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Monday, December 17, 2007

2007-12-17

My intuition and understanding about stock valuation metrics comes mostly from authors like John Hussman, as well as Clifford Asness and Robert Arnott 

I’ve included links to (and excerpts from) a bunch of their writings

 

Arnott:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/af1d2ac4-9fcb-11dc-8a08-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html

excerpt:

Many observers point out that, following an unprecedented peak in valuation multiples (price-earnings ratios as well as price-sales, price-book and price-dividend ratios) at the peak of the bubble in 2000, p/e ratios are now back down to their long-term historical norms. That’s true. But that’s only because prices and earnings are both well above their historical trends. 

….There is a very long history of real prices and real earnings moving in a surprisingly consistent – and parallel – corridor around a long-term growth trend, albeit with large swings in prices, earnings and the p/e ratios. 

There’s also a long history of reverting back to the trend. When earnings are 40 per cent or more below the trend (2002, for instance), subsequent real earnings growth averages about 10 per cent – over and above inflation – for the next 10 years, which is terrific. When earnings are 40 per cent or more above the trend, subsequent earnings growth tends to disappoint, with average real growth of zero – just matching inflation – over the next 10 years. 

Where are we today? Both prices and earnings are 60 per cent above trend. This suggests either that things are different this time, that prices and earnings have built a base from which to leap to new heights, or that both may disappoint.

 

Hussman:

Long-Term Evidence on the Fed Model and Forward Operating P/E Ratios

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc070820.htm

 

Adjusting P/E Ratios for the Profit Cycle 

The growing gap between traditional P/E ratios and P/Es adjusted for the profits cycle

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/rsi/adjustingpes.htm

 

Profit Margins, Earnings Growth, and Stock Returns 

Investors consistently overpay for stocks in periods when profit margins are high 

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/rsi/profitmargins.htm

 

Recessions and Stock Prices 

Recession-induced bear markets are much different than "stand alone" declines 

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/rsi/recessionbears.htm

 

Fair Value - 40% Off (Not a Forecast, but Don't Rule it Out)

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc070402.htm

Valuations Revisited 

Long-time readers will recognize some of the following arguments from various studies I've presented in recent years, but I believe that it is important for investors to understand how profoundly incorrect and potentially dangerous it is to accept the incessant argument that stocks are cheap on a "forward operating earnings basis." As AQR's Cliff Asness has previously noted, the belief that the current “price to forward operating earnings” multiple is reasonable is based on an apples-to-oranges comparison. It is the trailing P/E on reported net earnings that has a historical average of about 15, not the forward P/E on estimated operating earnings (which Asness estimates as having a historical norm closer to 11). 

Even that average for the trailing P/E is itself biased upward because earnings typically collapse during recessions, driving P/E ratios to extreme levels during those periods. Those get added into the average, and results in a “historical norm” of 15. If you correct for those spikes, the historical average P/E for the S&P 500 is even lower. 

To correct for the uninformative spike in P/E ratios during recessions, we can make the assumption that a given earnings level, once achieved, is likely to be achieved again even if the economy encounters temporary weakness. While that's not necessarily a reasonable assumption for an individual stock, it is much more reasonable for a diversified index like the S&P 500. Forming price/earnings ratios on the basis of the peak level of earnings-to-date (what I call the price/peak earnings ratio), we get a much better behaved measure of valuations that is more reliably correlated with subsequent long-term returns. Note that the word “peak” doesn't imply that earnings are about to decline – only that the P/E calculation uses the highest level of earnings achieved to-date. 

On that basis, the current price/peak earnings ratio is about 17.5, well above the historical average of 14 for the price/peak earnings ratio. 

But we're just getting warmed up. If we look closely at S&P 500 earnings, we find that we can draw a 6% growth trendline connecting earnings peaks from economic cycle to economic cycle as far back as we care to look. So even though earnings sometimes grow rapidly from the trough of a recession to the peak of an economic expansion, at rates sometimes exceeding 20% annually, we also find that the peak-to-peak growth rate has been very well contained historically at just 6%. 

Unfortunately, if we a) calculate the S&P 500 price earnings ratio based on those “trendline” earnings or b) look at periods where actual earnings were within 10-20% of that trendline connecting historical earnings peaks, we find that the average S&P 500 price/earnings ratio drops to just 10. 

Currently, S&P 500 earnings are again at that trendline. In fact, given the unusual spike in profit margins, they have actually moved slightly (but not significantly) above that line. On that basis, the current price/earnings ratio, normalized for the position of earnings at present, is about 75% above its historical norm (alternatively, the historical norm would be about 40% below current levels).

 

 

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=381480

Fight the Fed Model: The Relationship Between Stock Market Yields, Bond Market Yields, and Future Returns 

CLIFFORD S. ASNESS 

AQR Capital Management, LLC

December 2002

Abstract:      

The "Fed Model" has become a very popular yardstick for judging whether the U.S. stock market is fairly valued. The Fed Model compares the stock market's earnings yield (E/P) to the yield on long-term government bonds. In contrast, traditional methods evaluate the stock market purely on its own without regard to the level of interest rates. My goal is to examine the theoretical soundness, and empirical power for forecasting stock returns, of both the "Fed Model" and the "Traditional Model". The logic most often cited in support of the Fed Model is that stocks should yield less and cost more when bond yields are low, as stocks and bonds are competing assets. Unfortunately, this reasoning compares a real number to a nominal number, ignoring the fact that over the long-term companies' nominal earnings should, and generally do, move in tandem with inflation. In other words, while it is a very popular metric, there are serious theoretical flaws in the Fed Model. Empirical results support this conclusion. The crucible for testing a valuation indicator is how well it forecasts long-term returns, and the Fed Model fails this test, while the Traditional Model has strong forecasting power. Long-term expected real stock returns are low when starting P/Es are high and vice versa, regardless of starting nominal interest rates. I also examine the usefulness of the Fed Model for explaining how investors set stock market P/Es. That is, does the market contemporaneously set P/Es higher when interest rates are lower? Note the difference between testing whether the Fed Model makes economic sense, and thus forecasts future long-term returns, versus testing whether it explains how investors set current P/Es. If investors consistently confuse the real and nominal, high P/Es will indeed be contemporaneously explained by low nominal interest rates, but these high P/Es lead to low future returns regardless. I confirm that investors have indeed historically required a higher stock market P/E when nominal interest rates have been lower and vice versa. In addition, I show that this relationship is somewhat more complicated than described by the simple Fed Model, varying systematically with perceptions of long-term stock and bond market risk. This addition of perceived risk to the Fed Model also fully explains the previously puzzling fact that stocks "out yielded" bonds for the first half of the 20th century, but have "under yielded" bonds for the last 40 years. Finally, I note that as of the writing of this paper, the stock market's P/E (based on trend earnings) is still very high versus history. A major underpinning of bullish pundits' defense of this high valuation is the Fed Model I discredit. Sadly, the Fed Model perhaps offers a contemporaneous explanation of why P/Es are high, but no true solace for long-term investors. 


Monday, November 26, 2007

2007-11-26 - Hussman Wisdom

“Generally speaking, when valuations are stretched (on normalized earnings) and both market action and economic measures have turned negative (as they have now), you can expect that “buying-the-dip” will result in a brief feeling of genius and success followed by profound regret.” 

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc071126.htm

Wednesday, November 7, 2007

2007-11-07: The Catastrophist View

I agree we should always question our assumptions and have someone play devils advocate.

But I don't agree that, having done that, it is elitist to think it possible to come to the correct conclusion ahead of the market - as investment mgrs that's always our goal, right? (Altho I guess its possible to be way too ahead of the mkt)

The article below offers some insight on our dilemma (ie. Is the stock market telling us we're wrong or missing something crucial)

But first my own summary:

US stocks are up nearly double digits this YTD in a year when we've witnessed:

  • Payrolls job growth, despite being hugely boosted by inane B/D assumptions, slowing to under population growth
  • Household employment stats worse yet
  • Monetary policy, previously too long easy, became restrictive, now impacting with a lag
  • Inverted yield curve for most of past year, historically a reliable leading indicator
  • Huge consumer debt burdens increasing even worse as credit card debt escalating in recent mths
  • $100 oil - almost
  • Sinking home prices - conservatively estimated down 5% YoY so far
  • Housing recession ongoing a year after many were calling its bottom
  • Glut of housing on market likely to take years to digest
  • Homeowners affected by rate shock of resetting mortgages - but worst not til 08
  • Tightening lending standards - and seemingly borrowing appetites
  • Delinquencies and foreclosures rising quickly
  • Nonres construction finally showing signs of slowing, following res constr with a lag
  • Confidence surveys sliding
  • Same store sales less than stellar
  • Ongoing twin deficits
  • Imminent fiscal crisis due to entitlements and demographics with front edge of baby boom now retiring
  • State and local govt budgets getting pinched from declining corporate and property tax revenues
  • Fiscal ease therefore less likely as countercyclical option as with 2002 bush tax cuts particularly with Dems controlling house
  • Falling greenback
  • Opaque balance sheets
  • Unknown exposure to off balance sheet risks in SIVs
  • Massive writedowns of alphabet soup related assets
  • Fasb 157 requirement to soon start disclosing level 1, 2 and 3 assets at time of market suspicion of what's on the books
  • Credit crunch with TED spreads and the like blowing out
  • Shutdown of the LBO and CDO markets at least for now
  • CP drying up as mmkt investors flee to safety
  • Structured finance and debt repackaging which served as staple of markets for last few years losing credibility
  • Ratings agencies downgrading in what could possibly turn into a vicious spiral particularly if monoline insurers get affected
  • Corporate profits (at least domestic sourced if not yet multinatl) regressing to the mean from unsustainable record levels
  • Stocks expensive relative to normalized earnings (see Hussman's articles)
  • Food prices rising
  • Reduced foreign fund infusions into US as Asian and MidEast govts break $pegs and diversify reserves means reduced financing for private capital investment
  • Japan reentering recessionary conditions and euro area growth faltering - even without yet seeing much slowdown in US PCE

So have we really been too pessimistic about stocks or have stocks remained too optimistic for too long on the basis of, best as I can tell, just the following:

  • Corporate profits still doing well (for now - and why shouldn't they keep it up)
  • Fed will reflate
  • Weak $ will help exporters
  • Fed will reflate
  • Income growth seems okay
  • Fed will reflate
  • China's booming
  • Fed will reflate
  • Housing is the only weak spot in the economy (its contained)
  • Fed will reflate

Anyhow...

--------------------------

 

The Catastrophist View 

What would it take to send the U.S. economy—and New York’s—into free fall? A doomsday primer.

By Duff McDonald

Published Oct 28, 2007

New York Mag

Peter Schiff is laughing at me. I’ve just asked him to entertain the following notion: that we dodged a bullet during August’s financial-market turmoil and, with the stock market bouncing right back from every dip, things might be okay. So why worry?

He stops laughing. “Why worry?” he asks. “Because we dodged a bullet but are about to step on a hand grenade.”

Sitting in a corner office of a nondescript building just off I-95 in Darien, Connecticut, Schiff, the president of brokerage Euro Pacific Capital, and author of Crash Proof: How to Profit From the Coming Economic Collapse, will spend the next hour spelling out a singularly pessimistic view of the American economy. And he will do so while exhibiting a curious juxtaposition unique to the bearish prognosticator: He speaks of disaster with a smile on his face. No, he’s not happy about our impending doom. But he is happy that people are finally taking him seriously.

Some people, anyway. The recessionary fears that were sparked by the global liquidity crisis in August have eased, largely because of a resilient stock market and a belief that the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate cut in September curtailed deeper losses. When Goldman Sachs invested in its own imploding Global Equity Opportunities hedge fund in August, calling it an “opportunity” and not a “rescue,” people laughed. Guess who laughed last? Goldman, which had reportedly enjoyed a $370 million gain on its $2 billion rescue by October. The optimists stay focused on stories like Steve Jobs’s next stroke of genius.

But Schiff, whom CNBC calls “Dr. Doom,” has not, as bears do when winter approaches, gone off to hide in a cave. Why not? Because every single one of the underlying economic factors that he has identified as cause for concern has worsened. And his is no longer a lone voice in the woods. If you don’t care to listen to a man nicknamed Dr. Doom, you can listen to people like former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, esteemed bond-fund manager Bill Gross, or famed money manager Jeremy Grantham. They’re part of a growing chorus of voices that are saying many of the same things as Schiff.

Their bearish arguments come in many shapes and sizes, but here’s the basic one: The past five or six years have been deceptively fortunate ones for the U.S. economy. That’s because any troublesome developments—the surge in oil prices from $28 per barrel in 2003 to about $87 today, for example—have been papered over by rising home prices. Home equity has been used to buy flat-screen TVs, SUVs, and more homes. Wall Street bought up all this debt from lenders, thereby allowing them to lend more.

The softening of real-estate prices in most parts of the United States put a crimp in this system, but it hasn’t stopped it. The question is, what, if anything, will? What will bring on the apocalypse that Schiff and others believe is inevitable? They see it like this:

THREAT NO. 1

The Bottom Continues to Fall Out of the Housing Market

Manhattan’s gravity-defying real estate aside, it’s quite clear the nation is experiencing a genuine housing crisis. In August, pending home sales dropped 6.5 percent, and they currently sit at their lowest level since 2001. The National Association of Realtors conducted a recent survey that showed more than 10 percent of sales contracts fell through at the last moment in August, primarily owing to disappearing loan commitments from banks. The crisis will only deepen, when more borrowers see their adjustable-rate mortgages adjusted upward. There was a foreclosure filing for one of every 510 households in the country in August, the highest figure ever issued, and by one estimate, more than 1.7 million foreclosures will occur in the country by the end of 2008. That’s not just subprime borrowers: According to the Federal Housing Finance Board, while nearly 35 percent of conventional mortgages in 2004 used ARMs, some 70.7 percent of jumbo loans—those above $333,700 (the jumbo threshold in 2004; it’s now higher)—did too.

Historically, bond-market investors have been the boring counterparts to their equity-market brethren. But in his October Investment Outlook, famed bond investor Bill Gross was anything but. The managing director of money management firm pimco pointed out that the Federal Reserve is caught in a bind: It must continue to lower interest rates to ameliorate this burgeoning housing crisis, but in doing so, it “risks reigniting speculative equity market behavior, and … a run on the dollar.” (More on the dollar later.) Gross doesn’t have the answers but observes that the Fed is “in a pickle, and a sour one at that.” Worse yet, concerns that a rate cut might be inflationary actually caused bond yields to rise in the wake of the rate cut, something that doesn’t normally happen. The Fed’s influence, always overstated, might turn out to be nonexistent in a credit market that remains on edge.

Hedge-fund veteran Rick Bookstaber, the author of A Demon of Our Own Design, spells out a potentially disastrous scenario that could unfold regardless of what the Fed does: Continued foreclosures result in a further drop in housing prices, which results in further foreclosures, which result in a further drop in housing prices. Even for those of us not selling, reduced home values result in a reduced sense of security, which results in reduced consumption, which results in a slowing economy, which … you get the point.

THREAT NO. 2

The Derivatives-Related Meltdown, Part II

Anybody who glances occasionally at the financial pages these days knows that mortgages issued to home buyers are packaged together (in a process called securitization) into a collateralized-debt obligation, or CDO. That’s what’s known as a derivative, a security whose value depends on the value of other securities. The price of the CDO, you see, is “derived” from the prices of the underlying mortgages. (It works with credit cards, too, or bank loans—any kind of debt will do.)

In principle, the idea of a CDO makes perfect sense. In buying $5 million worth of a CDO, an investor has essentially lent money to an entire portfolio of homeowners, instead of placing all his eggs in one basket, say, by funding a single $5 million mortgage. In the real-estate-crazy environment of the past decade, the CDO market took off like a rocket. But the buyers of these derivatives made a critical error—they confused the spreading of risk with the elimination of risk. A booming economy made this confusion not just possible but irresistible. With relatively few defaults in the first half of the decade, investment firms, including many hedge funds, came to see CDO returns as a sure thing and loaded up on them, often borrowing money to do so, taking on debt to buy debt and thereby setting up a potentially deadly chain reaction. The readiness of the secondary market to buy all these mortgages encouraged the lenders to run wild and lend to anyone who walked through the door, leading—inevitably, in retrospect—to a decline in loan quality. Analyst Christopher Wood of Asia-Pacific investment house CLSA succinctly defines the problem in his highly readable newsletter Greed & Fear: “[Securitization] has one fatal flaw, which will ultimately prove to be its undoing … it removes the incentive of those making the loan to worry about whether the loan is a good credit.”

Still, it all held together until mortgage defaults began to cut into the yields of these CDOs and holders looked to sell them, only to realize their value had slipped. Forced liquidations as a result of that “price discovery” were a primary factor in Bear Stearns’ hedge-fund calamity in August. And it’s not over yet: The aftershocks of the mortgage meltdown are still being felt, as banks such as Citigroup and Deutsche Bank announce multibillion-dollar write-downs.

Each time one of these write-downs has been announced, the market has had a curiously positive response, taking the news as a sign that the worst was over and the banks were cleaning up their books. But because these derivatives are linked to other debt, there’s no reason to be certain that trouble won’t bleed into other markets. Among other things, the liquidity crisis froze the market in structured investment vehicles (SIVs), a nifty bit of financial engineering that banks use to profit from the spread between short-term debt and long-term debt. No one yet knows how nasty these losses could turn out to be because SIVs are stashed, Enron style, off the books.

THREAT NO. 3

Consumers Run Out of Steam (and Take the Economy Down With Them)

The U.S. economy, for all its worldly sophistication, is driven by mall shoppers and late-night Amazon addicts—70 percent of the gross domestic product is accounted for by consumer spending, which is buttressed by debt. According to the Federal Reserve, total U.S. household debt was, as of August, $2.5 trillion—a 24 percent increase in the past five years. Total credit-card debt, including gas cards and the like, was $915 billion.

The willingness of consumers to keep spending and piling on debt in the midst of a slowing real-estate market is hailed on Wall Street as an act of patriotism, which Schiff considers perverse. Imagine, he suggests, that you ran into a good friend and asked him how he was doing. His reply: “I took out a third mortgage, maxed out my credit cards, and emptied out my kids’ college savings account so I could buy a bigger TV and a new car, and we’re going to Greece on vacation over the holidays. Things are great!” Schiff lets the idea sink in and then finishes the thought: “And we’re celebrating the fact that we’re doing this as a nation?”

In a recent interview, John Santer, a district director of NeighborWorks America, a community-based nonprofit, pointed out that 43 percent of American households spend more than they earn each year, and fewer than six in ten have enough savings to last them three months if they were suddenly out of a job. So where’s the money coming from? From 1991 to 2005, Americans borrowed $530 billion against the value of their homes each year.

James Glassman, a senior economist at JPMorgan Chase, told a Tulsa, Oklahoma, luncheon crowd in early October that before 1985, consumer spending grew in line with income, but since that time, it’s grown half a percent faster on an annual basis. As a result, household savings, which once reached 10 percent of income, is now literally negative. “My guess is that in five years we’ll look back and realize … that the consumer we knew for twenty years is coming to an end,” he said.

Roger Ehrenberg, an ex–Wall Streeter and author of the financial blog Information Arbitrage, forecasts extreme financial pain. “You’ve got a weaker dollar, declining economic fundamentals, and a debt-strapped consumer—I’d call that a bad fact set,” he says. “Lay on top of that the mortgage problem and declining home values, and you can paint a pretty ugly picture.”

THREAT NO. 4

That the Rest of the World Decides They Don’t Need Us and the Dollar Tumbles Hard

The dollar is falling, possibly collapsing, depending on whom you talk to. The greenback has sunk close to its lowest point in the post-1973 floating-exchange-rate era, so low that it’s been overtaken by the Canadian dollar—affectionately known as the loonie—for the first time since 1976. How low will it go? When Alan Greenspan was asked by Lesley Stahl of 60 Minutes last month what currency he’d like to be paid in, his response was telling: “[The] key question … is, ‘In what currency do you wish to hold your assets?’ And what I’ve done is I diversify.” Translation: He isn’t betting on the dollar. And neither is the majority of Wall Street.

Here’s why catastrophists see that as a major problem: About 25 percent of our government debt is held by foreign governments, with the major holders being Japan ($610.9 billion), China ($407.8 billion), the U.K. ($210.1 billion), and our friends in the Middle East, the oil-exporting countries ($123.8 billion). When the current Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, cuts rates to soften the housing blow for Americans, he also weakens the dollar by making dollar-based investments less attractive. And when the dollar weakens, so, too, does the value of these gigantic positions held by the foreign governments. At some point, they’re no longer going to tolerate the losses we inflict on them by lowering rates, and if that happens and they start dumping dollars, watch out for the peso.

The bulls will tell you that foreign governments understand the American economy is the key to global economic health, and that they’ll suck it up and take it when we devalue their debt. To which Schiff offers another analogy. Imagine if five people were washed up on a desert island: four Asians and an American. In splitting up their duties, one Asian says he’ll fish; another will hunt, another will look for firewood, and another will cook. The American assigns himself the job of eating.

“The modern economist looks at this situation and says the American is key to the whole thing,” says Schiff. “Because without him to eat, the four Asians would be unemployed.” The alternative: Without the American, the Asians might eat a little more themselves and even spend some time building a boat. This is happening as we speak: With the rise of the Chinese consumer class, the local citizenry is now spending, and the country is no longer totally dependent on exports. Which means they’re no longer totally dependent on us.

Readers of the financial press are surely familiar with the buzzword of the moment, decoupling. It’s used to describe how U.S.-Europe and U.S.-Asian trade relationships are becoming less dependent at the same time as European-Asian ties are growing. Most Asian nations, including China, are seeing more rapid growth in exports to Europe than to the U.S. And the U.S. now accounts for a declining share of European exports. The bearish interpretation: that the longtime global embrace of the dollar is loosening.

THREAT NO. 5

That We Don’t See It Happening Because It’s a Slow-Motion Train Wreck

Last but not least, we can circle back to the Dow Jones Industrial Average making new highs in October—14,087.55 on October 1—offering hope that our equity portfolios will carry us through to the other side of whatever it is we’re on the wrong side of. Before addressing the fact that the equity market might just be clueless, there’s one last dollar-related point to make. The true value of a stock portfolio isn’t really its quoted worth in dollars—it’s what you could buy with that portfolio if you were to sell it.

Given that we as Americans don’t manufacture that much anymore (we’re a service economy!), we are largely talking about foreign-made goods, such as flat-screens from Korea or cars from Germany. Over time, if the dollar continues to slump, foreign manufacturers will raise prices to compensate for what they’re losing in the exchange rate. In that light, a Dow at 14,000 with the euro at $1.42 is really no different from a Dow at 13,000 with the euro at $1.33. (One reason the price of oil has risen so high is that it is quoted in dollars, and the sellers thereof have had to continually jack up the per-barrel price to maintain their own purchasing power at home and elsewhere.)

Still, a rising Dow is better than a falling Dow, and the bulls are piling into every rally. Which still doesn’t impress Jeremy Grantham, chairman of Boston-based money manager GMO, in the least. “The equity market is always slow to pick up on someone else’s crisis,” he says, referring to the turmoil in both the housing and fixed-income markets. “And so you’ve got a slow-motion train wreck that has to work itself through the system.”

How will it work itself through? Grantham points to the recent strength in profit margins, fueled by—you guessed it!—our plummeting savings rate, and says there’s nowhere to go but down. “If you start with an overpriced market and bring profit margins down, that’s more than enough to bring stock prices down,” he says. “It is the most certain mean-reversion in all of finance.” Grantham calculates that the U.S. stock market will have to fall by a full third before it gets to its “fair value.” At which point we will likely be in full-blown recession. And when that happens, Schiff says, we will see a country in downsizing mode, “selling the consumer goods we’ve been buying back to the Chinese. It will be one big, giant repossession.”

So assuming all this is true, that Schiff and his fellow doomsayers are right about the rotten core of the U.S. economy, how will this affect New York City? We’ve grown accustomed to the idea of our local economy, particularly the real-estate market, being inherently stronger than the nation’s and possibly immune to whatever woes strike the rest of America. Wall Street, after all, makes money on downs as well as ups, and the stampede of foreigners and foreign cash could, if anything, be aided by the weak dollar.

Last week, though, the argument against New York invincibility was implicitly made when Merrill Lynch announced a larger-than-expected write-down of $7.9 billion dollars in its third quarter alone, primarily due to losses in the credit markets. Numbers as large as that can paradoxically seem trivial due to the abstract nature of accounting—a “write-down” involves no movement of real-life cash, just a readjustment of some theoretical values—but here’s something nontrivial to consider: Merrill Lynch is one of the largest employers in New York City. While so far only a few Merrill bigwigs have been shown the door, it’s almost certain that a chunk of the company’s rank and file will soon follow. All told, New York–based financial companies had already announced more than 42,000 layoffs as of October, according to one study, and the pace could pick up through the end of the year. That’s people who won’t be bidding up new apartments, who won’t be going out to dinner five times a week, who won’t be testing the outer limits of their credit cards at Barneys. The downstream effects of this could be even more severe, as every Wall Street job is estimated to account for another 1.3 to 2 jobs, meaning that additional job losses could push 100,000.

Meanwhile, the public sector is feeling it, too. A recent report by Nicole Gelinas, published by the Manhattan Institute, forecast a budget deficit for New York City next year and predicted that Mayor Bloomberg, who enjoyed a string of budget surpluses until this year, will likely be forced to leave his successor with a double whammy: a deficit and a projected 50 percent increase in outstanding debt. Of course, the catastrophists could be dead wrong, as they have been for going on a decade now—but to them, it sure smells like the seventies all over again.

 

Monday, September 17, 2007

Sept 17, 2007 - Recession en route!!

I’m trying not to hold my recession story too tightly, as the Jims would say, but it’s the only one that I see cogently fits with the facts.

And those facts are that the best historical predictors of recession have included:

  1. inverted yield curve for 6mths plus
  2. negative YoY change in LEI
  3. YoY contraction in CPI-adjusted monetary base
  4. 30%+ contraction in YoY housing completions
  5. YoY change in employment growth < YoY change in population growth
  6. Every previous time real GDP growth slipped to stall speed of 2.0% or less YoY since 1970, the Fed cut rates significantly and it was impotent to prevent recession: 1974 (cut rates 8%), 80/81 (cut over 10%), 90/91 (cut over 4%), 2001 (cut 3.5% before 9/11 and 5.5% total)

In isolation, each of these independently has been a fairly reliable recession-predictor; in combination, even just a&c, never mind all of them, as per Kasriel below, has been a perfect predictor. And we’ve seen each of these recession predictors this year BEFORE the credit crunch and before the ARM resets!

As I said before on NFP day:

No more mortgage equity withdrawal, wealth effect in reverse, YoY housing prices negative for first time since 1930s, residential investment plummeting with no end in sight to housing recession, non-residential investment lags residential and starting to turn over, auto sector also in recession, mortgage resets with much higher payments beginning in earnest over next nine months, credit tap turned off for all but those with pristine credit records, real interest rates restrictive, exorbitant TED spread, unknown/opaque bank and corporate exposure to bad debts/assets, domestically-sourced corporate profits anemic, record household debt-to-income levels and debt service ratios, inverted yield curve for last year, real monetary base retracting, and now job situation obviously deteriorating. What more do we need to see to believe a recession is likely?

 

But for more firepower, just take a quick look at the stuff below from Paul Kasriel, of Northern Trust, and from Comstock Partners (even if only the bolded parts)

Excerpts from Kasriel:

LEI and KRWI - It's Different This Time?
by Paul Kasriel

April 21

The bulls on the economy had better hope it's different this time because both the index of Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) and the Kasriel Recession Warning Indicator (KRWI) are sending out recession warning signals

To refresh your memory, the combination of a year-over-year contraction in the quarterly average of the CPI-adjusted monetary base (unadjusted bank reserves and currency held by the public) and a negative four-quarter moving average of the spread between the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the federal funds rate has signaled every recession since that of 1969.

Chart: Kasriel Recession Warning Index

 

Also, year-over-year contractions in the quarterly average level of the LEI usually presage recessions, as shown

Chart: Index of Leading Indicators vs. Index of Coincident Indicators YoY

 

And from Comstock:

http://www.comstockfunds.com/

Strong Signals of Recession

Sept 13

No matter what the Fed does next Tuesday, the economy is most likely headed for recession.  The August employment report was not a one-off event, but part of an overall pattern indicating a softening economy.  Even prior to the latest release, year-over-year employment was already growing at a scant 1.4%, and with the August number now in the fold, growth is down to 1.2%.  The following facts indicate the strong probability of recession developing in the period ahead if it has not already started.

1)       Since 1953 there have been nine instances where year-over-year employment growth declined to 1.2% or less, and all nine occurred shortly before or after the start of a recession.  There was not a single false signal.

2)       Since 1960 there have been seven instances where year-over-year housing starts were down 30% or more, and six of the seven instances occurred shortly before or after a recession.  There was one false signal in 1966 when a recession was narrowly averted [MW note: huge fiscal infusion for military buildup] and the S&P 500 dropped 25%.

3)       Since 1960 there have been eight instances where the Conference Board leading indicators declined year-over-year, and seven of those instances were followed by recession.  Once again the false signal occurred in 1966.

4)       Of the last nine recessions, none were forecast by the consensus of economists, and even now, according to a Wall Street Journal survey, only 11 of 55 economists said there was at least a 50% chance, despite the depressed housing industry and credit market upheavals.

Summarizing the above numbers on employment, housing starts and the leading indicators, we have 24 data points, and 22 (92%) point to recession as opposed to two false signals.  On the other hand the consensus of economists is 0 for 9.  We see no reason why the recession signals will be false this time in light of the continuing collapse in housing and the re-pricing of risk in various markets throughout the globe. 

The main bullish argument appears to be that the economy is still growing and that the Fed will keep it that way. We point out, however, that the economy always appears to be growing at the peak of a cycle, and that when we really get confirmation that it is actually declining, we are already deep into a recession. In fact, by the time the National Bureau of Economic research pinpointed the start of the last recession it was almost over.  As for the Fed, since monetary policy works on the economy with anywhere from a 6-to-18 month lag, any action taken now will have little near-term effect.

 

No Return to Normality

Sept 6

"There can be no return to normality when the earlier 'normality’ was a freakish bubble — unless, of course, another bubble is created."

      John Plenders in the Financial Times

There is a great deal of wisdom in that one simple sentence.  Although the credit markets should calm down over time, where does that leave us?  There is virtually no possibility of a return to the economic and financial world that existed over the last few years.  First, it is doubtful that anything the Fed can do now will work, and second, the negative effect on the real economy will remain long after the immediate crisis settles down.  Referring to the innovative Fed efforts to separate the orderly markets problem from the real economy, leading economist Martin Feldstein recently stated, "It is not clear whether this will succeed since much of the credit market problem reflects a lack of trust, an inability to value securities, and a concern about counterparty risks."  Although the Fed can open up the discount window and make funds available, the lack of transparency causes lenders to be unwilling to lend.  As long as unanticipated disclosures of new problems keep popping out of the woodwork from unlikely sources financial turmoil will continue.

Furthermore the Fed can’t bring back the subprime and Alt-A mortgage market with any conceivable weapon currently in their arsenal.  Stricter lending standards have been put into place and will remain.  In fact, if additional regulations are promulgated to rein in loose lending standards, as congressional leaders are proposing, the mortgage market will get even tighter.  The Bear Stearns funds are not coming back and neither are all of the mortgage-related entities that have gone out of business or cut back sharply.  The world credit markets are de-leveraging on a massive scale despite anything the global central banks can do.  

The housing situation continues to worsen with no end in sight.  Pending home sales in July dropped a whopping 12.2% to the worst level since the record began in 2001.  Some contracts are not closing because mortgage commitments are falling through at the last possible moment.  Foreclosures are at record highs and will get a lot worse since the peak of mortgage rate resets on ARMS are not due to peak until the 4th quarter of 2007 and the 1st quarter of 2008.  An increased rate of foreclosures generally follows resets by about three-to-six months. 

The housing mess is almost certain to spread to the rest of the economy.  As we have previously shown, even in normal business cycles major downturns in housing almost always leads to recessions, and the current cycle is far from normal.  Some softening in the economy is already evident.  According to Real Capital Analytics investors in July bought the fewest commercial properties in a year.  Industry sources expect commercial property price to fall up to 15% over the next year.  One real estate investor said "There are so many deals falling apart.People who can get out are getting out."   Despite today’s positive sales reports from retailers, consumer spending growth on a year-over-year basis is at its lowest level since late 2003.  ADP estimated that U.S. employers added 38,000 jobs in August, the fewest since June 2003.  This week declines were reported in the ISM manufacturing index and construction spending, while scheduled 4th quarter vehicle production has been cut significantly.  Chancellor Grey Christmas reported a big increase in announced layoffs.  Even the Beige Book released yesterday was not as optimistic as the headlines depicted.  The report summary termed six of the 12 regions as "slowed" or "mixed", a change from the prior report that called only two regions "mixed" and none "slow".

In sum, although we think the current financial turmoil has longer to run, the real problem is fundamental as the economic expansion that started after the dot-com bust was largely based on a credit-induced housing boom that ignored risk and cannot be resuscitated anytime soon.  That the stock market is a long way from discounting this probability is indicated by the current article in Barron’s titled "No Bears Here".  This is likely to go down in history with the famous January 1973 article titled "Not a Bear Among Them".

 

Summary of the Bearish Case

June 14

Inflation fears are preventing the Fed from taking any action to save the economy from a hard landing or recession until it is too late.  As we have stated previously, the Fed is paralyzed between rising inflation on the one hand and a deteriorating economy on the other, and is therefore doing nothing.  Chairman Bernanke indicated that housing may get worse before it gets better, but still remains caught in a trap. The fact is that housing is a leading indicator and inflation a lagging indicator.   In our view, therefore, the inflation problem will be ameliorated when the economy sinks in the second half.    When the eventual rate cut comes the market will likely be far more focused on falling profits than the eventual benefits of easing.

The reported revision for 1st quarter GDP supports the view that the economy has entered the "hard landing" zone.  Although the quarter was adversely affected by some temporary factors, current numbers for housing and retail sales indicate that the economy is indeed softening at a rapid pace. 

The housing situation is continuing to weaken and is likely to get worse.  The Case-Shiller Home Price Index for the 1st quarter dropped 0.7% from the 4th quarter and 1.4% from a year earlier, the first decline since 1990—1991.  Existing home sales for April were at the lowest level since June 2003, and were down 10.7% from a year earlier.  Inventories of existing homes for sale were up 10.4% from March, amounting to 8.4 months of supply as compared to 7.4 months in March and only 3.6 months in early 2005.  The ratio of unsold homes to sales is at a 15-year high.  The highly anticipated spring selling season never got going and, according to housing officials, home buyer traffic is minimal.  In order to sell the huge inventories of both new and existing homes, prices will have to decline even more, a serious risk to the economy that was mentioned in the recent FOMC minutes.  In our view this is a strong probability rather than a mere risk.  In addition the tougher regulations that are coming will dampen home demand even more as mortgage approval requirements return to the rigorous standards that prevailed in more normal times.  And don’t forget the resets still ahead in existing mortgages that will add additional billions of dollars to monthly payments.

We strongly believe that the subprime problem will spread to the rest of the economy.  Tighter mortgage standards have only begun to be implemented and will have a significant impact.  On the demand side fewer people will get financing and fewer will be in the market for new homes.  Mortgage lenders will scrutinize applications much more carefully and require down payments and full documentation of assets and income.  As a result fewer people will apply and of those that do, some will be turned down.  In addition primary lenders know that they will have more difficulty selling off their loans as potential purchasers get more risk averse.  A recent New York Times article showed that even in the New York City area mortgages have become harder to get—and this is still one of the strongest markets in the nation.  All of this means that demand for new homes, already down 30% from a year ago, is almost certain to drop further.

Even in normal economic cycles when subprime lending was not a major problem housing has been the conduit through which tighter credit conditions has been transmitted to the rest of the economy.  In the last 47 years there have been seven occasions when housing starts declined 30% or more year-to-year.  In six of these instances a recession followed.  The only exception was in 1966 when the economy had a hard landing that barely avoided recession and the Dow Industrials dropped 26%.  As of February housing starts were down 30%.  With the addition of the subprime problem in the current cycle, the probability of a recession ahead is even greater than usual.

We have long argued that the housing malaise would spread to consumer spending which accounts for about 70% of GDP, and that appears to be happening now.  April same-store sales for 51 leading retailers tracked by the International Council of Shopping Centers were down an average of 2.3%, the worst showing since the organization began tracking the data in 1970.  In three decades there have been only two previous negative readings.  The Council’s Chief Economist stated that falling home prices were weighing on consumers more heavily and that mortgage equity withdrawals had dwindled.  Wal-Mart added that shoppers expressed concerns about their personal finances, the cost of living and high gasoline prices.

With factors making up over 70% of GDP now slowing down or declining it is difficult to see where any economic rebound will develop.  Typically capital spending does not pick up after consumer spending growth drops.  In fact, capital expenditures, on average, trail consumer spending by two quarters, while exports are too a low a percentage of the GDP to make much of a difference.  The most likely outcome is either a hard landing or recession. The latest FOMC minutes continue to show that the Fed is paralyzed between the risks of inflation on the one hand and further economic decline on the other.  This makes it highly likely that they will not cut rates until it is too late to matter.  Although the stock market is still fixated on the favorable forecast of a benign soft landing and eventual cut in interest rates, in our view the time is fast approaching when the incoming data renders that outlook no longer tenable.

The employment market, too, is weaker than it seems on first glance.  Even the dubious figures supplied in the establishment payroll report show a year-over-year jobs increase of only 1.4%, [MW: now 1.2%] a number usually preceding economic recessions.  In the first five months of the year average monthly jobs rose by only 132,000, compared to 201,000 in 2006.  In addition the increase of 157,000 jobs in May showed construction jobs virtually unchanged.  However, the BLS birth/death adjustment added a mythical 40,000 construction jobs to achieve that figure.  Given the condition of the housing industry, we find that hard to believe.

In addition there is even more reason to doubt the accuracy of the monthly payroll report.  The BLS also does a retroactive adjustment of the payroll data based on a much more inclusive state-by-state calculation that does not include a birth/death adjustment.  Unfortunately, that data is about nine months behind, but here is what the BLS has reported.  The original BLS reports showed that payroll employment increased 500,000 in the 3rd quarter of 2006, including positive growth in construction jobs.  However, the recently released state-by-state data for the same period showed a rise of only 19,000 jobs and a 37,000 drop in construction employment.  Given the recent weakness in the economy there is a good reason to believe that current payroll employment is being significantly overstated as well.

Adding to the case for continuing housing weakness is the strong prospect of tightening by the leading home lending regulators.  According to ISI’s Washington office, John Dugan, Controller of the Currency, strongly criticized so-called "stated income loans".  These are loans that are made without documentation of income or assets by the borrower.  The prospective borrower merely states his income and gets the loan.  Dugan states that studies show that income is inflated by 50% or more in 60% of stated income loans and that 43% of mortgage brokers know that the borrower wouldn’t otherwise qualify for the loan.  It is not without reason that the trade refers to these as "liars loans".  Regulators believe that loans with little or no documentation are not appropriate in the sub-prime loan market or in the alt-A market as well.

Until relatively recently the inability of so many borrowers to meet their periodic payments was masked by the big appreciation in home prices.  Now, however, the regulators are beginning a strong crackdown that is certain to reduce the availability of credit as well as the number of people who qualify for loans.  The downward pressure on home sales and prices is therefore likely to continue for some time.  As we have previously shown (please see archives for past comments) the housing mess is already having a negative effect on consumer spending and will probably spread to the rest of the economy.  The peak in industrial production usually lags the peak in real consumer spending by one quarter, while the peak in capital expenditures lags by two-to-four quarters.  Even in normal residential building cycles a sharp decline in housing sales has almost always led to a hard landing or recession.  Given the recent speculative boom in housing we see no reason why this time will prove to be an exception.

The market is living in a low-probability world that assumes a benign soft landing in the economy, a stimulative second-half Fed rate cut and continued economic strength from the rest of the globe.  While possible, we think the odds of this favorable outcome are low.  First, if history is any guide a hard landing or recession is highly probable.  In the past recessions have occurred under the following circumstances:

 

1)      Whenever GDP growth was below 3% annualized for 5 consecutive quarters.

2)      When the Fed tightened monetary policy (8 of the last 10 times).

3)      When the yield curve was inverted (6 of the last 7 times).

4)      When the Conference Board Leading Indicators were 0.5% or more below a year earlier (9 of the last 10 times).

5)      When new building permits were 25% or more below a year earlier (7 of the last 9 times).

6)      Whenever payroll employment growth dropped to 1.4% over a year earlier.

All of the above has now occurred.

On the other hand the consensus of economists has never predicted a recession in advance—NEVER.  Although anything can happen in the world of economics and financial markets, we would rather go along with a group of indicators with a high probability of being correct than with a group that has never gotten it right.

Second, as for the beneficial effect of Fed rate cuts on the stock market, we have to take the context into account.  It’s true that with the exception of the rate cut in January 2001, Fed decisions to ease have almost always resulted in rising markets following the move.  However, it is extremely important to note that the upward moves only happened because the market declined significantly prior to the rate cut.  In fact, of the ten Fed moves to ease in the last 50 years, the Dow Industrials dropped by an average of 23% prior to the first cut, and declined in every instance.  So the chances are that the market will move up after the first rate cut—whenever that occurs—but only after a damaging major decline.

The third argument being made is that any softness in the U.S. economy will be largely offset by a strong global outlook.  According to Northern Trust Chief Economist Paul Kasriel, this is not likely.  He points out that the weakening segments of the U.S. economy—consumer spending, housing and capital expenditures—account for 85% of GDP, compared to exports accounting for 11.5%.  In addition domestic demand as a percentage of GDP is declining in the EU, China and Japan, meaning that exports are accounting for most of their growth at the margin.  He estimates that U.S. consumer spending accounts for 29% of the rest of the world’s GDP, and is, in essence, their locomotive for growth.  It is therefore unlikely that global growth prospects can be split off from the growth outlook in the U.S.

In our view, therefore, a hard landing or recession is probable; a Fed rate cut won’t help unless the market declines significantly beforehand; and global economic growth is not likely to provide enough offset.  Since this is virtually the exact opposite of what most investors are counting on, we think that the current risks in the market are extremely high.

Sunday, August 26, 2007

2007-08-26 - worst is over? or signal of worse things to come?

This is a list of some of the references I follow; 

The point of following these sources of information is to get further information to support my contention/conviction that what we have experienced is just the start, NOT the end, of such crises, and, as such, should be treated as an opportunity to reassess our outlook based on the now obvious reality -- that the housing market has not bottomed yet and won’t anytime soon; that the mess in sub-prime is NOT contained; that availability of credit cannot increase indefinitely; that credit has been THE driving force behind market outcomes; that credit is NOT going to be nearly as available as it has been; that leverage begets further leverage on the upside, but on the downside leads to de-levering, into a vicious circle; that U.S. consumption (over 70% of US GDP and 30% of world GDP) would be forced to recede when MEW disappeared, the wealth effect turned around, billions of mortgages reset at much higher levels, and the reality of insufficient income growth to support consumption growth became obvious, and households would be forced to rebuild their personal balance sheets; and that episodes of such extremes do not unwind quickly nor gracefully. 

 

To treat the recent stock sell-off as a buying opportunity would be to ignore all these fundamentals. So far, what the markets have experienced is a financial event and a liquidity event. Markets have not yet come to appreciate the weak underlying economic fundamentals, nor the extent of insolvency in the system. The markets may rally in the short-term from here, in particular when the Fed first eases, but the Fed will be impotent as it will, as per D.R., be pushing on a string, the fundamentals will become more obvious over time even to the most rosy-eyed commentators on CNBC, and markets will resume a nastier sell-off (bonds rally).

 

In any case, what the recent turmoil HAS done is resolve the one question that I could never accurately predict --- i.e. when exactly the markets would be forced to acknowledge the brewing credit crisis. (even if they’re now trying again to dismiss it) (I thought it wouldn’t be until they first acknowledged recession risks – ie a hard landing would force people to acknowledge the unsustainability of the debt buildup)

 

In any case, I don’t want you to take MY word for it. In the past, I have forwarded some material that I thought was crucial to understanding the mess the U.S. economy is in and to assessing likely outcomes (these have included Paul Kasriel on U.S. labour market and predictors of U.S. recessions; Contrary Investors’ Monthly Observations on the unsustainable build-up of debt in the system; UBS’ George Magnus’ research on Hyman Minsky’s predictions for the resolution of credit excesses; Bank of International Settlements’ warnings on similar; as well as my own research on payrolls and debt). 

 

I would now like to broaden my recommended reading list. All along, my views have been motivated not just by my understanding of the raw data, but also by reading a wide variety of non-mainstream commentaries (the only mainstream economist I’ve read that I believe has been saying the right things has been Rosenberg): 

 

Economists on economy:

- Paul Kasriel, Northern Trust economist (limited free access on NT website, but full access to his research pieces (with a lag) at http://www.safehaven.com/archive-142.htm) (there are other insightful pieces at safehaven as well, but unfortunately you have to sift through a lot of extreme crap)

- Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics at New York University's Stern School of Business, Chairman of RGE Monitor (free but not full access to his writings at his blog, http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/ , can sign up for full RGE access)

 

Manager on stock market:

- Johh Hussman, PhD, formerly econ prof, now fund manager, (weekly commentary on state of stock market, especially, and bond market a bit as well, at http://www.hussman.net/weeklyMarketComment.html and more research at http://www.hussman.net/researchInsight.html) (in particular, read about his theory/condition of OVOBOBY – over-valued, over-bought, over-bullish, yields rising; as well as his criticism of the Fed model)

 

Daily insights (blog):

- Calculated Risk blog (http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/ ) for coverage of daily economic news, with special focus on housing

- Barry Ritholtz, manager (daily blog http://bigpicture.typepad.com/ ) 

- Minyanville (http://www.minyanville.com/ )

- Tim Iacono’s blog (http://themessthatgreenspanmade.blogspot.com/ )

- Michael Nystrom’s blog Bull, Not Bull (http://www.bullnotbull.com/bull/ )  

 

 

More viewpoints from managers:

- John Mauldin, manager, and guests (writes his own weekly commentary, Thoughts from the Frontline, plus has a weekly guest commentary, Outside the Box, both available via email through free registration, plus available online at http://www.investorsinsight.com/ )  

- Contrary Investor Monthly Observations (which I forwarded in PDF earlier; http://www.contraryinvestor.com/mo.htm)

- Comstock Funds’ weekly commentary http://www.comstockfunds.com/index.cfm/MenuItemID/185.htm

- Wilfred Hahn, Hahn Investment Partners: (most available here: http://www.hahninvest.com/global_spin.php, but more here: http://www.safehaven.com/archive-179.htm )

- Eric Sprott monthly Markets At A Glance article (http://www.sprott.com/marketoutlook/marketsataglance.php )

- Bill Fleckenstein’s Contrarian Chronicles (he has a subscription site, but his abridged views are available weekly for free at http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/ContrarianChronicles/ContrarianTodayButTomorrowWhoKnows.aspx )

- Priur de Plessis (http://investmentpostcards.wordpress.com/ )

 

 

And, finally, probably the most bearish/extreme of the bunch, but with lots of documentation to support his views:

- Mike Shedlock aka mish (http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/)  

 

If you want to start with just a few, I’d recommend reading everything you can by Kasriel, Roubini and Mish (and perhaps calculated risk)

 

Others to listen to, not via online blogs, but in their Bloomberg interviews, etc., would include:

-        Gary Shilling

-        Warren Buffett

-        Dr. Robert Shiller

-        Jeremy Grantham

-        Marc Faber

-        Dennis Gartman

-        Jim Rogers

-        Bob Prechter (you don’t have to believe in his Elliot Wave Theory hocus pocus to agree with his insights on the fundamental backdrop to the economy/markets)

-        Dick Bove (e.g. see Aug 20 interview on BBTV)

-        David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office

-        Andy Xie (formerly of MS, but walked away when he was criticized for being too outspoken)

-        Stephen Roach (since he moved to head up MS’ Asia unit, his semi-weekly commentaries are no longer available, but 

 

 

The above authors have been unanimous in their below consensus views on the U.S. economy (none are perennial bears (except for maybe Roach); they’re realists that have gotten bearish due to their interpretations of the fundamentals) but their predictions for outcomes (both the economy and markets), while unanimously cautious/defensive/negative, have gone to varying extremes, from relatively short-lived (harder landing than consensus, but recession not definitive; global economy will decouple from U.S.; stocks sell off temporarily but then resume upward course) to very nasty (long bear market; recession for sure, deflationary depression likely as well; global)

 

My understanding of the economic data and my understanding of the above authors’ writings has led me to conclude that:

- the U.S. economy will soon be in recession, if it is not already (not withstanding Q2 revisions to 4%+ GDP)

- the U.S. economy is now experiencing a Minsky Moment, which will have far-reaching and long-lasting impacts as all the leverage that has built up gets unwound, in each of the financial, household, corporate and, over a much longer timeframe, even government sectors

- corporate profitability and low default/bankruptcy rates have been sustained by access to cheap credit, which will be a thing of the past (even when the Fed cuts, as having a pulse won’t be enough to be approved, and spreads will be higher), and mean reversion will set in

- the global economy may appear to “decouple” for a time, but it will become apparent with a lag that what has driven global economic growth has been furnishing the U.S. consumer with all its possible needs/wants/desires, and a consumer-led U.S. recession will ultimately drag global economy down too, albeit with a lag

- the bull stock market is over; the bear market will not be measured in months but years

- U.S. treasuries and the USD will initially benefit from a flight to “quality”, but a renewed focus on at least the twin deficits and a likely new appreciation of the miserable state of U.S. government finances (see Walker at GAO) could put that bond rally at risk, especially if foreign buyers of USD start trying to get out before their counterparts, causing a snowball effect

- a deflationary depression is a distinct possibility that we should be considering as a potential outcome (this is more like Japan 16 years ago than people are willing to admit)

 

M

 

 

p.s. Once upon a time, not so long ago, these views were considered extreme, if not ridiculous:

- there was a bubble in housing (Jun06)

- housing would enter a long recession (Sep06)

- there would be a related financial crisis, a la S&L (Sep06)

- housing was not bottoming anytime soon (Oct06/Jan07)

- subprime mess would not be contained (Feb07)

- there would be a credit crunch (Apr07)

- all of these would negatively impact consumers, with impacts first obvious in housing and autos, but expanding broadly from there

All of these once-Chicken Little-theories are precursors to the yet-proven predictions above. It doesn’t mean the worst of my predictions is a sure thing, by any means, but I hope it means that they’re worth considering at least as seriously as the views of those who, motivated by Malpass, Kudlow, Wesbury and the other optimists, continue to be blasé about the downside risks --- and means the burden of proof should be at least as much on the optimists as the pessimists.

p.p.s. at D.R.’s suggestion, I’m now reading Charles Kindlebergh’s book “Manias, Panics and Crashes” – I’m sure it’ll be instructive

 

Sunday, August 12, 2007

2007-08-12 - Roubini: WE ARE FACING A “FUNDAMENTAL DEBT, CREDIT AND INSOLVENCY CRISIS”, NOT JUST A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH

NOURIEL ROUBINI’S INSIGHTS INTO THE CURRENT MARKET TURMOIL: WE ARE FACING A “FUNDAMENTAL DEBT, CREDIT AND INSOLVENCY CRISIS”, NOT JUST A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH


“(T)he vicious circle of a weakening US economy – with a housing recession getting worse and a fatigued consumer at the tipping point - and a generalized credit crunch has sharply increased the probability that the US economy will experience a hard landing.”



New York, NY August 10th, 2007 – RGE Monitor chairman and NYU/Stern School of Business professor Nouriel Roubini has provided analysis of the current precipitous declines seen throughout the global markets in his blog posting, “Worse than LTCM: Not Just a Liquidity Crisis; Rather a Credit Crisis and Crunch.”

Professor Roubini argues that the current market turmoil will be much worse than the crises of the late 1990s – such as the LTCM liquidity crunch - for several reasons. “Today we do not have only a liquidity crisis like in 1998; we also have a insolvency/debt crisis among a variety of borrowers that over-borrowed excessively during the boom,” Professor Roubini observes. “You have hundreds of thousands of US households who are insolvent on their mortgages. . . lots of insolvent mortgage lenders. . .(and) soon enough – plenty of insolvent home builders,” he adds. “We also have insolvent hedge funds and other funds exposed to subprime and other mortgages.” And even in the corporate sector default rates – that have been kept unusually low until now by excessively easy credit conditions – will sharply increased now that risk has been repriced and corporate yield spreads are much higher.

Combined with other fundamental economic factors, Professor Roubini argues the result is likely to be a hard landing for the U.S. economy, most likely a “growth recession” where growth stagnates below 1% for several quarters. He concludes, “The risks of a systemic crisis are rising: liquidity injections and lender of last resort bail out of insolvent borrowers - however necessary and unavoidable during a liquidity panic – will not work; they will only postpone and exacerbate the eventual and unavoidable insolvencies.”

The full posting follows below and can also be accessed at www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=6ba697a1d304a7d2cba0e87f4a9375e6&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> . For commentary and analysis from Nouriel Roubini, RGE Monitor Chief Economist Brad Setser and numerous other well-known economists, please visit www.rgemonitor.com <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=97d5b64d6f23a8f41769c825c4ccd7db&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> today.


Worse than LTCM: Not Just a Liquidity Crisis; Rather a Credit Crisis and Crunch

Nouriel Roubini | Aug 09, 2007

The global market turmoil got ugly today forcing the ECB and the Fed to inject liquidity in the financial system as the concerns about subprime, credit and debt turned into a full blown liquidity run and crisis. As in 1998 at the time of the LTCM crisis, the Fed and global central banks decided to ease monetary policy in between meetings and injected a large amount of liquidity into the system. Coming two days after the Fed tried to prevent perceptions of a "Bernanke put" by signaling in its FOMC statement no Fed easing and no bail out of the financial system, the Fed actions today are certainly ironic if necessary given the massive liquidity seizure in the financial markets.

But the current market turmoil is much worse than the liquidity crisis experienced by the US and the global economy in the 1998 LTCM episode. Let me explain why. Economists distinguish between liquidity crises and insolvency/debt crises. An agent (household, firm, financial corporation, country) can experience distress either because it is illiquid or because it is insolvent; of course insolvent agents are – in most cases - also illiquid, i.e. they cannot roll over their debts. Illiquidity occurs when the agent is solvent – i.e. it could pay its debts over time as long as such debts can be refinanced or rolled over - but he/she experiences a sudden liquidity crisis, i.e. its creditors are unwilling to roll over or refinance its claims. An insolvent debtor does not only face a liquidity problem (large amounts of debts coming to maturity, little stock of liquid reserves and no ability to refinance). It is also insolvent as it could not pay its claim over time even if there was no liquidity problem; thus, debt crises are more severe than illiquidity crises as they imply that the debtor is insolvent, i.e. bankrupt, and its debt claims will be defaulted and reduced. In emerging market crises of the last decade, we had liquidity crises (i.e. a solvent but illiquid sovereign) in Mexico, Korea, Brazil, Turkey; we had debt/insolvency crises (a sovereign that was both illiquid and insolvent) in Russia, Ecuador, Argentina.

The 1998 LTCM crisis was mostly a liquidity crisis: the US was growing then at 4% plus, the internet bubble had not burst yet, we were in the middle of the "New Economy" productivity boom, households were not financially stretched and corporations were not financially stretched with debt either. In spite of those sound and solvent fundamentals the collapse of Russia – a country then with the GDP of a country such as the Netherlands – caused a global liquidity seizure and crisis of the type experienced by credit markets in the last few weeks: sudden demand for cash liquidity, sharp increase in the 10 year swap spread, sharp increase in the VIX gauge of investors’ risk aversion, liquidity drought in the interbank and euro-dollar market, deleveraging of highly leveraged positions, reversal of the yen carry trades. With the exception of the credit event in Russia, this was not a credit/insolvency crisis. And since it was a liquidity crisis the Fed easing – 75bps – was successful in restoring in a matter of weeks calm and liquidity in financial markets. Even that liquidity episode had painful credit fallout: it is not remembered by most but the entire subprime mortgage industry went bankrupt in 1998-99 following the LTCM liquidity crisis. So a liquidity shock event triggered massive credit events then.

Today we do not have only a liquidity crisis like in 1998; we also have a insolvency/debt crisis among a variety of borrowers that overborrowed excessively during the boom phase of the latest Minsky credit bubble <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=d604ce80501f0ea1b28e877f82d917d7&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> .

First, you have hundreds of thousands of US households who are insolvent on their mortgages. And this is not just a subprime problem: the same reckless lending practices used in subprime – no downpayment, no verification of income and assets, interest rate only loans, negative amortization, teaser rates – were used for near prime, Alt-A loans, hybrid prime ARMs, home equity loans, piggyback loans. More than 50% of all mortgage originations in 2005 and 2006 had this toxic waste characteristics. That is why you will have hundreds of thousands – perhaps over a million - of subprime, near prime and prime borrowers who will end up in delinquency, default and foreclosure. Lots of insolvent borrowers.

You also have lots of insolvent mortgage lenders – not just the 60 plus subprime ones who have already gone out of business – but also plenty of near prime and prime ones. AHM – that went bankrupt last week – was not exposed mostly to subprime; it was exposed to near prime and prime. Countrywide has reported sharp losses not only on subprime lending but also on prime ones. So on top of insolvent households/mortgage borrowers you have plenty of insolvent mortgage lenders, subprime and - soon enough - near prime and prime.

You will also have – soon enough – plenty of insolvent home builders. Many small ones have gone out of business; now it is likely that some of the larger ones will follow in the next few months. Beazer Homes – a major home builder - last week had to refute rumors of its impending insolvency; but so did AHM a few weeks before its insolvency. With orders for home builders falling 30-40% and cancellation rates above 30% more than a few home builders will become insolvent over the next year or so.

We also have insolvent hedge funds and other funds exposed to subprime and other mortgages. A few – at Bear Stearns, in Australia, in Germany, in France – have already gone bankrupt or are near bankrupt. You can be sure that with at least of $100 billion of subprime alone losses – and most losses are still hidden given the reckless practice of mark-to-model rather than mark-to-market - many more will go belly up. In the meanwhile the CDO, CLO and LBO market have completed closed down - a “constipated owl” where “absolutely nothing moves” the way Bill Gross of Pimco put it. This is for now a liquidity crisis in these credit markets; but credit events will occur given that the underlying problem was not of of liquidity but rather one of insolvency: if you take a bunch of to-be-defaulted subprime and near prime mortgages and you repackage them into RMBS and then these RMBS are repackaged into various tranches of CDOs, the rating agencies may be using magic voodoo to turn those junk BBB- mortgages into AAA tranches of CDOs; but this is only voodoo as the underlying assets are going to be defaulted on.

Moreover, the recent sharp widening in corporate credit spreads is not just a sign of a liquidity crunch; it is a sign that investors are realizing that there are serious credit/solvency problems in some parts of the corporate system. Ed Altman <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=72246836411a061376e8d24e2aa43c59&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> , a colleague of mine at Stern, is recognized as the leading world academic expert on corporate defaults and distress. He has argued that we have observed in the last few years record low default rates for corporations in the U.S. and other advanced economies (1.4% for the G7 countries this year). The historical average default rate for US corporations is 3% per year; and given current economic and corporate fundamentals the default rate should be – in his view - 2.5%. But last year such corporate default rates were only 0.6%, i.e. only one fifth of what they should be given firms' and economic fundamentals. He also noted that recovery rates - given default - have been high relative to historical standards.

These low default rates are driven in part by solid corporate profitability and improved balance sheets. In Altman’s view <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=60d3c40f9d9fb6ae31562540efb585a5&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> , however, they have also been crucially driven - among other factors - by the unprecedented growth in liquidity from non traditional lenders, such as hedge fund and private equity. Until recently, their demand for corporate bonds kept risk spreads low, reduced the cost of debt financing for corporations and reduced the rate of defaults. Earlier this year Altman argued that this year "hot money" from non traditional lenders could move to other uses for a number of reasons, including a repricing of risk. If that were to occur, he argued that the historical patterns of default rates - based on firms’ fundamentals - would reassert itself. I.e. we are not in a new brave world of permanently low default rates. He said: "If we observe disappointing returns to highly leveraged and rescue financing packages, some of the hedge funds may find it difficult to cover their own loan requirements as well as the likely fund withdrawals. And broker-dealers who are not only providing the leverage to the hedge funds but whom are also investing in similar strategy deals will recede from these activities." The same could be said of the consequences of the unraveling of some leveraged buyouts. Altman suggested that triggers of the repricing of credit risk could also be "disappointing returns to highly leveraged and rescue financing packages". So he argued that the unraveling of the low spreads in the corporate bond market could occur even in the absence of changes in US and/or global liquidity conditions.

Thus, until recently the insolvent firms in the corporate sectors included corporations that could service their debt only by refinancing such debt payments at very low interest rates and financially favorable conditions. Many firms, under normal liquidity conditions, would have been forced into distress and debt default (either of the Chapter 7 liquidation form or Chapter 11 debt restructuring form) but were instead able to obtain out-of-court rescue and refinancing packages because of the most easy credit and liquidity conditions in bubbly markets. Now that we are observing a liquidity and credit crunch and a vast widening of credit spread you will observe a sharp increase in corporate defaults and a further risk in corporate risk spreads.

Insolvent and bankrupt households, mortgage lenders, home builders, leveraged hedge funds and asset managers, and non-financial corporations. This is not just a liquidity crisis like in the 1998 LTCM episode. This is rather a liquidity crisis that signals a more fundamental debt, credit and insolvency crisis among many economic agents in the US and global economy. Liquidity runs can be resolved by the liquidity injections by a lender of last resort: in the cases of the liquidity crises of Mexico, Korea, Turkey, Brazil that international lender of last resort was the IMF; but in the insolvency crises of Russia, Argentina, and Ecudaor the provision of the liquidity by the lender of last resort – the IMF – only postponed the inevitable default and made the eventual crisis deeper and uglier. And provision of liquidity during an insolvency crisis causes moral hazard as it creates expectations of investors’ bailout. Thus, while the Fed and the ECB had no option today but to provide massive liquidity in the presence of a most severe liquidity crunch and run, they should not delude themselves that this liquidity injections can resolve the deep insolvency problems of many overstretched borrowers: households, financial institutions, corporates. Insolvency/credit crises lead to financial and economic distress – hard landing of economies – and cannot be resolved with liquidity injections by a lender of last resort. And now the vicious circle of a weakening US economy – with a housing recession getting worse and a fatigued consumer being at the tipping point - and a generalized credit crunch sharply has increased the probability that the US economy will experience a hard landing. We are indeed at a "Minsky Moment <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=27bf1c6ae34cacb1e1f427d18b542068&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> " and this recent financial turmoil is the beginning of a much more serious and protracted US and global credit crunch <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=3b39a483f613089278d967db6d3ebfd7&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> . The risks of a systemic crisis are rising: liquidity injections and lender of last resort bail out of insolvent borrowers - however necessary and unavoidable during a liquidity panic- will not work; they will only pospone and exacerbate the eventual and unavoidable insolvencies.


Thursday evening update:

Countrywide, the US largest mortgage lender, announced that it faces "unprecedented disruptions" in the debt market and secondary market for mortgages that "could have an adverse impact on the company's earnings and financial condition, particularly in the short-term." Same for WaMu. This is a serious and scary development. As reported by Reuters <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=1363303fc521c1c4d6e6224cc42170cf&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> :

Two of the largest U.S. providers of home loans, Countrywide Financial Corp (CFC.N: Quote <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=92027c430f18a5c5f96853bf24433f0b&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> , Profile <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=c9f66163fbdd668ea359996268e5523d&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> , Research <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=edee18c196f42835ec74edc3014d968d&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> ) and Washington Mutual Inc (WM.N: Quote <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=a2c673ed219e0791482154f4396f6d01&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> , Profile <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=0a92bbedd9f2aaa5499fda7a5cd78efb&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> , Research <http://clicks.skem1.com/v/?u=405243e867f49acd970e9dbc918a0c50&g=1088&c=444&p=f22026063a61ca80e83cb037b76b4e84&t=1> ), on Thursday said difficult mortgage market conditions are likely to hurt operations in the near term.

Countrywide, the largest mortgage lender, said it faces "unprecedented disruptions" in the debt market and secondary market for mortgages. It said these "could have an adverse impact on the company's earnings and financial condition, particularly in the short-term."

Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. savings and loan, said liquidity in the market for less-than-prime home loans and securities backed by the loans has "diminished significantly." It said that while this persists, its ability to raise liquidity by selling home loans will be "adversely affected."

The lenders offered their assessments in quarterly reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.