Worthwhile Reading - New Year's Eve Edition

China has lost its appetite for risky assets. Brad Setser, Follow the Money.

The collapse of financial globalization. Brad Setser again.

Groundwork for trade conflict being laid. Yves Smith, naked capitalism.

Banking industry sinking faster than the government can bail? Yves Smith again.

Funding the deficit. John Jansen, Across the Curve.

A Minsky meltdown? John Bogle, Journal of Indexes.

The yield curve (wonkish). Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal.

Fifty Herbert Hoovers. Paul Krugman, NYT Op-Ed.

a little late, but...
Federal Reserve balance sheet. James Hamilton, Econbrowser.

hat tip for above, and worth reading itself:
Fedthink. Steve Waldman, interfluidity.

The Great Crash, 2008. Roger Altman, Foreign Affairs. (hat tip, Paul Kedrosky)

An imaginary retrospective of 2009. Niall Ferguson, FT. (hat tip, PK again)

Estimated earnings growth for the S&P500. Bespoke Investment Group. (ditto)

Scenarios for 2009: Straight lines, moonshots, EKGs, etc. Paul Kedrosky, Infectious Greed.

Yellow brick road economic theory. Michel Shedlock, Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

More Failures to Come

Reggie Middleton has not been one to drink the Kool Aid, but he believes there are many out there who still are. Once upon a time, the kool aid they were drinking was that leverage was a one-way street to profits, that the music would keep playing, etc etc. Now, its a new flavour of kool aid being drunk, which is that government can save the day. In Another Big Bank Failure: More Likely Than Not to Occur (hat tip: naked capitalism), Middleton argues that deleveraging has actually increased the concentration of the crap that banks have hidden behind the scenes (Level 3 assets keep going up), meaning a day of reckoning is inevitable.

Countrywide was forced into a fire sale vs. bankruptcy situation. It was totally insolvent and reeked of non-performing, illiquid and depreciating assets.

Merrill Lynch (MER) was forced into a fire sale vs bankruptcy situation. It was totally insolvent and reeked of non-performing, illiquid and depreciating assets.

Bank of America (BAC) bought both of these companies. Hmmmm. Look at its share price and balance sheet. Where do we think all of those reeking assets ended up?

Bear Stearns was forced into a fire sale vs. bankruptcy situation. It was totally insolvent and reeked of non-performing, illiquid and depreciating assets.

Washington Mutual was forced into a fire sale vs bankruptcy situation. It was totally insolvent and reeked of non-performing, illiquid and depreciating assets.

JP Morgan (JPM) bought both of these companies. Hmmmm. Look at its share price and balance sheet. Where do we think all of those reeking assets ended up?

The government virtually nationalizes Citibank (C), one of (use to be, anyway) the world's largest banks.

Goldman (GS) falls in price by ~75%, Morgan Stanley (MS) likewise. They are both forced to become commercial banks. Morgan decides to play the retail banking game, but Goldman appears to remain obstinate. I think they are still punch drunk from drinking their own (we're the best on the Street) Kool Aid.

I stated in the past, they have a very high share price correlation to their brethren (most of which no longer exist) and they still have some of the most illiquid and dangerous assets on their books. Yes, they have delevered significantly over the last few quarters, but a forensic glance shows that this delivering was achieved by selling the more liquid and marketable stuff, thus actually increasing the concentrations of the stuff that made them need to delever in the first place.

Now, this is a judgment call by management, and I will not argue with it. I am sure they are loathe to sell depreciating assets in a down market when they probably feel the market will turn in the near to medium term.

I look at it this way though. They wrote leveraged products on overvalued underlyings at the top of one of the most effervescent bubbles in modern history. Now the bubble has popped, and reality is hastily approaching. Many companies from the previous year would have been much better off (actually, would still be in business), if they bit the bullet and sold at a loss today in lieu of waiting tomorrow when their assets for sale are definitively worth less than the aggregate debt used to finance them. That is the danger of 30x leverage, and that is the danger with what's left with these banks.

We don't know what the leverage ratio is for these banks. Although many (example Goldman and Citi) have taken their leverage down considerably - we really don't know from what level it is truly coming from. Almost all of the off balance sheet vehicle, specifically the SIV's, use significant leverage. The reporting on them is murky at best, non-existent for the most part. Make no mistake, there is exposure to economic risk from these entities. Thus, as Goldman delevers by selling few things that it probably should keep, it amasses greater concentrations of the things most likely to kill it.

Think of a woman that sheds lots of water (marketable assets) to lose weight to impress beauty judges (short sighted shareholders, shorter sighted regulators, and the sell side game), thereby building up dangerous levels of toxicity within her system. Now, the woman looks a lot better from the outside, and may even win a trophy, but the poisons within are now undiluted and potentially killing her. The pretty woman that walks down the aisle very well may collapse (like so many of her sisters from last year), and I get the feeling that if she does, everyone will act surprised.

"Won't the government help us?"

Many of my lesser aware associates are still of the mindset that the government will pull us out of this one. I am put in mind of those who blindly follow religion without bothering to once wonder exactly how all of those miracles may actually work. I believe it is a lot easier for government to allow us to go down the path to recession than it is to work our way out of it. Recession is natural and normal anyway, and needs to happen. The kicker is that we had a wildly voracious up-cycle that ridiculed both the fundamentals and fiscal prudence - this lasted for about six and a half years.

We have seen roughly one and half years of carnage. Methinks that we have roughly three to six years more of this to go, or 12 to 18 months of a hyper accelerated, extremely destructive downward plunge - one that would have 2008 something the optimists would end up wishing for. The only variable is the velocity of the descent. It is guaranteed, a given, that mother equilibrium will insist upon returning to her pre-bubble ways, and potentially then some.

I rant ad nauseum because I find myself returning back to the big money center banks mentioned above.

As you all know, I shorted all of the names mentioned above heavily backed by some rather comprehensive fundamental and forensic research, and am still short most of those that are still in business. The trades were roughly six months to a year in duration, and although proved to be very, very profitable (several scoring more than 100 point hits) had a significant amount of volatility introduced that produced some nasty drawdowns. These drawdowns came from bear market rallies that were sparked by the "Won't the government help us?" mentality.

As stated earlier, recession is a natural and inevitable occurrence that needs to happen, just as much so as economic boom times. The dead banks will have to die. It's just a matter of whether we get it over quickly and allow the Phoenix to rise from its ashes to start anew, or we drag this out in a form of macro-economic water torture.

Remember, mortgage banks were dropping like flies. Bear Stearns collapsed over the weekend. The Fed backstopped investment banks by allowing unprecedented borrowing from the Fed discount window, accepting as collateral practically anything, stocks, private labeled MBS, baseball cards, manure and fertilizer (Okay, I was joking about the baseball cards). This allowed the market to rally from the March lows that was put in by the Bear Stearns collapse. After all, the government has unlimited resources and they have pretty much stated that they will not allow a large investment bank to fail.

Six months later, a large investment banks fails in the form of Lehman Brothers. What happened? The government said it wasn't their fault. They had no viable buyer. What happened to the government sanctioned liquidity? What did Lehman and Bear have on their books that the other ex-I banks don't? The short answer is nothing. They had higher concentrations of mortgage related assets.

That may sound bad given the occurrences of the past year, but it trust me, it sounds worse than it is. This was not a real estate or mortgage crisis, but an asset securitization crisis born from the punch drunk giddiness to be had when lenders and their cronies have access to nigh unlimited balance sheets and liquidity, and very limited recourse and responsibility for their actions. Thus, any asset that was normally lent against, was most likely abusively lent against under this scenario. Real assets and mortgages were simply the first to pop, starting with subprime, and as we have already seen, definitely not ending there.

As a matter of opinion, it is quite probable that the other asset classes that have bore witness to the lending abuses very well may be hit harder than real estate and mortgages - if not on an individual basis, then definitely on an aggregate basis. This is where Goldman, Morgan, HSBC (HBC), et. al. will see real pain. This is why Goldman's level 3 assets are actually increasing as they delever. Think private equity, think, leveraged loans, think venture capital. Just think...

Do you really think the government can prevent another big bank failure? It will happen sooner or later, but looking at the current condition and prospects, it appears to be more likely to happen than not.

Worthwhile Reading - Boxing Day Edition

Low Mortgage Rates to Spur New Wave of Defaults. Mr. Mortgage, The Mortgage Lender's Implode-O-Meter.

Economy "on knife-edge" as Japan faces deflation fear. The Times Online.

Japan Should Scrap U.S. Debt; Dollar May Plummet, Mikuni Says. Bloomberg.

How Can No One See An Imminent Fall in Chinese GDP and a Secular Slowdown Thereafter? George Jankovic, via naked capitalism.

'Twas the Street Before Christmas. Edmundo Braverman, via The Big Picture Cafe.

You Can Lead A Horse To Water...

In his Adviser Soapbox on Forbes, entitled Deflation Descends Upon the U.S., Gary Shilling describes how falling goods prices are self-perpetuating, how they make the burden of debt repayment harder, and how this process will prolong the economy's misery.

For years, we've been forecasting that chronic deflation of 1% to 2% per year would start with the next major global recession. Well, it's here!

In October, the U.S. producer price index fell 2.8% from September, and the consumer price index dropped 1%, the biggest decline since before World War II. Sure, the big driver was the decline in energy costs, but even excluding food and energy, consumer prices dropped 0.1%. As retailers panic in the face of retrenching consumers, prices of many items have nosedived.

Dell is offering 20% to 30% discounts on new notebooks. Nearly empty Hawaiian hotels give free drinks and all sorts of discounts. Retailers like Crate & Barrel have gained pricing power over vendors and are getting 10% to 25% lower prices to pass on to customers. Kohl's is discounting Christmas merchandise up to 75% to attract shoppers. Toys are being discounted 50% to 60%, and sellers are emphasizing low-priced merchandise to attract frugal buyers. Just look at Wal-Mart.

Grocers are also gaining pricing power over suppliers of branded goods, as consumer zeal for house brands gives retailers more leverage with producers of national labels. Upscale retailers are unloading excess inventory on discounters who then offer designer apparel for 45% to 70% off list prices. And luxury goods makers themselves are slashing prices on apparel, shoes and handbags sold in the U.S. Of course, the strong dollar makes that easy for eurozone-based firms. Don't forget that recent auctions were disappointing and saw prices of contemporary, modern and impressionist art drop 30%.

The Fed worries that in deflation, offsetting monetary policy is difficult since its target rate has to stop declining when it reaches zero. Of course, the Fed has other tools, like quantitative easing (juicing the money supply). Nevertheless, all these measures amount to leading the horse to water, but he may not drink.

The deflation in Japan in the 1999-2005 years worried the Fed when it appeared imminent in the U.S. early in this decade, and it still does. Japan again faces chronic deflation, and the Bank of Japan forecast zero change in the CPI (excluding food but not energy) for the fiscal year ending March 2010. Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn said the lesson from Japan was that "we should be very aggressive in combating deflation."

Deflation encourages saving, since money is worth more in the future than it is today. It also spawns deflationary expectations. Buyers anticipate lower prices later by waiting to buy. That sires excess inventories and capacity, which forces prices down. Buyer suspicions are confirmed so they wait even further to buy, generating a self-feeding downward price spiral, as now seen in autos and houses.

Deflation also elevates the cost of debts and debt service since both remain fixed in nominal terms but the revenues and incomes used to repay them tend to fall with overall prices. Deflation fears and other forces have also reduced reducing 30-year Treasury bond yields to our long-held target of 3% and completed what we dubbed in 1981, when the yield was 14.7%, "the bond rally of a lifetime." The recent financial crisis has also helped as investors abandon everything else, stocks and fixed income alike, in favor of Treasuries.

Deflation results from overall supply exceeding general demand. We have been forecasting the good deflation of excess supply, as in the late 1800s and in the 1920s, due to today's confluence of semiconductors, the Internet, computers, biotech, telecom and other productivity-soaked technologies. But we have allowed for the bad deflation of deficient demand, as in the 1930s, if one of two adverse conditions develops: widespread financial crises and worldwide protectionism. Sadly, both are real possibilities.

Inflation? Many, of course, worry not about deflation but inflation, due to all the money being pumped out by central banks and governments globally. They, no doubt, are biased since most have lived only in an era of inflation and don't agree with us that inflation is the result of excess government spending in wars, both hot and cold. In peacetime, deflation reigns. Starting with rearmament in the late 1930s, then World War II and the Cold War with its hot phases, Korea and Vietnam--wartime and inflation persisted for 60 years. For now, at least, all that money from central banks and governments isn't getting beyond the financial institutions it's meant to buoy.

We're in a liquidity trap. The horse isn't drinking, thank you very much. And if lenders do start to lend, central bankers, with their congenital fear of inflation, will no doubt reel in all that extra credit. Even if the bank reserves stimulate the money supply with the usual multiplier effect, the credit created will pale in comparison to the destruction of derivatives and other privately created liquidity due to persistent de-leveraging and write-downs.

Finally, the consumer saving spree we're forecasting will probably increase the saving rate by one percentage point per year on average for the next decade. That would generate a cumulative $5.5 trillion in savings (read "not spending") and go a long way to offsetting the intervening fiscal stimuli, and then some.

Latest Inactivity Report

November's update of the Chicago Fed National Activity Index was released today. The current number for November of -2.47 wasn't as bad as September's low (-3.74), but worse then October's bounce-back level (-1.27), dragging the 3-month moving average to -2.49 from -2.40 the previous month.

This isn't too much of a surprise given the significant deterioration in the last non-farm payrolls data announced earlier this month, including the revisions announced to earlier months.

Worthwhile Reading - Dec 22nd Edition

Has Beggar Thy Neighbour Started? Yves Smith, naked capitalism.

Wage Deflation Underway. Yves Smith, naked capitalism.

A Trap in Obama's Spending Plan. Louis Uchitelle, The New York Times. (hat tip: naked capitalism)

S&P 600: That's Gary Shilling's Forecast for 2009, Not an Index. Yahoo! Finance. (hat tip: Paul Kedrosky)
Shilling's using the same math I used for my equity market performance forecast for 2009: S&P 500 earnings = $40 * P/E of 15 => 600, down 33% from recent 900-ish level

Is the Medicine Worse Than the Illness? James Grant, WSJ.

Back to Normal?

Seriously, everyone should just read the blog naked capitalism. This is a bad habit I'm likely to be in for awhile, of re-posting here what's already been posted there. The reason I'll keep doing so is to serve as a filter, posting here just what I view as essential reading, as opposed to just the other very good or merely important stuff.

This time, its a post from Cassandra, from Cassandra Does Tokyo: If You Can't Tell Who the Sucker Is....

Thumbing through the sell-side research from their multitudes of Strategists, I notice some recurring phrases, small and innocuous as they may be, that trouble me. Time and again, they repeat, in various contexts, the mantras: "when things return to normal", "when markets return to normal", and "when x, y or z normalizes" with "normal" implied to be that which has been common over the past decade-or-so in respect of liquidity, leverage, asset prices, equity risk premiums, speculative activity, growth. Mulling this over, I wonder to myself: "is this not just the perfect "recency bias" example, defined by wikipedia as "a cognitive bias that results from disproportionate salience of recent stimuli or observations"? For as I consider what precisely is meant by "normal", it seems to me that there is a reasonable good chance insofar as this IS "The Big One" (as Bridgewater Associates precsiently termed it nearly a year ago) that all these things - debt, leverage, consumption vs. income, relative asset prices - are ALREADY returning to normal, and the strategists, demonstrating the old poker joke about "if you look around the table and you don't know who the sucker is, its you....", simply haven't yet fathomed the appropriate interval frame of the normality to which things are returning towards.

In Japan, "normal" meant that in 2004 residential real estate prices were roughly 30% of late 1980s or early 1990s prices. In Germany , though nominal prices might be similar in many places to those prevailing two decades ago, the real price destruction would be probably be similar to Japan's. But what is "normal" for economic growth? Or what is "normal" for aggregate US consumption? Or the amount of debt a typical household can sustain? What is the "normal" leverage for a bank, or the normal return on equity o a listed company? What is a normal share of GDP for corporate profits in an economy experiencing deep recession? What is "normal" for sustainable government budget deficits? What is the normal income multiple of a banker or CEO to a policeman, a professional baseball player to a school-teacher or a doctor to a nurse? What is the normal amount of due diligence a bank should do before extending a loan and what is normal for the amount Honeywell Industries will earn per-share in the coming years?

These may seem disparate and unrelated, but I fear they are not. I fear that the final acceleration towards the denoument of Peak Credit, rooted as it was in poor fiscal policies and lack of regulation & oversight, greased with monetary ease and official foreign mercantile enablement, and driven by parochial and herd-like animal spirits, has distorted what is normal, what should be expected, and of course, what is, and will prove to be reasonably sustainable in the future. But the Strategists, the ones who've offended my sense of the normal, seem, in their sanguineness, to be implying that is was normal to extend credit as it was during the last eight years; that gains in asset prices (be they a portrait of Dr Gachet NYC apartments, Chelsea or Notting Hill pied-a-terres ?) are normal at somewhere nearer to the top of their seemingly almost-exponential three-decade rise; that it is normal that US households continue to live with negative rates of savings or consume en masse beyond their means; or cavalierly burn hydrocarbons at the elevated relative per-capita rates that they do presently; that past income-inequality, now rolled-up into massive eddies of wealth discrepancy that approach those which evoke those prevailing during the enclosures in England are normal, and that their sense of normalcy will swiftly return despite the continued pressure to the contrary upon the financial sector, and households to return to a normalcy of a much different mean than those of the recent past, which in their turn directly the impact the corporate sector with body blows from BOTH the cost and availability of their gearing and the ultimate demand for their products.

I do not believe (yet) that we are about to beat each with bones back to the stone-age. But I believe that what we've seen in leverage and credit growth during the past 15 years is NOT normal, nor is it sustainable - neither relative to history or in absolute terms. And this return to what is sustainable, and service-able has profound economy-wide, implications, and they are indisputably contractionary: deleveraging, higher savings rates, matching household consumption to income, and government revenues to expenditure. Add to this the impending pull of demographics, the emerging trend towards greater environmental consciousness and sustainability, and "normal" begins to resemble a mean-that is something of a much different magnitude, something still to the south of where we are that - in the big time series - we will continue to revert towards from our presently divergent location rather than - as the Strategists imply - a normal that is something we've already overshot.

An Economy Gone Madoff

In his latest Op-Ed column, the Madoff Economy, Paul Krugman discusses the parallels between the $50 billion Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernard Madoff with that bigger Ponzi scheme --- the whole financial system.

The revelation that Bernard Madoff — brilliant investor (or so almost everyone thought), philanthropist, pillar of the community — was a phony has shocked the world, and understandably so. The scale of his alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme is hard to comprehend.

Yet surely I’m not the only person to ask the obvious question: How different, really, is Mr. Madoff’s tale from the story of the investment industry as a whole?

The financial services industry has claimed an ever-growing share of the nation’s income over the past generation, making the people who run the industry incredibly rich. Yet, at this point, it looks as if much of the industry has been destroying value, not creating it. And it’s not just a matter of money: the vast riches achieved by those who managed other people’s money have had a corrupting effect on our society as a whole.

Let’s start with those paychecks. Last year, the average salary of employees in “securities, commodity contracts, and investments” was more than four times the average salary in the rest of the economy. Earning a million dollars was nothing special, and even incomes of $20 million or more were fairly common. The incomes of the richest Americans have exploded over the past generation, even as wages of ordinary workers have stagnated; high pay on Wall Street was a major cause of that
divergence.

But surely those financial superstars must have been earning their millions, right? No, not necessarily. The pay system on Wall Street lavishly rewards the appearance of profit, even if that appearance later turns out to have been an illusion.

Consider the hypothetical example of a money manager who leverages up his clients’ money with lots of debt, then invests the bulked-up total in high-yielding but risky assets, such as dubious mortgage-backed securities. For a while — say, as long as a housing bubble continues to inflate — he (it’s almost always a he) will make big profits and receive big bonuses. Then, when the bubble bursts and his investments turn into toxic waste, his investors will lose big — but he’ll keep those bonuses.

O.K., maybe my example wasn’t hypothetical after all.

So, how different is what Wall Street in general did from the Madoff affair? Well, Mr. Madoff allegedly skipped a few steps, simply stealing his clients’ money rather than collecting big fees while exposing investors to risks they didn’t understand. And while Mr. Madoff was apparently a self-conscious fraud, many people on Wall Street believed their own hype. Still, the end result was the same (except for the house arrest): the money managers got rich; the investors saw their money disappear.

We’re talking about a lot of money here. In recent years the finance sector accounted for 8 percent of America’s G.D.P., up from less than 5 percent a generation earlier. If that extra 3 percent was money for nothing — and it probably was — we’re talking about $400 billion a year in waste, fraud and abuse.

But the costs of America’s Ponzi era surely went beyond the direct waste of dollars and cents. At the crudest level, Wall Street’s ill-gotten gains corrupted and continue to corrupt politics, in a nicely bipartisan way. From Bush administration officials like Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who looked the other way as evidence of financial fraud mounted, to Democrats who still haven’t closed the outrageous tax loophole that benefits executives at hedge funds and private equity firms (hello, Senator Schumer), politicians have walked when money talked.

Meanwhile, how much has our nation’s future been damaged by the magnetic pull of quick personal wealth, which for years has drawn many of our best and brightest young people into investment banking, at the expense of science, public service and just about everything else? Most of all, the vast riches being earned — or maybe that should be “earned” — in our bloated financial industry undermined our sense of reality and degraded our judgment.

Think of the way almost everyone important missed the warning signs of an impending crisis. How was that possible? How, for example, could Alan Greenspan have declared, just a few years ago, that “the financial system as a whole has become more resilient” — thanks to derivatives, no less? The answer, I believe, is that there’s an innate tendency on the part of even the elite to idolize men who are making a lot of money, and assume that they know what they’re doing.

After all, that’s why so many people trusted Mr. Madoff.

Now, as we survey the wreckage and try to understand how things can have gone so wrong, so fast, the answer is actually quite simple: What we’re looking at now are the consequences of a world gone Madoff.

UPDATE: Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. sees the same parallels in his Madoff as Metaphor post at the Mises Institute.

Minsky

I wanted to get some info on Hyman Minsky on the blog, so I thought that posting an email that I sent to my colleagues in July 2007 would serve a dual purpose -- i.e. publishing a Minsky backgrounder while also establishing a bit my bona fides (i.e. that I'm not a johnny-come-lately to this point of view)

So, with that intro, here's what I had to say July 5, 2007:


I’ve been contemplating putting this email together for weeks. I don't want to barrage you with stuff that you don't want to receive, particularly at quarter-end when everyone is busy, but I still want to rationalize my viewpoint from our forecast meetings, and expand on my concerns about the greater possibility than normally assumed for a major credit-related tail event.

We've discussed housing, the labour market, and recession risks quite a bit and everyone is well aware of the issues/concerns, so I won't belabour those areas. But it seems clear that my concerns about a credit bubble and the likelihood of its bursting are not shared (notwithstanding our caution on credit spreads), and I suspect that in addition to my forecast being too far outside the realm of normal experience, it may also simply be because most of us have more immediate things to track and worry about than credit bubbles. But, on the offhand chance that I'm right, the bursting of a credit bubble could have huge ramifications, including deflation (something like 1990s Japan or 1930s Depression should not be considered totally out of the question).
In fact, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) warned just last week in its latest annual report (http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2007e.htm) about just such a risk (BIS warns of Great Depression dangers from credit spree: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2007/06/25/cncredit125.xml ; Credit crunch will 'shred investment portfolios to ribbons' : http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2007/07/02/bcncrunch102.xml ); meanwhile Lombard Street Research, among others, are ringing similar warning bells following the Bear Stearns fiasco ( Banks 'set to call in a swathe of loans' : http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2007/06/26/cnusecon126.xml )

The Bank is clearly concerned about the risks associated with today’s global credit buildup.

Without naming names, the Bank noted that there are basically three prevailing views among monetary authorities around the world about how to include monetary and credit aggregates in the formulation of policy: (1) the output gap between aggregate supply and aggregate demand is what matters, and monetary &/or credit growth is uninformative (Fed); (2) the output gap impacts short-run inflation, but monetary trends have significant influence on inflation in the long-run (ECB); (3) monetary, and especially credit, growth are of great importance, particularly in periods when rapid growth of these aggregates combine with deviations of spending patterns from traditional norms, portending not just inflationary outcomes in the medium term, but more significantly a boom-bust cycle with significant economic costs, including deflation over the long-run.

Not only did the Bank make clear that it is not an adherent of the 1st school and cite the fact that the 2nd and 3rd schools of thought have been gaining influence of late, but it in particular said “new crises and the further analysis of old ones have provided empirical evidence to support the specific arguments for concern expressed by the third school”.

The Bank also discussed the question of “how best to deal with what seems to be the natural pro-cyclicality of the financial system”, i.e. asset bubbles and global financial imbalances, endorsing a monetary policy approach of reacting when a number of indicators (asset prices, credit growth, spending patterns) exceed normal ranges.

Without naming it as such, the Bank criticized the “Greenspan Put” of mopping up with vigorous monetary easing after a bubble bursts, due to that approach’s “shortcomings”. For one, as in Japan’s experience of “pushing on a string”, it “might not always work”, as the “zero lower bound for policy rates proved an important constraint”, and “excessive investment and debt built up in the good times weigh heavily on the economy for many years”. The Bank also reflected on the post I.T. bubble experience that “lower rates have unwelcome side effects” (“below-equilibrium interest rates effectively transfer wealth from creditors to debtors, which will tend to lower savings rates and economic potential over time”; “search for yield might encourage imprudent behaviour”). In essence, “these factors make the economy more vulnerable to shocks over time. In effect, dealing with today’s problem of deficient demand through sustained monetary accommodation can sow the seeds for more serious problems further ahead.” Clearly, the Bank is suggesting that the Fed policy of easy money after the stock market bubble burst has fostered new bigger problems currently than those the Fed originally had to deal with.

But the U.S. is certainly not the only concern of the Bank: “given the recent rates of credit expansion, asset price increases and massive investments in heavy industry, the Chinese economy also seems to be demonstrating very similar, disquieting symptoms” to those experienced prior to the 1991 Japanese bust, which “were actually sown in the preceding, rampant monetary expansion designed to keep the yen down.”

All told, the Bank is not forecasting the certainty of a major financial and economic event, but it is warning loudly that ignoring monetary and credit aggregates is wrong-headed, that complacency is foolhardy, and that the risks are currently much greater than is widely appreciated:

- “As a near-term proposition, a forecast that says the future will be a lot like the past has a lot to recommend it…. Yet it is not difficult to identify uncertainties that could conceivably cause this near-term forecast to come unstuck, or that could result in less welcome outcomes over a longer horizon.” These include:
o Possible resurgence of global inflation
o US economic growth soft landing would be welcome to tame inflation, but too-much-of-a-good thing is quite possible as the positive forces that supported US housing/debt/consumption all reverse, in conjunction with “corporate fixed investment already inextricably weak given high profits and low financing costs”, leading to a hard landing
o Persistent and substantial global trade imbalances
o Reliability of public sector inflows has also become more uncertain, and holders of large portfolios of reserves might begin to reduce the proportion of new reserves held in US dollars
o Potential vulnerabilities in financial markets and possible knock-on effects on financial institutions

- “Behind each set of concerns lurks the common factor of highly accommodating financial conditions”… “tail events affecting the global economy might at some point have much higher costs than is commonly supposed”

- Irrational exuberance: “There seems to be a natural tendency in markets for past successes to lead to more risk-taking, more leverage, more funding, higher prices, more collateral, and, in turn, more risk-taking… Apparently, the observed resilience of markets to successive shocks has increasingly encouraged the view that lower prices constitute a buying opportunity. The danger with such endogenous market processes is that they can, indeed must, eventually go into reverse if the fundamentals have been overpriced. Moreover, should liquidity dry up and correlations among asset prices rise, the concern would be that prices might also overshoot on the downside. Such cycles have been seen many times in the past.”

- “The attention of financial markets first focused on the US subprime mortgage market, but the underlying issue is much broader.” The “too rapid growth of [monetary and credit] aggregates could be either a harbinger of inflation or the sign of financially driven boom-bust cycle with its own unwelcome characteristics.”

- the difficulty of economic forecasting, particularly at cyclical turning points: “The Great Inflation in the 1970s took most commentators and policymakers completely by surprise…. Similarly, virtually no one foresaw the Great Depression of the 1930s, or the crises which affected Japan and Southeast Asia in the early and late 1990s, respectively. In fact, each downturn was preceded by a period of non-inflationary growth exuberant enough to lead many commentators to suggest that a “new era” had arrived.”






One of the experts on credit cycles was an economist named Hyman Minsky. I've attached a report on the prospects of a "Minsky Moment" from a UBS economist, and there are a few introductory articles about Minskian beliefs below.


- AN ARTICLE FOR YOU, FROM ECONOMIST.COM -

PONZIFICATING
Mar 15th 2007

Is the financial system a confidence trick?

CHARLES PONZI was a likeable man. That helped him persuade American investors in 1920 that he could deliver returns of 50% in just 45 days by exploiting a loophole in the pricing of international postal coupons. In a way, he was advertising an early version of an arbitrage fund.

In reality, the loophole could not be practically exploited. So Ponzi exploited his customers instead. He could deliver returns only by taking money from new investors to give to his early backers. But although he died in poverty, the Italian immigrant achieved immortality of a sort: fraudulent moneymaking operations are often known as Ponzi schemes.

In the world of finance, describing something as a Ponzi scheme is a standard form of abuse. This insult has been bandied around a lot of late. Financial-sector profits have grown far faster than GDP over the past 25 years; everyone has become richer by lending money to everyone else. Household debt is running at about 100% of GDP in America and higher still in Britain. Credit derivatives are soaring in value and payment-in-kind notes (which pay interest with more debt, rather than cash) are in vogue. Last month Tim Lee, a strategist at pi Economics, described the whole financial system as "the equivalent of a gigantic Ponzi scheme."

In one sense, of course, he is right. Many elements of the system are Ponzi-like in that they depend on confidence--they would collapse if all investors demanded their stakes back--or they rely on new backers to keep them going. Pay-as-you-go pension systems, for example, depend on there being enough workers to fund promises made to retired employees.

The health of the commercial banking system depends on the assumption that, at any time, most depositors will keep their money in the bank. That allows banks to borrow short and lend long; earning higher rates on loans to business. When depositors panic and start to withdraw their money, the result is usually an economic catastrophe.

Ponzi's original scheme was fraudulent from the start. But even if he had found some exploitable anomaly in the financial system, his rationale was flawed. Because he offered such a high rate of return over such a short period, claims on the "Bank of Ponzi" would quickly have reached ridiculous levels.

So perhaps there are good and bad Ponzi schemes. Good schemes will do more than funnel money from latecomers to early takers, allowing the foremost to prosper at the expense of the hindmost. And they will not allow claims to increase too fast. That was the big mistake of John Law, the pioneer of paper money in early 18th-century France. Law's system eventually collapsed, but he did have the insight that the creation of credit might increase trade, and thus general welfare.

But how to tell when a scheme has gone too far? Hyman Minsky, an American economist, distinguished three kinds of borrowers. Hedged debtors can safely meet all debt payments from their cashflows. Speculative borrowers can meet current interest payments from cashflows but need to "roll over" their debt in order to pay back the principal. And Ponzi borrowers can pay neither interest nor principal from cashflows but rely on rising asset prices to keep going.

The American housing market seems to be suffering from the unravelling of a Ponzi-type system. Subprime loans were offered on generous terms that, implicitly or explicitly, depended on rising house prices. The banks that made these loans bundled them up and sold them in the credit markets to investors, eager for high yields. This was supposed to make the financial system more secure by dispersing risk more widely.

But look what is happening now. The buyers of these loans are asking the original mortgage-writers to buy them back. But these homelenders do not have the money to do so. The confidence that sustained their balance sheets has evaporated, leaving many in dire trouble.

Might the problem be more widespread than housing? The latest stockmarket wobbles suggest investors are asking themselves the same question. Financial-sector debt has risen from virtually zero 50 years ago to 100% of American GDP today, and Europe's financial corporations have helped to accelerate the money supply.

George Magnus, a strategist at UBS, has just written a research note entitled "Have we arrived at a Minsky moment?" His big worry is of a contraction in credit supply. As lending standards tighten, consumer demand could suffer, possibly prompting a recession in the United States. No one knows when the credit cycle will end, he says. But the pyramid is beginning to look a bit top-heavy.



See this article with graphics and related items at http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=2512631&story_id=8864415




ALSO, FROM MONEYWEEK
http://www.moneyweek.com/file/27889/have-we-reached-a-minsky-moment.html


If economist Hyman Minsky is right, then our economy is like a giant Ponzi scheme, and the rush for the exits is due to start. Is he right? Simon Wilson reports

Why is Minsky suddenly popular?
Minky was a moderately well-known US economist who died in 1996 at the age of 77. He was well regarded within academia, but it wasn’t until after his death that he became a cult hero among more bearish commentators after his model of a credit-driven asset-bubble, proposed back in the 1970s, was almost uncannily played out shortly after he died. Minky’s postulated stages of how a bubble develops and ends (see below) described almost exactly the rise and demise of the tech bubble.
And now the US subprime mortgage meltdown is following a similar pattern.

What were his economic ideas?
Minsky is most famous for the idea that ‘stability is unstable’. In short, unusually long periods of economic stability lull investors into taking on more risk. This leads them to borrow excessively and to overpay for assets. Minsky suggested three main types of borrower, increasingly risky in nature. Hedged borrowers can meet all debt payments from their cash flows. Speculative borrowers can meet their interest payments, but have to keep ‘rolling’ the debt over to pay back the original loan. Ponzi borrowers (named after the notorious American pyramid-scheme conman) can repay neither the interest or the original debt, and rely entirely on rising asset prices to allow them continually to refinance their debt. The longer a period of economic stability lasts, his argument goes, the more society moves towards being full of Ponzi borrowers, until the entire economy is a house of cards, built on excessively easy credit and speculation.

Is this an orthodox view?
No. Mainstream economics generally views capitalism as essentially stable – tending towards steady growth. Crises arise either from preventable mistakes by policy makers (eg, the Federal Reserve’s too-tight monetary policy, widely supposed to have exacerbated the Great Depression), or by external shocks, such as Opec’s oil price hike in the early 1970s. Minsky, by contrast, argues that capitalism is prone to crises from within; even good times are destined to end as people start to get cocky about risk and borrow too much.

Why is he so relevant now?
Minsky’s Ponzi borrowers are all too familiar from the US subprime debacle. But Minsky went further, describing the process whereby financial institutions, which also take more risks when stability reigns, devise ways of getting round regulations and norms once seen as prudent. Again, we can see this in US senators and regulators’ current concerns about lax mortgage lending – but it also applies more broadly. Joseph Schumpeter (under whom Minsky studied) is famous for the idea that capitalism renews itself through competition and innovation – ‘creative destruction’ that chucks out the bad and ushers in the good. But while Schumpeter focused on technology’s role in driving capitalism, Minsky’s focus is on banking and finance. In a 1993 essay, Schumpeter and Finance, he wrote: “Nowhere is evolution, change and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship more evident than in banking and finance and nowhere is the drive for profits more clearly a factor in making for change.” It’s this focus on financial innovation as a destabilising influence that is now ringing alarm bells on Wall Street and in the City.

Why should we worry about instability?
Because much of the financial world shows signs of the same kind of “this-time-it’s-different” mentality, as Edward Chancellor says in Institutional Investor (see below). The success of the authorities in avoiding a deflationary bust in 2002 through easy-money policies encouraged people to take on huge debts, while competition among big lenders has loosened lending standards (making the present private-equity boom possible, for example). The rise of credit derivatives means loans are increasingly parcelled up in innovative ways, insured, reinsured, and sold on – using a web of transactions to bypass regulations intended to protect the credit system, as Minsky predicted. The question now, as UBS economist George Magnus put it, is “have we reached a Minsky moment”?

What’s that?
The Minsky moment comes when “lenders become increasingly cautious or restrictive and when it isn’t only over-leveraged structures that encounter financing difficulties”, says Magnus. Then, Minsky’s credit cycle, extended beyond apparent breaking point as long as there are profits to make and bonuses to collect, tips towards bust. As Chancellor concludes, “investors who accept this analysis will probably conclude that risk and reward are currently out of whack. They will position their portfolios defensively, keeping cash on hand to spend when the rewards for risk appear more compelling.”

How does Minky’s bubble model work?
Minsky said that a bubble begins with a ‘displacement’, such as a significant invention – the internet, for example. This creates profitable opportunities in the sector affected, but alone it’s not enough – financial innovation is needed to give people access to the cheap credit required to kick-off the next phase: overtrading. People pile into the sector, driving demand and prices higher. A euphoria phase ensues as ‘Ponzi’ investors speculate, often with borrowed money, on the basis that a ‘greater fool’ will buy their assets at an even higher price. But eventually, whether down to insiders selling out, or lenders tightening lending criteria, the market hits a peak, panic sets in, there’s a stampede out of the market, and bankruptcies ensue.




AND, FINALLY, FROM INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR:
http://www.iimagazine.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1234217&PositionID=16672



Ponzi nation
07 Feb 2007

Edward Chancellor

Low volatility and easy credit are boosting asset prices. But according to the late theorist Hyman Minsky, today's stability may be sowing the seeds of its own demise.


Credit has grown rapidly in recent years. This expansion has come in many forms, from home mortgages to newfangled structured products created by clever financial engineers. There are, broadly speaking, two views about these developments. The conventional wisdom -- held by most economists and denizens of Wall Street -- is optimistic. Higher rates of credit growth and increasing levels of leverage, they maintain, are reasonable in light of increasing economic stability.

An opposing view -- held by a miscellaneous bunch, including some notable investors and Wall Street observers -- holds that the massive buildup of debt augurs ill. Drawing on the work of a little-known, deceased economist named Hyman Minsky, the pessimists contend that the recent calm has induced people to take on too much risk. "Stability is unstable," this group says, quoting Minsky. Like the differences of opinion toward the end of the last decade concerning the existence or not of a stock market bubble, the current argument will be settled only by the unfolding of events. Either the prosperity will continue in the years to come, or a financial crisis will occur.

But not everyone can afford to await the passage of time. Professional investors are paid to anticipate. Adherents to the conventional view will construct radically different portfolios from those who accept the instability hypothesis. Many investors, however, are undecided. They believe, or perhaps just hope, that prosperity will endure while at the same time they may feel uneasy about the growth of credit and other risk-taking behavior evident in today's markets. The purpose of this essay is to introduce Minsky's unorthodox ideas and relate them to recent developments in the financial world. Readers should then be better able to judge for themselves where they stand.



THE GREAT MODERATION

Just over a decade ago, a Wall Street equity strategist published a report that helped give birth to the so-called New Paradigm of the 1990s. The monetary authorities, asserted David Shulman of Salomon Brothers, had improved their handling of the economy. Recessions had become less severe and frequent, and inflation was under control. Shulman argued that as a result of these developments, equities should trade at higher multiples than in the past -- the "valuation paradigm" had changed.

The New Paradigm was later used to rationalize the lofty equity valuations at the turn of the century and was much mocked when the bubble eventually burst. But it didn't entirely go away. Rather, the New Paradigm was given a name change. According to central bankers, we currently live in the age of the "Great Moderation" -- a term coined by Ben Bernanke, now Federal Reserve Board chairman, back in 2004. His argument was very familiar, although expressed, in the argot of modern finance, in terms of risk and volatility: The world had become more stable and predictable, economic growth was steadier, and inflation didn't oscillate so violently.

This calm was reflected in the market behavior of various asset classes, including equities and bonds, which had become less changeable and were expected to remain so in the future. Because volatility is equated in theory with risk, it's safe to say the financial markets had become less risky places for investors. As Yogi Berra noted, "The future ain't what it used to be." Today the outlook appears less uncertain and less daunting than in the past.

A recent paper from the Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers' central bank, analyzes the reasons for the decline in financial market volatility. The report's authors argue that alongside more-astute monetary decision making, which has reduced inflation and extended the business cycle, several other factors should be considered. They ascribe lower volatility in part to the benefits of globalization and improvements in information technology. Rising profits and a decline in corporate leverage in recent years have also played a role.

The report draws attention to changes in financial practices. An increasing number of loans are now packaged and sold on through securitizations. The complex world of structured finance, with its alphabet soup of CDOs and CLOs, allows credit risks to be chopped up and parceled out. Credit derivatives enable lenders to insure against defaults. The sophisticated players in this multitrillion-dollar market have been improving the management of credit risk, which is no longer concentrated in banks but has shifted toward hedge funds and other new intermediaries that are more willing and able to hold it. As a result, risk premiums have fallen.

This new financial order has demonstrated its robustness. It has coped well with a variety of shocks, including the bursting of the bubble in technology stocks in 2000, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, the corporate credit crisis following the failures of Enron Corp. and WorldCom, the run-up in the price of oil and other commodities, and institutional failures such as the bankruptcy of commodities brokerage Refco in 2005 and the recent collapse of Amaranth Advisors, a hedge fund that once boasted $9 billion worth of assets. The recession that appeared in 2001 was mercifully brief and shallow, a small black cloud that scudded across the blue sky and was soon forgotten.

There is no doubt that volatility in the financial markets has declined dramatically. In late November the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index, also known as the "fear gauge," which uses options prices to measure the implied volatility of stocks in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, fell to its lowest level in 12 years. The volatility of bonds, which is recorded by the Merrill Lynch MOVE index, also hit an all-time low in 2006.

Various analysts have observed a strong correlation between the decline of U.S. stock market volatility and falling corporate bond spreads. It's no mystery why premiums on bonds, which compensate investors for the risk against default, have narrowed. The number of business failures has fallen dramatically. According to recent figures from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings are at roughly half the level of five years ago. In September defaults on U.S. high-yield bonds reached a record low of 0.89 percent, according to S&P.

The BIS authors conclude that "if the reduction in the volatility of stock returns turns out to be of a permanent nature, sooner or later the equity risk premium will have to adjust downwards." In other words, stock prices would have to rise (as, in fact, they did in the months after the report was published last August).

The Great Moderation, however, isn't generally associated with the case for more-generous equity valuations. Rather, it has been used to rationalize the extraordinary growth of credit in recent years. After all, if economic cycles are longer and less volatile, if interest rates don't jump around as much as in the past, and if the threat of bankruptcy has permanently diminished, it makes sense for everyone -- households, corporations and financial players alike -- to take on more debt.

It's only to be expected that credit should increase with economic activity. But in recent years it has been expanding more rapidly than that. Between the end of 2002 and the third quarter of 2006, total outstanding debt in the U.S. expanded by more than $8 trillion, according to Federal Reserve data. During the same period the gross domestic product increased by $2.8 trillion. That means credit has grown by nearly three times the incremental increase in economic activity.

The exponents of the Great Moderation are unfazed. They argue that as the credit system evolves and becomes more resilient, it can support greater debt levels for a given degree of activity. The rising ratio of debt to GDP is a sign of the "deepening" of the financial system. According to this view, the recent increase in liabilities has been driven by a combination of rising demand (because of greater stability) and plentiful supply (because of improvements to the financial system).



SOME CONCERNED VOICES

Not everyone is so sanguine. In the months before leaving office last January, then­Fed chairman Alan Greenspan made several speeches alluding to the possibility of excessive risk-taking in financial markets. In July 2005 he warned that "vast increases in the market value of assets are in part the result of investors' accepting lower compensation for risk. . . . History has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums."

In a September 2005 speech, Greenspan commented that "extended periods of low concern about credit risk have invariably been followed by reversal, with an attendant fall in the prices of risky assets. Such developments apparently reflect not only market dynamics but also the all-too-evident alternating and infectious bouts of human euphoria and the instability they engender." He summed up the irony in words that echoed Minsky's: "Success at stabilization carries its own risks."

Several other central bankers have expressed similar thoughts. In October 2004, Malcolm Knight, general manager of the BIS, cautioned that "lending booms can boost economic activity and asset levels to unsustainable levels, sowing the seeds of subsequent instability." A large appetite for risk, Knight suggested, "can sow the seeds of subsequent problems."

Timothy Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has pointed out that "against the background of an apparently healthy financial system, market participants report a substantial rise in transactions leverage, erosion in the use of loan covenants, more favorable financing terms for hedge fund counterparties and especially a pressure to reduce initial margin against OTC derivatives exposure to hedge funds." At the Bank of England, deputy governor Sir John Gieve warned a gathering of hedge fund managers last July of the "danger that risk models are giving too much weight to the low volatility of recent times."

"There is an underpricing of risks in general in financial markets," Jean-Claude Trichet, head of the European Central Bank, told a BIS summit in Australia in November. "We don't exclude the possibility that there will be a repricing of risk." At the same meeting Australian Treasurer Peter Costello compared the current "general euphoria" to 1997 before the Asian crisis.

It's only to be expected that central bankers should attempt to jawbone market participants about taking on too much risk. "Moral suasion" is the fancy name given to this generally futile activity. However, other prominent figures in the financial world are also concerned. In a recent letter to investors, Jeremy Grantham, head of Boston fund manager GMO, observed that "long periods of stability cause all types of leverage and other risk-taking to grow. . . . This process can go on and on until finally something goes badly wrong."

Those who are concerned about excessive leverage often cite the work of economist Hyman Minsky. Grantham credits Minsky as the source for his observation that "stability is unstable." Over the course of the past year, Paul McCulley, Fed watcher and investment committee member at bond powerhouse Pacific Investment Management Co.; Michael Hughes, chief investment officer of Barings Asset Management; and James Grant of influential investment newsletter Grant's Interest Rate Observer have all cited Minsky to support their assertion that risks are rising as the rewards for taking risk have declined.



WHO IS HYMAN MINSKY?

The name of Hyman Minsky, who died just over a decade ago, isn't well known in financial circles. He never won a Nobel Prize or published a best-selling book. In fact, he spent most of his professional life in the relative backwater of Washington University in St. Louis. Nevertheless, Minsky has attracted something of a cult following over the years. Conferences are held in his honor, and collections of learned (and largely unreadable) essays are published to celebrate his legacy. Hard-core Minsky fans pay upwards of $3,000 for used copies of his last work, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, published in 1986.

Born in 1919 to Russian immigrant parents and raised in Chicago, Minsky was educated at Harvard University, where he came into contact with famed Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. From Schumpeter, Minsky learned about both the potential destructiveness of competition and the centrality of credit to economic development. Minsky also greatly admired John Maynard Keynes. These two great economists shaped Minsky's thought, along with a number of other influences, including John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx and Irving Fisher. Given this unorthodox mélange, it's hardly surprising that Minsky's ideas aren't taught in Econ 101.

Most economists see the world in terms of production and exchange, with money added on somewhat as an afterthought, but Minsky had a very financial understanding of the capitalist system. He looked at all participants in the economy -- whether households, companies or financial institutions -- in terms of their balance sheets and cash flows. Minsky's experience as a consultant and later director of the Mark Twain Bank of St. Louis (acquired in 1997 by Mercantile Bancorp.) probably contributed to this strikingly original perspective. Balance sheets are composed of assets and liabilities, while cash flows validate the liabilities. Minsky's economy comprises what he calls a "web of interlocking commitments" -- a vast and complex network of interconnected balance sheets and cash flows that is always changing and evolving.

During periods of stability people feel more confident. According to Minsky, they respond by increasing their liabilities relative to income. Borrowing the phrase of Warren Buffett's mentor, the noted value investor Benjamin Graham, Minsky suggests that the "margin of safety" declines.

Minsky created his own categories of balance sheets, which reflected the degree of risk market participants assumed. The riskiest of these he categorized as "Ponzi finance," named after the swindler Carlo Ponzi, who operated a notorious pyramid scheme in Boston in 1920.

The key feature of a Ponzi scheme is its need to attract ever greater sums of money. Ponzi finance, in Minsky's terminology, describes the condition of those who can neither repay the principal on their liabilities nor meet their interest payments from current cash flows. To survive they must refinance, either by selling assets or by raising more debt. For this to happen asset prices must continue to rise. Ponzi finance typically emerges during a speculative bubble, when the margin of safety has been extinguished.

Stability is not the only factor that induces people to engage in risky behavior. Competition also plays a role. Minsky observed that financial institutions compete furiously, both when investing and providing credit to others. We read a lot nowadays about Schumpeter's notion of "creative destruction" in relation to developments in technology. Minsky saw this in a rather different light. "Nowhere," he wrote in "Schumpeter and Finance," a 1993 essay, "is evolution, change and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship more evident than in banking and finance and nowhere is the drive for profits more clearly a factor in making for change." Anyone who has spent some time observing the behavior of Wall Street will understand what he means.

In the financial world, according to Minsky, competition goes hand in hand with innovation. This tends to increase the availability of finance, which boosts the demand for existing assets, pushing up their prices. Higher asset prices, in turn, allow even more debt to be taken on, thereby increasing the demand for finance. There is, however, a dark side to financial innovation: It can be used to bypass existing regulations intended to safeguard the credit system. In his 1982 book, Can "It" Happen Again?, Minsky observed that in periods of stability there is "the reappearance of prohibited practices in new and unprohibited forms."

Minsky also incorporated into his analysis Keynes's notion of the fundamental instability of market expectations. Keynes's General Theory holds that there are no rational or probabilistic grounds for valuing share prices. Rather, our perceptions influence our activities, whether we are borrowing or investing, and these determine future outcomes. This process is inherently unstable, according to Keynes, and subject to sudden revisions. The capitalist system, in the view of Keynes and Minsky, holds itself up by its bootstraps. "Mere ideas about the future become realities as they become embedded in financial relations," Barnard College Professor Perry Mehrling quotes Minsky as having said in "The Vision of Hyman P. Minsky" in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. There is a danger that we may misjudge our future income and not be able to make good the cash payments on our liabilities.

"In economies where borrowing and lending exist," wrote Minsky in his 1975 book, John Maynard Keynes, "ingenuity goes into developing and introducing financial innovations. . . . Financing is often based upon an assumption 'that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely' [a quotation from Keynes]. . . . As a recovery approaches full employment, the current generation of economic soothsayers will proclaim that the business cycle has been banished from the land and a new era of permanent prosperity has been inaugurated. Debts can be taken on because the new policy instruments -- be it the Federal Reserve System or fiscal policy -- together with the greater sophistication of the economic scientists advising on policy assure that crises and debt deflations are now things of the past. But in truth neither the boom, nor the debt deflation, nor the stagnation, and certainly not a recovery or full-employment growth can continue indefinitely. Each state nurtures forces that lead to its own destruction."

This yin-yang view of financial life lies at the heart of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, a view that is best summarized by his oft-repeated comment, "Stability is destabilizing."

Orthodox economics teaches that capitalism is essentially stable and that it tends toward equilibrium. Crises are either the result of preventable policy errors -- such as when a central bank pursues an overly restrictive monetary policy (an accusation commonly leveled against the Federal Reserve for its actions at the onset of the Great Depression) -- or they result from uncontrollable external shocks, such as the OPEC oil price hike in the early 1970s. Economists refer to such shocks as "exogenous." Minsky's view is radically different. He suggests that the crisis builds up inexorably from within, as people continually accumulate fixed liabilities in a world where future cash flows are uncertain. His crisis is "endogenous."

Minsky's cycle goes something like this: During a period of stability, financial relations become increasingly precarious. Ponzi finance is common. Banks and other financial institutions find novel ways to evade prudential regulations. Long-term assets are financed with short-term liabilities. Under such circumstances, it doesn't take much to trigger a crisis. As debt increases, the maximum rate of interest that an economy can sustain diminishes. The system becomes vulnerable to even a small rise in interest rates. Alternatively, an unexpected drop in profits or the failure of a financial institution may be all that it takes to generate a crisis.

Following the teaching of celebrated American economist Irving Fisher, Minsky held that the crisis has a deflationary impact as people seek to pay off debts. His prescription was conventional: More government spending and lower interest rates from the central bank could prevent debt deflation. His view on the consequences of these actions was less conventional. Minsky contended that successful interventions during crises discouraged financial conservatism. "If the boom is unwound with little trouble," he wrote in Can "It" Happen Again?, "it becomes quite easy for the economy to enter a 'new era.'" People respond to the fact that the authorities are protecting them from financial catastrophe by plunging anew into risky activities. The successful resolution of a crisis creates a moral hazard.

Minsky's notion that stability induces people to take on more risk is supported by recent work in safety studies. John Adams, a British safety expert and author of Risk (Routledge, 1995), asserts that we all come equipped with a "risk thermostat" that seeks to maintain the same level of risk. "People modify both their levels of vigilance and their exposure to danger in response to their subjective perceptions of risk," he writes.

People balance risk with reward. Incremental improvements in safety are likely to be accompanied by more risk-taking activity. When motorcyclists don helmets, they open up the throttle a little further. Contrary to common belief, the introduction of seat belt laws didn't produce a decline in accident levels. Risk was transferred rather than diminished. Faster cars ended up killing more pedestrians and cyclists. Safety interventions that don't affect the settings of our risk thermostat are likely to be frustrated by our behavioral responses.



A BRIEF MINSKIAN ACCOUNT OF THE PAST DECADE

Minsky died in 1996. However, it's possible to construe how he might have interpreted developments in the financial world over the past decade. As we have seen, the New Paradigm made its first appearance in the mid-1990s. Volatility in the stock market dipped to very low levels at around that time. This emboldened market participants. In the fall of 1998, a sudden crisis occurred after the near failure of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that had taken on extraordinary amounts of leverage.

The Federal Reserve responded to LTCM's problems by organizing a bailout and cutting interest rates. As Minsky might have predicted, this "Greenspan put" encouraged yet more risk-taking. Shortly afterward a bubble appeared in the stock market. During the dot-com frenzy many telecommunications and Internet businesses represented classic examples of Ponzi finance. Their income was insufficient to meet their expenditures, whether for new investment or to meet their debt payments. But as long as the valuations continued to rise, these Ponzi companies were able to attract new finance. When the market turned their fate was sealed.

U.S. companies in general greatly increased their debt levels in the late 1990s. The failure of Enron and WorldCom precipitated a corporate credit crisis. As risk premiums on loans soared, companies moved rapidly to pay down their debts. Many commentators, including present Fed chairman Bernanke, expressed a fear that deflation would ensue. The authorities responded in an appropriate manner. Government spending soared, and short-term interest rates were slashed. The Great Moderation was born.



MR. PONZI BUYS A HOUSE

If one is looking for contemporary evidence to fit Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, there is no better place to start than with the U.S. residential real estate market. Since the economy came out of recession in 2002, the outstanding mortgage debt of U.S. households has increased by more than 60 percent, to $9.5 trillion. This increase is larger than GDP growth over the same period.

As the housing market has boomed, lending standards have deteriorated. The margin of safety has declined both for borrowers and lenders. Banks have raised the maximum they are prepared to lend relative to the value of the property. "Piggyback" loans have allowed borrowers to take out simultaneous second-lien mortgages, further reducing the amount of equity they are required to put into the home. Piggybacks also have enabled borrowers to evade the rules requiring mortgage insurance on highly leveraged home purchases.

Mortgage providers reduced minimum credit scores required of borrowers. The market for so-called subprime lending has experienced explosive growth: More than $2 trillion worth of subprime mortgage loans have been made since 2002. The dangers posed by these loans have been concealed by strong house price inflation. As long as home prices kept rising, credit was available for fresh loans, and delinquencies could be kept in check. Between 2001 and 2003, defaults of subprime loans fell by half.

A number of other corners were cut to make homes more affordable to those without deep pockets. Although the Fed kept interest rates low, borrowers were tempted to take out adjustable-rate mortgages, which had lower monthly payments than traditional 30-year fixed-rate loans. And when the Fed nudged up short-term rates, lenders pushed so-called affordability mortgages with deferred interest payments. Interest-only loans and mortgages with negative amortization became particularly popular in the hottest housing markets, like California, where affordability was the most stretched.

On top of all this, banks are prying less into the private lives of their mortgage applicants. Traditionally, lenders wished to know something of the borrowers' background -- their jobs, their wealth and so forth. In an age of perennially rising home prices, these tedious details could be dispensed with. "Low doc" and "no doc" loans have proliferated. One mortgage provider, HCL Finance, advertises itself as the "home of the 'no doc' loan." Among the products listed on its Web site is the NINJA loan: Even borrowers with "No Income, No Job and No Assets" are welcome to apply.

Then there is the "stated income" loan, known in the trade as the "liar loan." These loans typically require only the applicants' verbal verification of their job history and stated income, not a W-2 form or tax documents. It comes as no surprise that certain borrowers choose to put a gloss on their circumstances when applying for these loans. A survey commissioned by the Mortgage Bankers Association of 100 stated income loans found that more than half of the borrowers had exaggerated their incomes by 50 percent or more.

In August, Larry Goldstone, president of Thornburg Mortgage in Santa Fe, New Mexico, told the Wall Street Journal that "greater competition and the desire to simplify and quicken the loan origination process has led more lenders to extend stated income loans to borrowers with lower credit scores, and higher loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios than traditionally allowed." Underwriting standards have continued to decline even as the housing market has slowed.

The booming real estate market has tempted consumers to cash out their burgeoning home equity. Mortgage equity withdrawal reached an estimated $500 billion in 2005. In recent years U.S. household savings disappeared as consumer borrowing soared. Paul Kasriel, head of economic research at Northern Trust Co., estimates that household borrowing surged from about 5 percent of disposable income in the early 1990s to nearly 15 percent in 2005, before falling back below 10 percent in 2006. In aggregate, the household sector has been running a financial deficit -- the excess of expenditure over income -- equivalent to about 6 percent of GDP.

The behavior of U.S. households during the real estate boom closely resembles the Ponzi finance described by Minsky. The danger is that when home prices stop climbing, households may have to rein in their spending or sell assets to make good on their debts. When U.S. corporations followed the same course of action after the technology bubble burst in 2000, they induced a recession, followed by a credit crisis and a deflation scare.



OUTSIDE THE HOME

Away from the housing market, much that has occurred in the financial world appears to conform with the type of behavior described by Minsky. A deflationary bust was avoided by the authorities in 2002. But the very success of central bankers' easy-money policies has encouraged people to play with fire. Debt has escalated. Competition among financial institutions has contributed to looser lending standards. New entrants into the credit markets and financial innovations have eroded the power of old regulations to protect the credit system. In many financial transactions the margin of safety has been whittled away.

There's ample evidence that people have responded to more-stable markets by placing larger and more-hazardous bets. The greatest beneficiaries from the decline in volatility have been riskier types of securities. In the stock market that's meant a "dash to trash" as small caps, cyclicals and emerging-markets stocks have outperformed blue chips, which tend to have large market capitalizations and are less exposed to the vicissitudes of the business cycle. Likewise, emerging-markets and high-yield bonds have proved a better investment than government or corporate bonds.

Jan Loeys, the global markets strategist for J.P. Morgan Securities in London, finds "strong evidence that bond managers, credit managers, banks and hedge funds raise leverage when volatility is low." This is hardly surprising. Modern techniques of risk measurement, such as the widely used value-at-risk (VaR) approach, use historical volatility as a proxy for risk. As volatility declines, financial institutions are obliged to increase their leverage to maintain the same risk level. The VaR technique is a kind of financial version of Adams's risk thermostat.

As inflation fears have subsided and the Federal Reserve's moves have become more predictable, Treasury bonds have also become less volatile. Bond market leverage, as measured by primary dealer borrowing in the repo market, has doubled over the past three years, to about $1.25 trillion, according to investment research firm Bianco Research.

Recent surveys by both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency point to looser lending practices. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey in October reported that "all domestic and foreign respondents that have eased their lending standards . . . pointed to more aggressive competition from other banks or nonbank lenders as the most important reason for doing so." The banks in the OCC's contemporaneous survey also alluded to competition, as well as a higher risk appetite and the more benign economic outlook, as among the chief reasons for their easing underwriting standards for the third year in a row.

Banks are not the only financial institutions competing fiercely with one another for profits. Hedge funds play an increasingly important role in the credit markets, providing liquidity to the housing market by buying mortgage-backed securities and fueling the growth of leveraged buyouts and structured finance. The Bank of England's Gieve has warned that competition among hedge fund managers could lead to trouble in the future. "The history of financial crises," he observed last July, "is replete with injudicious attempts to 'keep up with the Joneses.'"

As hedge funds are lightly regulated, little is known about the true extent of their leverage or the positions they are taking. However, their capacity to leverage is potentially enormous. A July 2005 paper by Fitch Ratings suggests that by borrowing five times its assets and investing in the riskiest part of a structured security such as collateralized mortgage obligations, a credit hedge fund could in theory become the marginal lender on $850 million worth of residential securities by committing just $10 million of its own funds.

Hedge fund managers have a huge incentive to take outsize risks, as they generally keep 20 percent of the gains while losses fall elsewhere. Performance fees are paid annually. Because credit busts are infrequent, managers stand to amass large personal fortunes even when making loans that are fated to produce losses over a long stretch. Fitch also observes that many credit hedge funds rely on short-term financing to pursue leveraged strategies and warns of "a synchronous deleveraging of credit hedge funds as a new risk element in the credit markets."

The financial innovations of recent years have taken risk off the balance sheets of banks. Lenders can now use credit derivatives to protect themselves against the possibility of a default. Loans are increasingly insured, parceled up and sold in the secondary markets to hedge funds and others. Yet innovation in structured finance is also being used to bypass regulations intended to safeguard the credit system, as Minsky suggested would be the case.

The sellers of credit default protection are not required to hold the same capital reserves as banks. Regulatory arbitrage, together with the search for more yield in an age of low interest rates and declining risk premiums, appears to lie behind much recent invention in this field. Satyajit Das, a derivatives expert and the author of Traders, Guns & Money (FT Prentice Hall, 2006), suggested in an interview with Financial Engineering News that "the level of product innovation has run far in advance of the capacity to utilize these products and the ability to understand the risks and long-term consequences."

The recent surge in leveraged-buyout activity is another consequence of the decline in financial volatility. Private equity funds have raised more money than ever before. The amount of leverage the private equity outfits pile onto the companies they acquire -- as measured by the ratio of debt to pretax cash flow -- has crept ever higher. And the amount of equity that buyout firms inject into their deals has diminished. Joshua Galaun, a credit strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort, contends that in some cases private equity firms have dispensed with equity and are financing their acquisitions entirely with debt.

The risks are also rising for those who lend to buyouts. Leveraged loans and high-yield bonds come with covenants that are intended to protect creditors. Yet despite record loan volumes, the average number of covenants has been declining, according to Fitch Ratings. Buyouts are also being financed with riskier debt, such as subordinated second-lien loans and payment-in-kind provisions, which allow borrowers to decide whether to pay coupons in cash or with an additional issue of bonds. Furthermore, large LBOs are occurring in sectors, such as technology, whose cash flows used to be considered too volatile to support high debt levels.

Low numbers of defaults and a less volatile bond market make high-yield bonds appear safer than in the past. But junk has never been junkier. The high-yield-bond market is now populated by companies with much lower credit ratings than at the end of the Michael Milken era in the late 1980s. Martin Fridson, editor of Distressed Debt Investor, recently warned that a recession as mild as that of 1990­'91 could produce a default rate for non-investment-grade bonds even greater than that witnessed during the Great Depression.



LIQUIDITY AND CREDIT

Credit has a paradoxical effect on stability. Although debt and leverage raise the level of risk, credit provides the markets with liquidity that serves to dampen volatility. Stock market volatility is inversely related to corporate profits. Credit growth boosts earnings, which in the U.S. have recently touched 40-year highs relative to GDP, thereby reducing volatility. Fridson suggests that the low current levels of distressed debt can partly be explained by the fact that many potentially troubled companies have access to finance. This keeps them out of the bankruptcy courts. Finally, Pimco's McCulley points out that the increased demand for risky assets has served to push down their volatility.

At the close of 2006, the markets were flush with liquidity. If credit were to take flight, however, the rocks submerged by this tide of liquidity might suddenly be revealed. This process already appears to be under way in residential real estate, where slowing home price inflation has been accompanied by a decline in mortgage growth, a drop in home sales and a rise in delinquencies on subprime loans.

Two contrasting hypotheses can explain recent developments in the financial world. The Great Moderation holds that owing to better policymaking and structural improvements to the financial system, both the economy and markets are more stable than in the past. The newfound stability is viewed as a secular development. In other words, it's here to stay. Therefore lower credit spreads and higher levels of leverage are justified. Investors persuaded by this view will have few qualms about buying risky assets despite their historically low yields.

Hyman Minsky, on the other hand, suggests that people's response to stability engenders instability. Such behavior is not necessarily irrational, as there are profits to be earned and bonuses to collect as long as the good times last. In fact, the cycle may extend as long as credit flows and people are hungry for risk. Yet Minsky's credit cycle heads inexorably toward a bust. Investors who accept this analysis will probably conclude that risk and reward are currently out of whack. They will position their portfolios defensively, keeping cash on hand to spend when the rewards for taking risk appear more compelling.

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Edward Chancellor, an editor at breakingviews.com, is the author of Devil Take the Hindmost, a history of financial speculation.







The BIS suspects, and I truly believe, that a Minsky moment is at hand. Many bearish commentators have been warning, prematurely, of excessive debt and leverage for years, but things have kept going. And perhaps they could keep going if there wasn’t a major episode to turn the tide. That episode is the bursting of the housing bubble (even if there is no recession, which I suspect too will happen).

Worthwhile Reading - Dec 21st Edition

Germany is fighting with Europe. Can China be far behind? Michael Pettis, China Financial Markets. (hat tip: naked capitalism)

Is the Treasury market a bubble? Accrued Interest.

Blackouts and Cascading Failures of the Global Markets. Jeffrey Sachs, Scientific American. (hat tip: naked capitalism)

An Overview of the Housing/Credit Crisis - And Why There is More Pain to Come. T2 Partners LLC. (hat tip: CR)

Trepidation about Quantitative Easing, Version 2.0. Yves Smith, naked capitalism.

Fed Watch: What if the Analogy is Wrong. Tim Duy, Economist's View.
key quote: "What if years of research on the Great Depression have left even the best and the brightest with tunnel vision such that they could not accept that they were wrong?"

Quite; I suspect Anna Schwartz feels similarly. From October, in the WSJ:

Bernanke is Fighting the Last War. The Weekend Interview with Anna Schwartz. Brian Carney, WSJ.

Deflation has become inevitable. London Banker.

Worthwhile Reading - Dec 20th Version

Federal Reserve is damned either way as it battles debt and deflation: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph

The age of obligation: Niall Ferguson, FT

Fed Watch: Zero, But Not Quite Quantitative Easing: Tim Duy, Economist's View

So Now We Are Trying To Emulate Japan's Lost Decade?: Yves Smith, nakedcapitalism

Stability is Destabilizing: Randall Wray, TPMCafe

Q Ratio Signals Horrific Market Bottom, CLSA Says. Bloomberg.
Here's the money quote:

The ratio, developed in 1969 by Nobel Prize-winning economist James Tobin, shows the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index is still too expensive relative to the cost of replacing assets, said Napier. While the 39 percent drop in the index this year pushed equity prices below replacement cost, history suggests the ratio must sink further as deflation sets in, he said. The S&P may plunge another 55 percent to 400 by 2014, Napier said.

Back to the '50s for the Bank of Canada

The Bank of Canada announced this morning a 75bp cut to its overnight target rate, dropping the level to 1.50%, the lowest since 1958.

The extent to which many central banks keep cutting their policy interest rates has to date overwhelmed what even the most bearish economic observers anticipated even just 3 months ago, never mind a year ago.

I've done pretty well this year managing my money market portfolios by staying consistently long (max long, as far as my mandates would allow, for the vast majority of the time), but I've got to admit, I didn't see this coming.

If one held the view that this economic environment would deteriorate to worse levels than recent previous recessionary periods (early '80s, '90s and '00s), it was not hard to envision that monetary policy would need to be at least as stimulative now as in those cycles. So its not terribly surprising that the Bank dropped its rate to below the past cycles' lows of 2.00%. The surprising thing is that the job is likely not yet done.

After today's statement from the Bank, it would no longer be surprising if the Bank took out the historical low of 1.12% set in the '50s by cutting at its next scheduled meeting on January 20th by another 50bps to 1.00%. The statement, which uses language like "deteriorated significantly" (i.e. the world economy), "broader and deeper" (i.e. the coming global recession) and "severely strained" (i.e. the global financial markets), and the absence of any mention of two-sided inflation risks (although there is some acknowledgement of countervailing factors, including the amount of monetary medicine injected into the patient to date, as well as the depreciation of the C$, which will help offset some of the effects of plunging commodity prices and falling global demand for our exports), is quite dovish. And the forward-looking policy bias remains toward further easing, with the extent of such extra stimulus being data-dependent.

In other words, as much as the Bank would surely like for its job to be done, it seems that its actions will be determined by the evolution of the economic outlook, and on that front, there seems little reason for optimism just yet. Will the Bank at some point go on hold to see how well its actions to date are acting? Surely, yes. But it seems clear now that if 2% and 1.5% weren't going to be viewed by the Bank as lower bounds, then there's little reason to expect 1% to either.

Look out below, as the only lower bound that will truly stand in the Bank's way is 0!