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Sunday, March 12, 2023

2023-03-12

*** denotes well-worth reading in full at source (even if excerpted extensively here)


Economic and Market Fare:

given all the fireworks on Friday and this weekend, seems appropriate to note the 3yr anniversary of this bazooka:



In our recent Approaching a turning point publication, we compared the excess Fed policy tightening across cycles.

Our excess tightening metric is based on comparing the peak in real federal funds rate with the estimated level of neutral real rate (R*). The real fed funds peak in the current cycle is based on market pricing (fed funds futures and inflation swap pricing), while R* is assumed to be at 1% (as suggested by the bond/equity correlation estimate and confirmed by our joint analysis with our US economists). The excess tightening (Peak real FF - R*) currently stands at the top end of the range (50-125bp) observed since the 70s, with the notable exception of the late 70s. In particular, the degree of excess tightening currently priced is very similar to the late 80s, when both realized and (short-term) inflation expectations were higher than today.

Overall, if market and consumer inflation expectations are correct, monetary policy seems restrictive enough relative to history.



................ However, there is concern that the Fed’s tightening could trigger another bust. Why? From sound economic theory, we know that issuing fiat currency through bank loans that are not backed by real savings creates an artificial upswing (“boom”), which sooner or later must end in a recession (“bust”). This is because the initial increase in the supply of bank credit artificially suppresses the market interest rate below the level that would prevail without an increase in bank credit. This artificially suppressed market interest rate entices consumers and producers to live beyond their means, leading to overconsumption and malinvestment.

All this ends once the inflow of new credit and money stops; then the market interest rate rises. Consumption decreases, savings increase, and investment projects are liquidated. Firms go bankrupt, and unemployment rises. Asset prices, such as the prices of stocks and real estate, which had been inflated during the period of artificially lowered interest rates, plummet. Deflated asset prices squeeze the equity capital of private households, firms, and banks. Higher credit costs put borrowers under increasing pressure to service their debt. The number of loan defaults increases, causing banks to tighten their lending standards. A downward spiral begins: tightening credit market conditions lead to more defaults and even tighter credit market conditions. At the extreme, the credit crunch, asset price deflation, and output and employment losses could collapse the fiat money system. ............


......... The Fed has announced that it intends not only to continue to raise interest rates further but also to continue to reduce its balance sheet and sponge up central bank money. What is concerning in this context is that Fed chairman Jerome H. Powell—and presumably the rest of his team—does not really pay attention to the developments in monetary aggregates when making policy decisions. This, in turn, implies a real risk that the Fed will overtighten, meaning contract the quantity of money further.

The Fed appears to be taking current inflation into account when setting its policy. However, it is fair to say that future inflation is ultimately determined by past or current monetary expansion. And since the nominal (and real) money supply is now contracting—not only in the US but also in many other currency areas, by the way—a deflationary shock is building up, which would then become really problematic if the money stock continues to shrink as bank credit supply starts dwindling. It’s a recipe for disaster (aka the next bust).  .......



Markets are poised this week for another pivotal US jobs report, but risk-assets are exposed to further downside from a labor market that may not be as robust as surface data imply.

“He who knows only his own case, knows little of that,” said John Stuart Mill. With the Fed and most other market participants using a dashboard showing a strong labor market, risk-reward favors examining the case that employment is not as strong as the data infer.

If the dashboard is indeed faulty, downside equity protection looks cheap, credit spreads look too tight, the VIX looks underpriced, and rates look too high, as the forgotten-about Fed pivot makes a return. .............

So why should we question the jobs data?

To start with, historically low survey-participation rates are potentially leading to a rise in model-driven adjustments to the data.

Payrolls has seen its response rate fall sharply through the pandemic, in a trend beginning around 2015. The BLS uses a “birth-death” model to take account of expired firms that have gone out of business and new firms created, with the model adding 1.3 million jobs since last March. ........


..... The [B/D] model may be sound, but the greater the work it is having to do naturally raises the risk that reported numbers could be significantly different from what is really happening.

We may be beginning to see these adjustments come through. The payrolls data is based on a sample of about 400,000 establishments covering almost a third of US jobs, but that data is updated with the Quarterly Consensus on Employment and Wages (QCEW). That uses unemployment insurance data covering 95% of jobs, so is a very accurate read.

Unfortunately, we only get the data with a significant lag. But the QCEW for 2Q22 was recently released, revising payrolls lower by 287k in that quarter. This was driven by a jump in gross job losses. If the payrolls survey is over-compensating for job losses with the birth-death model, this may be starting to show out of last year’s data.

If this trend in rising gross job losses continues, we would soon find out the labor market is already much weaker than it appears, both last year and now.

This is not confined to payrolls. The JOLTS survey, which has shown a large jump in job openings and an elevated quits rate also invites skepticism, given its response rates have collapsed by half since 2019 to about 30%.

The small sample size means the survey is being compiled using data from about 6,500 establishments, a tiny fraction of the 11 million total. The JOLTS survey uses a similar birth-death model to payrolls to make adjustments.

Again, this is not to say the data are cataclysmically wrong, but that caution should be applied in taking the data at face value, given the vulnerability of asset prices if it is not accurate .......


Variant Perception: Liquidity: theory vs practice



The Fed’s supply chain pressure gauge just went negative
NY Fed: ‘Global supply chain conditions have returned to normal’


...... "So in what follows I show you how far removed the current situation is from what happened in the 1970s and this renders the narratives from our central bankers a pack of lies." ............



Almost every major pundit in 2022 believed a prolonged recession was around the corner.
But it never seemed to come.
At least not yet (as I’ll explain below). . .
Now, these same pundits believe that the U.S. economy is heading towards a “soft-landing” – aka a slower growth period that avoids a recession.
Their reasons? An extremely tight U.S. labor market – because of demographics – and the spend-happy U.S. consumer.
So, what’s a speculator to make of these seemingly bipolar pundits and markets?
Well – even though the data remains mixed – I still believe the economy’s unbalanced, fragile, and running on fumes.
Or putting it simply, we’re nearing a tipping point.
And that’s because consumer purchasing power is eroding – fast.
Let me explain why. . .
“Not All Savings Are Equal” – Most U.S. Consumers Have Already Bled Through Their ‘Excess Savings’
.........
Beware The Risk Of Debt-Deflation As Over-leveraged Private Consumers And Markets Near A Tipping-Point.
............



Banking Fare:




Is Silicon Valley Bank systemically essential? No. Is it systemically important? Yes
........................ Thus the overwhelming bulk of SVB’s deposits were uninsured. In a situation without deposit insurance, a bank run does not require any rational external cause. Its possibility is always baked into the situation. All that has to happen is for a significant number of depositors to become concerned that a significant number of depositors may fear that a critical mass of depositors may withdraw their funds, whether out of fear that the bank is in some sense insolvent, or out of a fear that the bank is illiquid and that its need to suddenly raise cash for payouts to fleeing depositors may depress the prices it can realize for its assets enough to make it insolvent, or simply out of fear that although the bank is and will remain solvent a bank run will create chaos and delay, and so lock-up their funds for a period of time. ...........
If we lived in a good world—one in which Dodd-Frank had, as it should have, established the principle that all commercial banking deposits are insured (and that banks pay insurance premiums on all of their deposits) and if the 2018 EGRR&CPA had not been passed exempting SVB from NSFR, et cetera, then Peter Thiel’s chaos-monkey appearance would not have made a difference. No one would have an incentive to pull their money out of SVB. If anyone had felt the urge, SVB would have had a very different portfolio—one without this mark-to-market loss and the expected-future-capital-gain offset—because it would have had to maintain its NSFR ratio above 100% throughout
Now the right long-run thing to do is to have a system in which (a) commercial-bank deposits are insured—all of them—and (b) commercial banks are regulated so that they must meet their liquidity and stable-funding ratios.
What is the right shot-run thing to do, now that we are here where we are? ...........


nice concise example of the B.S. hyperbole (as also from likes of Ackman and Cuban):
For most people in America, the news that a 'bank in Silicon Valley' has failed will be forgotten quicker than a story about soaring shoplifting in their local supermarket.
It shouldn't.
Reality is that the contagion of the shuttering of the 18th largest bank in the US are widespread.
SVB is in fact the second largest (by assets) bank failure in US history after WaMu. ...
.... Brad Hargreaves explains in a brief thread how SVB's closure & receivership is going to have a massive impact on the tech ecosystem. .......
......... There are thousands of US startups that banked at SVB, often as their *sole bank*. $250K per account is not going to last long.
The #1 pressing issue for these startups is *payroll* - you can't have people work if you can't pay them.
This means mass furlough.
It might mean thousands of startups die before the FDIC gets through its receivership process and releases the funds. ........


and while I think the above was hyperbole, it may not surprise most of you that I do nonetheless agree with this:
.......... That said, it has become fairly obvious to any fair-minded observer that the past few years were an era where there was a rather relaxed approach to the dual mandate of the Fed. Price stability and full employment seems to have taken a back seat to asset prices, discouraging speculation, and increasing Fed Chair “credibility.”
What we got instead was a spike in inflation that was initially ignored, and then belatedly overcompensated for. The FOMC seems a little panicky; the result is the Fed is breaking things throughout the economy.
The Federal Reserve has become the bear in the China shop. .......
............ A key concept you learn driving a car at high speeds is to never overreact to a problem, or you will only make it worse.
Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve have overreacted to the inflation we saw in 2020-22. Where the 2000s-era Fed ignored obvious recklessness among banks and leveraged asset managers, the current Fed seems to be overly concerned with asset prices and appearances.
In their haste, they may be doing more damage than good.


and for more detail on why I agree with Ritholtz above about the Fed breaking things, its always a good idea to listen to Steve Keen:

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank has many parents. Twitter is alight with fingers pointing at venture capitalists for starting a run against a bank whose many wealthy customers had deposits far in excess of the maximum that is guaranteed in the event of a bank failure ($250,000). Michael Hudson blames the aftermath of the Fed’s Quantitative Easing, which boosted asset prices—including bonds—via massive bond purchases by the Fed and matching low interest rates. Alf at the Macro Compass blames the failure of the bank to hedge its risk to changes in interest rates. Frances Coppola blames the failure to carry sufficient capital to cope with a bank run.

Running through all these explanations is the impact of rising interest rates on bank solvency. In this post, I want to give a simple explanation of why this can cause systemic failure—not just to a single bank like SVB, but to the entire banking system.

When inflation returned to the economic scene after a 3-decade absence, The Fed fought it the only way it knows how—by raising interest rates on government bonds. Its mainstream economic models, which ignore banks, debt and money—weird, eh?—predicted that raising interest rates would lower the public’s expectations of inflation, and this would cause actual inflation to fall. Problem solved—in mainstream economic model world.

Meanwhile, in the real world, rising interest rates on government bonds can cause banks to go insolvent. SVB was the canary in the coal mine here, but the factor that brought it undone is shared by all financial institutions, because government bonds are a major component of their assets. When interest rates rise, bond values fall, and this can drive financial institutions into insolvency—where their Liabilities exceed their Assets.

I want to give a very simple explanation of why this can lead to systemic disaster—and, therefore, why it is vitally important that the Fed stop using economic models that ignore the banking sector. ...........

......  Its arguable too that, though an individual bank can hedge its risk, the banking system as a whole can’t; and while the whole system can delay a day of reckoning with falling asset values, it can’t avoid that day while interest rates remain well above those paid by the bonds they own. ..........


A classic run on the bank exposes harsh realities hiding in plain sight

....................... As Thomas Hoenig pointed out years ago, the adjustment from ZIRP to a normal interest rate environment was sure to cause inevitable pain in the economy.

SVB is the latest example of the pain manifesting itself in the real world. The simple analysis of SVB’s financial position shown in this article can be repeated with any bank. The presence of unrealized losses on HTM portfolios is not unique to SVB.

The fear in the financial markets this weekend stems from the fact that investors are scrutinizing other financial institutions for similar vulnerabilities. Fractional reserve banking is a system that requires confidence. Other banks in a position similar to SVB could face bank runs next week which is why market participants fear contagion.

The failure of SVB itself is not a systemic risk to the economy, but systemic risks could arise if the bank run on SVB becomes a stampede next week. Small depositors are protected due to $250,000 of FDIC insurance. Large depositors should view themselves as creditors and must accept risk of loss. It should go without saying that those who invest in stocks and bonds of banks should be prepared to bear losses.

There have already been scattered calls for bailing out SVB due to fear of systemic risk and some have called into question whether the Federal Reserve can afford to continue raising interest rates to fight inflation.

Bailouts and easing financial conditions act like a shot of morphine, dulling the immediate pain but doing nothing to address the underlying problems.

The next few days will be very interesting.


................... Ultimately, though, it seems unlikely that this will stop until the Fed stops tightening. Continued interest rate increases have been widening the gap between what bank deposits pay and what customers could earn by buying Treasuries directly. At some point, the dam would just burst and deposits would get converted to direct Treasury investments, never to return. Also, higher interest rates have already basically wiped out the equity in commercial real estate (just look at a stock chart of an office REIT like BXP or VNO), and if the rates increase further, these properties will start getting handed back to the banks.

But once the Fed pauses, then no one will think that their bank deposits are at risk because of the interest-rate related decreases in value of assets which are still performing. Banks can then continue to earn their way out of their liquidation value hole, as they had been doing and as has normally happened at various points in past economic cycles. ...........


decent article for some details, including this CRO nugget:
The Rapid Collapse of the 16th Largest Bank in America
........................... So big was this drawdown that on a marked-to-market basis, Silicon Valley Bank was technically insolvent at the end of September. Its $15.9 billion of HTM mark-to-market losses completely subsumed the $11.8 billion of tangible common equity that supported the bank’s balance sheet. 
.............. The Chief Risk Officer may have spotted some clouds, but she didn’t hang around to find out. She left her role in April 2022 (after selling some stock in December) and wasn’t replaced until January 2023.


back to systemic-type concerns; even though I thought those mass furlough type concerns above were scare-mongering, I do think the following is potentially problematic, in this new world of digital banking:

........... First, welcome to the world of mobile banking.
Gone are the frictions of standing in line with tellers instructed to count money slowly. (Media images of lines Friday were largely gawkers)
Question: How did $42 billion get withdrawn Friday alone without thousands in line?
Answer: your phone!
This is not the Bailey Savings and Loan anymore.
This should scare the hell of bankers and regulators worldwide.

.......... [Bianco:] The second, and I did a long thread on this on Friday... banks are over-reserved, after 14 years of QE, and are still paying 0.50% on accounts when T-bills are yielding 5.00%. They don’t need to compete for deposits.

Initially as rates passed 2%, 3% and 4%, the public did not notice. So bankers thought deposits were well anchored at their bank and not moving regardless of the interest rate paid.

But at 5% the public finally noticed, and millions reached for the phone at once and transferred to a money market account or Treasury direct to buy T-bills. Banks were squeezed to convert loans and securities to cash instantly so depositors could leave for better rates.

Add in the bleed out from tech firms struggling, and Senator Warrens tweeting with glee about SI going out of business, and depositors at SVB got the message and picked up their phones and acted.

This is why I have been tweeting that this has to stop now.

The Fed is meeting Monday at 11:30. Too late!

They need to meet today (Sunday) at 11:30.

What needs to be done?

Two things.
  1. The FDIC needs to raise the deposit insurance ceiling to unlimited as they did this in 2008. Besides $250k is a made up number anyway. So make up a bigger number.
  2. Banks need to get their deposit base to stop figuring out how to buy a 4.5% money market fund. They need to raise the interest rates they pay 3.00% - 3.50%, from 0.50%, immediately. Yes, this will kill bank profitability so expect Bank Execs to balk at doing this.
This way the public gets the message that you money is safe, no matter the bank, or the amount, and the rate paid on your money is at least competitive with other alternatives.

Otherwise, if they do nothing and wait for the Fed to START a meeting at 11:30 Monday, hundreds of billions of deposits will have moved by phone and it will be far worse. .......


and yet, despite the mobility of mobile banking, I certainly agree with this:
Silicon Valley Bank's shareholders and creditors should not be bailed out

................................ The idea that tens of thousands of jobs at highly promising growth businesses are going to be allowed to be destroyed with the venture capital industry watching helplessly seems highly dubious and is only serving as a scare tactic to justify a massive bailout of venture capital backed firms.

Large segments of the investment community seek to harness the power of capitalism and enjoy its upside during good times but avoid responsibility and losses that represent other side of the coin. That is not how the system is supposed to work.


after all that, Tchir is certainly right with his first line; but the rest of this piece is instructive too

There is so much uncertainty surrounding the banking developments last week. .........
....................
Bank Runs!
I hate even writing those two words! It seems incredibly flammable. Like shouting fire in a crowded theater. I’m not even sure who I keep checking for over my shoulder when I write or say “bank runs”. Is it compliance? Is it the regulators? I don’t know, but this is a term that I rarely use because I think that it is shocking and dangerous, but I couldn’t figure out a better way to start the analysis of what is going on because this phrase is coming up with more frequency.

Banks are “strange” beasts. In some ways their business model is so simple (take deposits, lend money, and make the spread in between). But not only is that simplistic, it misses the key ingredient, leverage. You cannot take enough deposits and lend them out “one to one” to make a reasonable return.

VCSH, a 1 to 5-year corporate bond ETF, has a spread of about 110 bps. No one is buying a bank making 1%, so it needs leverage. Maybe the bank could take a lot of duration risk (I don’t know why it would, since banks learned a lot during the S&L crisis). But even with duration risk, banks aren’t an interesting thing without leverage!

So, we will talk about leverage, at least initially. ...................

........ CCAR does a lot to capture the risk side of the balance sheet. It is designed so that “we” (collectively) can sleep at night “knowing” that banks are safe and won’t go through another GFC. Some of this may be questioned in light of recent events and disclosures, but I for one suspect that CCAR is serving its purpose, which is one reason why I’m heavily leaning towards this being isolated and not an industrywide issue.

On a cursory glance and from what I’ve read, there were some issues linked to the performance of “safe” (from a credit perspective) long-duration assets. From what I’ve seen so far, I’m surprised by the duration risk that was being run. I’m a big believer in “match funding” as much as possible. That tends to reduce NIM, but also greatly reduces risks, like the ones we seem to be seeing now. Sure, hindsight is 20/20, but that is something that I strongly believe in at all times.

Neither Moody’s nor S&P seemed to see much amiss at SIVB (no material rating action for years, until this past week). It seemed like business as usual, at least from a NRSRO (Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization) perspective.

I will attempt to demonstrate that this is a unique situation and is linked more to the types of depositors that these banks had than to anything that is reflective of a broad trend across the industry. .............

I’m convinced that the Fed learned one massive lesson from the GFC (we saw Europe do a semi-decent job with their own debt crisis) - DON’T LET CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING SECTOR FAIL!!!!

Nothing else really matters. Financial institutions can write “living wills” until the cows come home, but if we get to that point, all bets are off.

If this is isolated (or even if it isn’t), regulators are supposed to be ring-fencing it in because the last thing they need is for “bank run” to become the word of the week. That is hard to walk back, so getting out in front of it is crucial. ..........


and here is more from ProfPlum, with lots of background, but most of which is redundant to above, though his conclusions merit inclusion here, even if only for that chart:
A Few Thoughts on Bank Runs

..........................................So who really owns the failure of SVB? The Fed. By hiking rates in a totally unprecedented manner less than a year after assuring market participants that they were NOT going to hike rates until 2024, they created conditions that predictably led to the second-largest bank failure in US history. And managed to drive stimulus to the economy even as they claimed to be fighting inflation. Is SVB management blameless? Of course not. But unfortunately, they are far from the only bank management team that is seeing deposits collapse as banks struggle with rising competition from money market funds. In fact, the system-wide collapse in deposits is approaching unprecedented levels:




Deeper Dive Old Fare (in case bank runs are becoming a thing again):

Powell, 2013: Ending "Too Big to Fail" 


Bank Issues Vid and Quotes of the Week:



Minsky, 1982: "If an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values"

Greg Becker, CEO of Silicon Valley Bank: “Cycling is my advice,” he replied. “Living in Northern California and being on the peninsula. That’s just—I think it’s the best bike-riding cycling in the world, period.”
... in response to the question: “When you’re not working, what do you do to de-stress?”
... Three days later, Becker’s bank is in receivership.

Alf: Spent hours going through SVB's financial statements and changed my mind on the topic.
These guys weren't bad at risk management.
They were outright horrific.
They literally gambled billions away.
You should not reward this level of moral hazard with a bailout.

Mac: This fiasco can be traced back to the 1,000+ junk IPOs that got dumped into the market in 2021. Parking their cash at SIVB as their fraudulent business models slowly drained the bank of reserves. Leading to margin call two years later. ...

Dowd: I don’t expect a cascade of bank runs immediately and the Fed & Government will respond over weekend. However the fuse has certainly been lit.

Pomboy: "We Are on the Brink of a 2008-Style Financial Crisis — And I'm Not Trying to Be Hyperbolic"

Kayfabe: This cycle is very different than 2008, but there is a structural similarity - a systemic misunderstanding of risk. Similar to the complacency on subprime being "contained," SVB and its ilk are just the tip of the iceberg. ... [see full thread]

Field: Like 2008, investors will be asking lots of questions about the risk at every bank.  Like 2008, investors will find they don't have access to information they need to answer these questions.  Before we get another acute phase of a financial crisis, time to fix opacity problem.

Romanchuk: So long as the credit markets are at least somewhat functional, the circular flows between the formal banks and the non-bank sector (“shadow banks”) will continue, albeit with hiccups. Rising credit spreads is not disastrous from the perspective of the authorities — we need to scare risk takers periodically to keep everybody on their toes. As such, the concern is not an increased cost of credit, rather the situation where credit is not available at any price. The magnitude of realised defaults so far seems to be nowhere near enough to trigger that reaction.

Whalen: “Silicon Valley Bank is just the tip of the iceberg,” “I’m not worried about the big guys but a lot of the small guys are going to take a terrible kicking,” he said. “Many of them will have to raise equity.”

Markets&Mayhem: Capitalism is supposed to allow those that take too big of risks to fail. This is part of what allows other companies to have a chance. Perverting that with bailouts and having taxpayers foot the bill is the antithesis of free markets. Particularly for a mismanaged bank.

Whalen: I think next Monday (the 13th), the Fed’s gonna have to drop interest rates fifty bips, and they’re gonna have to open the discount window and say, “Guys - we’re here to take any collateral you have, but we’re not gonna look at the coupon, ok? No haircut. They have to do things like that to get ahead of this. Otherwise we’re gonna have a problem. Forget about raising interest rates, even if we leave rates where they are, the banking industry has got a solvency problem.

McDonald: Breaking "news": 500bps in 14 months comes with a price, it´s NOT free --- Anything can happen, but when the banking sector breaks down like this, it usually last more than a day - like weeks or months. The Fed MUST be getting hysterical calls. They are aware.

Levinson: If the Fed cuts rates over the weekend and backstops the banks stocks and bonds would explode and a crisis temporarily averted . Big they’d be admitting they made another mistake and are incompetent. Big weekend for certain

Field: Lots of speculation on will Fed stop raising rates as a result of SVB's collapse ... if Fed did so, it would be a public acknowledgement all the post financial crisis reforms are worthless ... so expect Fed to continue hiking rates ...

DiMartinoBooth: BREAKING: SVB depositors “will have access to all of their money starting Monday, March 13,” @USTreasury  said Sunday in a joint statement with @FDICgov  and 
@federalreserve. “No losses associated with the resolution of SVB will be borne by the taxpayer.”

Alf: Massive announcement by the Fed and US policymakers. The gist: all depositors of SVB and Signature Bank made whole, and a new facility to provide liquidity to banks under stress. A short thread. ...

ProfPlum: This is very exciting! Unlimited FDIC insurance! So stop moving your money out of 0.5% banks and into 5% money market funds! Who’s with me?!?!

Choi: Sunday night futures: Nasdaq up 1.5%. Russell up 2.0%. #BTC up 7.0%. On FED pivot hopium. FED cares more about banks than the entire world economy.



Charts:
how will the markets fare on Monday? well, as of 6:32pm Sunday, futures look green:

0: i honestly don't know if this [impromptu closed door meeting] has anything to do with SVIB; seen people suggest it is [hey, its impromptu and closed door; too coincidental not to be, right?]; but also seen others contest that:
1: 
2: 

3:




Other Quotes and Tweets of the Week:

Heisenberg Macro: Curve inversion is not a signal of recession it’s a cause - borrowing short at higher rates than you can lend makes lending business unprofitable - tightening credit conditions - get the popcorn out to watch long and variable lags play out ..



...
...


Reading List:




(not just) for the ESG crowd:





High Seas Treaty aims to preserve marine biodiversity while encouraging research-capacity building among nations.



Sci Fare:



A neurologist explains why our bodies fare better when aligned with the natural light of standard time



Other Fare:






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