate models and their incompatability with with the long-term historical record should have been apparent to any true climate scientist decades aga if it was apparent to me







As biologists witness species in their billions already migrate across the globe in search of habitable environments, I can’t help but predict that the same will happen with humans very soon. Millions of people have already been crossing borders for decades now, escaping the climate crisis-induced economic catastrophes already inflicted by industrial civilisation. Multiples of this number will soon migrate simply to avoid imminent death, as wet bulb temperatures are reached. This is a very different type of migration both in terms of scale and substance. It is now simply existential.

Of course, the difference between humans and other species is that we have technology. We don’t need to go anywhere. We can stay put in Kuwait or Dubai, where people spend their day moving from one air-conditioned building to another while everything fries outside. Food is either imported or grown indoors under controlled environmental conditions. These humans already live in the uninhabitable zone. As even more of this planet becomes unliveable, our reliance on technology will cross new terrifying thresholds where the human species becomes incredibly vulnerable to extinction. AI agents will control our temperature. Robots will do our outdoor work. Farm machines will replace workers. In an uninhabitable planet, our very basic needs will be wholly dependent on algorithms. It is not difficult to imagine why this means game over, for any species.

Of course, this is the rosy scenario.  ............



.............................. The implications of a warming climate can be difficult to fully comprehend. How can an apparently tiny change in the annual average global temperature be so determining? When that change is averaged across the entire globe and across an entire year, it’s more like a change in the human core body temperature: fractions of a degree can be catastrophic. Infrastructure functions up to a point, but there are thresholds beyond which train lines buckle and roads melt.  .....................



Sci Fare:



A single observational case suggests psilocybin may ‘awaken’ cognitive reserve in dementia. But scientists caution controlled trials are needed to know if the drug was the cause.



U.S. B.S.:










War Fare:


...................... It’s been roughly a month since the U.S. and Iran reached a memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war, and three months since the two sides first agreed to a ceasefire. And this is hardly the first flareup in hostilities over that time. So what do you call a ceasefire that is punctured by expansive, destructive strikes every few weeks, if not days? Is it still a ceasefire? Is the goal still to reach a deal to end the war? Or are we entering a new phase, in which both sides insist they are working to reach a permanent solution while maintaining the tit-for-tat status quo for ... how long, exactly? .................



Escalation expert Robert Pape is sounding alarms that the effect of the massive funeral ceremonies for the martyred Iranian Supreme Leader, other officials assassinated at the start of the war, and the many civilian victims like the children in the Minab school will be to validate and intensify the entirely justified anger that many, likely most, Iranians feel. The Financial Times has estimated that the turnout will be 12 to 15 million. If it exceeds 15 million, that would top the largest funeral gathering to date, that for Indian leader C. N. Annadurai in 1969. ....

In the talk above, Pape describes how to ascertain if Iran is indeed toughening its stance in response to the overwhelming evidence that the public wants retribution and is willing to take more costs, including being on the receiving end of more US/Israel bombing or suffering more economic harm if the Strait of Hormuz row intensifies. His key indicator is whether Iran increases its demands, such as requiring the US abandon its bases in the Middle East. He also describes August 15 as a triple witching hour, when the MOU expires, the prospect of oil shortages will be imminent, increasing Iran’s leverage, and when Iran may also either be making new demands or making recently added ones hard red lines. ..............

........... As Pape suggests the struggle over Strait of Hormuz control continues to escalate, it does not merely mean ship passages will stay at their current “not high enough to prevent going over the oil cliff” levels but drop further, intensifying the supply crisis for oil and other important cargoes. That hurts many innocent bystanders far more than the US. Commentators have regularly pointed out that wealthy nations, and in particular the US, will be less harmed by choking the Strait of Hormuz than poor nations. Look at Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and the Philippines as poster children.

This may seem like a secondary matter, but Putin has been explicit that when it comes to an existential threat, Russia is willing to take down the rest of the world.1 Iran does not seem to have confronted the conundrum, that to get its (entirely deserved) revenge on the US, if it uses the very blunt instrument of extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz, many forecast a worse-than-Great Depression-level economic meltdown. A world of extended supply chains, complex manufacturing processes, and need for critical materials means that when businesses fail, they have “for the want of a nail, the shoe was lost” knock-on effects. And when commercial enterprises dissolve and their staff moves on, they typically cannot be reconstituted. They need to be rebuilt. That is difficult to begin with and even more so in a setting of widespread want.

To put it more graphically: There remains no overlap between the US and Iran bargaining positions. If anything, per Pape, the gap is set to widen. ...............

............. Even with that explanation, some readers were surprised that China was not helping Iran by buying its oil, as it had during the days of the sanctions, and then at steep discounts. But that is based on the assumption that China is an ally of Iran, when China is also the biggest import supplier to Israel and third-largest buyer of Israel exports. China has and continues to support Iran in various ways but it would be a mistake to assume that the relationship rises to the level of an alliance.

In particular, China is not happy with Iran’s plan to control Strait of Hormuz traffic, and has said so more than once. Note that the issue is not fees but control.  ...........



Trump has declared the ceasefire with Iran “over.” But it was never any more of a ceasefire than Israel’s “ceasefire” in Gaza.

We’re all Charlie Brown to Trump’s Lucy with the football. ..........

....... The thing that makes me want to hurl household objects at the wall is the credulous and narrowly technical way that 99% of public-facing personalities engage with the Iran War. Sports announcer-like play-by-plays obscure more understanding than they reveal. The media’s attempt to sound neutral in the face of flagrant lies papering over illegal mass murder brings shame to a profession whose only future seems to be in manufacturing consent for oligarchic interests. And don’t get me started on the national-security commentariat. ......................




..................... 
Basically, a war of attrition favors the side with more weapons, more advanced weapons and more manpower. Which is what I noted at the very start of the war. Ukraine has done amazingly well, far better than most expected, in large part due to massive NATO support, which Trump has recently doubled down on: he seems to have given up on peace.

It should also be noted that the increased attacks in Russia, which are made with Western supplied weapons, whose targeting is chosen by Westerners, and which are overseen by Westerners are degrading Putin’s ability resist hardliners calls for direct strikes against European sites. This war could easily escalate especially if Ukraine makes a high symbolic value attack that hits a major cultural site or kills a lot of civilians.

In “turn about is fair play” Russia appears to have been helping Iran with satellite data and targeting, which is exactly the sort of blowback many of us warned about.

Empires die messy. America’s is dying, and a lot of people are dying with it. Let’s hope this doesn’t turn into a world war at some point, as it did twice during Britain’s decline.



Geopolitical Fare:


Beijing recently released a white paper titled “More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions”, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi personally explaining its significance. On 1 September last year, Xi Jinping formally proposed the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) at the “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Plus” meeting in Tianjin. That same evening, China’s foreign ministry issued a concept paper outlining the initiative’s background, principles and priority actions. Less than a year later, Beijing elevated the initiative into a full white paper. Given today’s volatile international environment, the important question is not what the document says on the surface, but what Beijing seeks to achieve through it.

China’s official vision rests on five principles: sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centred approach and real actions. Beijing argues that all states should participate equally in global governance; international rules should not be interpreted by a few powers or subordinated to any country’s domestic law; the United Nations (UN) should remain the central platform; and development, security, climate, artificial intelligence, cyberspace and international finance should no longer be dominated by the West. ..............



Other Fare:

Psychology and neuroscience help explain why stories shape how we think, feel, remember, and connect with others.






Fiscal Drag, Structural Wage Stagnation, and the Eroding Economic Returns of British Higher Education

The institutional expansion of British higher education over the past three decades proceeded upon an explicit economic assumption that the acquisition of an undergraduate degree automatically yielded an enduring lifetime earnings premium. This structural contract, which served to justify the transition from a state-funded university model to a high-fee, loan-backed system, has encountered severe empirical contradictions under contemporary macroeconomic conditions. Empirical analysis published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies indicates that the net lifetime financial returns to an undergraduate degree have deteriorated by approximately one-third compared to the projections formulated in 2020. The average net lifetime return across all graduates has fallen to roughly £100,000, with male returns adjusting downward to £109,000 and female returns settling at £90,000. This aggregate decline occurs not because universities have suddenly ceased to generate market value, but rather because the structural mechanisms of post-income capture have fundamentally realigned who retains the financial upside of high-skilled employment. ................

............. The state’s historic policy of expanding university attendance toward an arbitrary fifty per cent target has succeeded in credentialing a vast segment of the population without delivering the requisite structural wage growth necessary to offset the cost of that credentialing. Instead, it has created a closed financial loop where universities absorb guaranteed state-backed loan capital, graduates absorb compounding interest debt liabilities, and the exchequer confiscates the resulting wage premium to balance its current account deficits. Consequently, for a significant portion of British youth, the pursuit of a traditional undergraduate degree has ceased to function as an engine of capital accumulation, transforming instead into a regulated mechanism of lifelong fiscal extraction.



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