The chart below shows the implied path of the Fed funds rate based on a broad composite of inflation expectations and labor market indicators (over 20 individual data series — which serve to amplify the true signal vs noise).
We can clearly see how it was justified for the Fed to cut rates into the pandemic (perhaps even more than it did)… but that they should have removed the emergency measures shortly after reopening. Instead, they made an active decision to take the risk of overcooking growth/inflation/speculation vs the risk of tightening too early and potentially scuppering the nascent recovery.
A direct consequence of all this and everything else that’s gone on over the past year is the various leading indicators for the US economy have plunged to record lows (very high risk of recession now), so the Fed will probably need to pivot later this year as it continues to fight yesterday’s battle. But that will not be good news — contrary to popular narratives — because by the time it becomes obvious (and because of 1970’s inflation fears affecting decision making biases: it will need to be obvious) recession will already be underway.
In markets, it pays to remember that things take longer to happen than you think they will, and then they happen much faster than you thought they ever could. It was only two weeks ago that the market was expecting up to another four rate hikes. Now it’s effectively pricing the end of the rate-hike cycle, and the first cut by the end of the third quarter.
But there are several reasons why there could be another abrupt alteration in the state-of-play, with the first cut coming as early as June, and potentially significant cuts priced in before the end of the year:
- Signs of deterioration in the job market that gain momentum very quickly;
- A recession that now looks unavoidable and could begin as early as June;
- Inflation that is long past its cycle peak; and
- A rapid fall in velocity leading to a stock-market selloff
One of the surprising aspects of this cycle has been the resilience in the labor market. But that looks about to change. Unemployment claims are one of the most leading measures of the job market. The headline number has remained low, but the real information content comes from looking under the surface. ...
An old saying cautions one to be careful of what one wishes for. Stock investors wishing for the Federal Reserve to pivot may want to rethink their logic and review the charts. ... Like Pavlov’s dogs, investors buy when they hear the pivot bell ringing. Their conditioning may prove harmful if the past proves prescient. .........
................ The CRE loan risk is yet to hit. But it will hit the regional banks, already reeling, the hardest. And it’s a vicious spiral. CRE defaults hurt regional banks as falling office occupancy and rising interest rates depress property valuations, creating losses. In turn, regional banks hurt the real estate developers as they impose stricter lending standards post-SVB. This deprives commercial property borrowers of reasonably priced credit, crimping their profit margins and pushing up defaults.
When Silicon Valley Bank went down, many progressives, and much of the media, immediately pointed to malfeasance, special pleading and regulatory failures—a conditioned response with a strong pedigree. But if those were the real causes, then SVB (and Signature, and First Republic) would have been isolated cases. It’s clear now that they were not. A systemic crisis is unfolding—with a systemic cause. .......
................. So why did the Federal Reserve invert the yield curve? To fight inflation? To kill jobs and stall wages? If so, the stupidity—or the economistic groupthink—is shocking. .............
....... The money will flow into the United States. Into the money market funds and the biggest banks. Enhanced swap lines—to keep dollars available to foreign central banks—were trotted out on Sunday. They signal that the dollar is still boss, and also that the entire global banking system, indeed most of the world economy—outside of China and Russia—is fragile. Hold on tight.
Plus: Silicon Valley Bank, Money-Go-Round, Liquidity Coverage Ratios
.... The first thing to understand about banks is that they operate a unique financial structure. Other companies borrow from one group of stakeholders and provide services to another. For banks, these stakeholders are one and the same: their creditors are their customers. Most customers don’t realise this and as long as their loan to the bank (traditionally called a deposit) falls within the scope of their national deposit insurance scheme, they don’t have to.
........ For an analyst, this structure complicates things. No use looking at the ‘enterprise value’ of the business – the traditional barometer for measuring a business’ worth – because the debt is the business. No use looking at cash flow statements which disentangle cash generated in operating activities from cash generated in investing and financing activities because the operating activities are the financing activities.1
Because it’s where the customers sit, if you want to understand a bank, you have to look at its balance sheet. As a bank analyst, I would often peer over in envy as colleagues covering other sectors would go on factory tours or visit flagship retail outlets. I’d stay at home and study bank balance sheets.
To some extent the balance sheet is the business. The rest is there simply to feed it – the store a device to attract new funding. Bank executives may not want to admit it because it seems overly reductive, but those that forget do so at their peril. ........
.... Banks have a licence to create money which confers on them a special status somewhere between private enterprise and public entity. Economists argue that commercial banks create money by making new loans. When a bank makes a loan, it credits the borrower’s bank account with a deposit the size of the loan. At that moment, new money is created.
Bank analysts don’t quite see the world like this. In their view, banks need deposits in order to make loans. ‘Deposits before loans’ is a more useful model for an individual bank. ........
...... Wherever you sit in a bank’s capital stack, make no mistake: a higher authority sits above you.
...... Most companies thrive on growth. “If you’re not growing, you’re dying,” they say. For investors, growth is a key input in the valuation process.
But if your job is to create money, growth is not all that hard. And if the cost of generating growth is deferred, because the blowback from mispricing credit isn’t apparent until further down the line, it makes growth even easier to manufacture. .........
....... The absolute foundation of banking is confidence. Depositors entrust their money to banks in the confidence that they will get it back according to the terms of their deposit.
As Matt Levine of Bloomberg’s Money Stuff writes (emphasis mine):
“The bank doesn’t just put your dollars in a box and wait for you to take them out; the bank uses its depositors’ money to make loans or buy bonds, and just keeps a little bit around for people who need cash. If everyone asked for their money back tomorrow, the bank wouldn’t have it. But everyone is confident that, if they ask for their money back tomorrow, the bank will have it. So they mostly don’t ask for it, so when they do, the bank does have it. The widespread belief that banks have the money is what makes it true.” ........
..... The dirty secret among bank analysts is that it’s quite hard for an outsider to discern what’s going on inside a bank. Former bank analyst Terry Smith knows it. “I think it is precisely because I understand banks that I never invest in their shares,” he wrote in the Financial Times last week. It’s only after the fact it becomes apparent what questions to ask. ......
.......................... The CEPR authors note that there is a recent literature that links monetary policy decisions taken by central banks to financial system stability and that low interest rate eras increase “financial fragility” over time.
There is also a long dated literature in Post Keynesian economics that ‘discovered’ the same thing (years ago).
Minsky any one?
But the astounding part of the CEPR article is their next claim:
Why, though, do money and credit expand in the first place? By analyzing this question, we contribute to the strand of the literature that focuses on potential causes of credit booms. To the best of our knowledge, this strand is relatively thin.
The reality is that the literature is, in fact, very rich on this topic.
Knut Wicksell
Axel Leijonhufvud
Basil Moore
Marc Lavoie
Augusto Graziani
Wynn Godley
and others, have all provided the original contributions in this field over many decades.
It is just that mainstream economists have ignored their work for all these years because by acknowledging it one has to jettison all the main precepts in mainstream monetary theory, which then leads to the conclusion that the dominant paradigm has nothing interesting or valid to say about policy design.
But now, in 2023, these German economists based at the University of Würzburg are claiming a contribution.
The problem is the horse already bolted – years ago.
Their contribution is really no contribution but merely a useful summary of the state of knowledge in Post Keynesian economic thinking. .........
Bubble Fare: